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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the social and environmental performance of five Caribbean nations (Trinidad & Tobago, 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti and Cuba) using the Safe and Just Space (SJS) framework proposed by 
Kate Raworth (2012). For each country, values for 11 social and 7 environmental indicators are calculated. 
This is the first study that uses the Safe and Just Space framework for the Caribbean region, and with a focus 
on small island states.  
 
Johan Rockström and colleagues first proposed the Planetary Boundaries (PB) framework in 2009, where 
they identify the urgency to remain within nine biophysical planetary boundaries if humanity must continue 
to thrive. The authors claim that by crossing these boundaries we would significantly risk our own survival 
and cause large-scale, abrupt or irreversible environmental changes. In 2012, Kate Raworth added the social 
dimension to the Planetary Boundaries framework, which she defines as the Safe and Just Space (SJS). She 
argues that humanity must not only remain within biophysical thresholds, but as part of the sustainability 
mandate, also aspire to achieve quality of life where no one is left behind. In other words, how can humanity 
achieve an acceptable quality of life at the lowest environmental costs, or in Raworth’ s words, “can we live 
within the Doughnut?”  
 
Drawing on the SJS framework, this study calculates 11 social and 7 environmental indicators for the 5 
Caribbean nations to assess their sustainability performance. To this end, the method proposed by O’Neill et 
al. (2018) is taken as a starting point. The 11 social indicators include Life Satisfaction, Social Support, 
Nutrition, Assess to Electricity (Energy), Access to Improved Sanitation, Health and Life Expectancy, Income, 
Equality, Democratic Quality, Education and Employment. The 7 environmental indicators are: Climate 
Change (represented by CO₂ emission), Phosphorous Flows, Nitrogen Flows, Blue Water, eHANPP (embodied 
Human Appropriated Net Primary Production), Ecological Footprint and Material Footprint.  
 
The results suggest that none of these five nations is in an ideal position within the doughnut of the 
environmentally safe and socially just space. Four of the nations (Trinidad Tobago, Dominican Republic, 
Jamaica and Cuba) exceed at least four out of seven planetary boundaries and none of them achieve more 
than half of the social outcomes. Haiti exceeds the boundary for CO₂ emission and functions slightly under 
the eHANPP boundary (that measures the intensity of use of biomass), but achieves none of the 11 social 
outcomes.  
 
While the relationship between the environmental and social variables is multi-metric, a few patterns and 
correlation between environment and social indicators can be observed. In general, the achievement of most 
social outcomes such as access to electricity, sanitation, income, nutrition, employment, education, social 
support and life satisfaction are positively related to emission or material consumption, such as CO₂ 
emission, especially from emission from fossil fuels, phosphorous flow, eHANPP, ecological footprint and 
material footprint. Based on performances of these five nations, the achievement of social outcomes is not 
closely related to blue water as one of the environmental performance indicator. There does not exist clear 
positive relationship between environmental indicators and social indicators such as healthy life expectancy, 
equality and democratic quality.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past half century, the Earth’s life-support system has been eroded by human activities in the efforts 
to satisfy social needs and ensure improved quality of life (Foley et al. 2005; Haberl et al. 2007; Hoekstra & 
Wiedmann, 2014; Likens, 1991; Steffen et al. 2007; Vitousek et al. 1997). Changes have occurred in global 
climate, biogeochemical cycles and land cover, and through biodiversity loss and environmental pollution 
(Rockström et al. 2009). The ecosystem degradation has resulted in a declining capacity to provide renewable 
supplies of natural resources; regulate climate, water delivery and the spread of diseases; and offer cultural, 
esthetic and recreational benefits for humanbeings (Chapin et al. 2011). It has been stated by numerous 
scholars that our life-support system has been changing from the stable Holocene state of the last 12,000 
years to an uncertain state of Anthropocene because of the active and large-scaled human imprint on the 
global environment that rivals some of the forces of Nature in its impact on the earth’s functions. The 
approaching Anthropocence is raising global concerns for continuous human-induced stress to the 
environment and the earth’s continuing ability to provide services for viable human civilization (Carrington, 
2016; Lockie, 2017, O’Neill et al. 2018; Rockströet et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2007; Steffen et al. 2011a, Steffen 
et al. 2011b ). Despite the increased effort for improved access to basic needs, and its consequential 
increased biophysical stress, currently one in five persons in developing regions still live on less than $1.25 a 
day, one in nine people in the world today are still undernourished, and 57 million children remain out of 
school. In addition, 2.5 million people lack access to basic sanitation services and 1.3 billion people, which is 
one in five globally, lack access to modren electricity. Global unemployment increases from 170 million in 
2007 to nearly 202 million in 2012, an inease of 19% when the population increases by 6.3%. On average, 
income inequality has increased by 11% in developing nations between 1990 and 2010, and more than 75% 
of the households in those areas live in societies where income is more unequally distributed than in the 
1990s (United Nations, 2015).  
 
The increased stress on the biophysical system, combined with the uncertainties of the approaching 
Anthropocence and unsatisfactory social statistics and global change, challenges the current popular 
development model. Within such a context, sustainable development defined as “development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, 
has become the international agenda (WCED, 1987). During the past decades, sustainable development, 
defined as the human use of natural resources in fulfilling basic human rights (Raworth, 2012),  
 has been the political and academic focus of a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations. It has become a new paradigm of development with many different meanings and responses 
(Lélé, 1991; Hopwood et al. 2005).  
 
To define the environmental limits within which human society can safely operate, the concept of Planetary 
Boundary (PB) was developed by Rockström and Steffen et al. (2009). PB aims to integrate human 
development with the Earth’s biophysical system, within accommodating boundaries. This framework 
provides a science-based analysis of the scale and magnitude of human perturbations that might destabilize 
the biophysical system, which is proved influential in global sustainability policy development. There are nine 
planetary boundaries for Ocean Acidification, Biochemical Flows, Freshwater Use, Land-System Change, 
Biosphere Integrity, Climate Change, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading and Novel 
Entities, which define a safe operating space for humanity. The boundaries do not function in isolation, 
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instead, they interact with each other with climate change and biosphere integrity as two core boundaries, 
which are connected to all other boundaries and either of which, alone, could drive the Earth’s biosystem 
into a new state. Four out of these nine boundaries, Climate Change, Biosphere Integrity, Land-System 
Change and Biochemical Flows, have already been exceeded (Steffen et al. 2015).   
 
The concept of Planetary Boundary provides a safe biophysical zone, beyond which there exists uncertainty 
that might endanger the existence of humanity. However, it only addresses the environmental aspect of 
sustainable development and does not include the necessary social dimension that addresses the concerns 
regarding quality of life. Raworth (2012) combines the concept of social foundation and the fulfillment of 
basic human rights, such as peoples’ need for food, water, health care and energy, with that of PB and 
environmental limitations into a single framework, the Safe and Just Space Framework, also nicknamed “The 
Doughnut.” This framework consists of an inner circle and outer circle, much like the shape of a doughnut, 
with each circle outlining a necessary set of foundations for sustainable development. Its inner circle 
represents social foundations, and the multi-dimensional requirements to avoid human deprivation. The 
outer layer of the doughnut is the environmental ceiling, representing the biophysical boundary beyond 
which indicates multi-metric environmental degradation. The zone between the environmental ceiling and 
social foundations is the environmentally safe and socially just space for human existence, the space where 
sustainable development takes place. Moving into the Safe and Just Framework coincides with the dual 
objectives of sustainable development, bringing everyone beyond social foundations and reducing the stress 
on the biophysical system within planetary boundaries. The Safe and Just Space framework provides a new 
perspective from which the sustainability of an individual country’s development process can be assessed by 
both its social performances and its environmental performances.  
 
1.1 Small Island States and Dimensions of Vulnerabilities  
The Oxford dictionary defines island as “A piece of land surrounded by Water” and “A thing regarded as 
resembling an island, especially in being isolated, detached or surrounded in some way”. Kelman (2006) 
describes islands as being isolated but inspiring, small yet fascinating. In his discussion about “islandness”, 
Kelman (2003a & 2006) addresses “ambiguities” embedded in the Oxford definition and emphasizes both 
geographical and social perspectives of “islandness”. Kelman interprets island as an intuitive concept of a 
comparatively small land mass, generally without strong land-based connections to a large land mass. Rather 
than using “island” as an external, academic and abstract label, Kelman (2003 & 2006) focuses more on the 
social attributes of islandness, i.e., the importance of people, communities and their heritage.  
 
The term Small Island Developing States (SIDS) was first used at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (UN-OHRLLS, 
2011), and again, shortly after at The Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) in 1994, referring to the 
prioritization of action for small island development (United Nations General Assembly, 1994). Small island 
states are often described as vulnerable special considerations, with smallness and remoteness as intrinsic 
qualities (Alonso, Cortez, & Klasen, 2014; UNCTAD Secretariat, 1985). The small land area and population, 
limited resources, susceptibility to natural disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, and excessive 
dependence on international trade have been identified as the inherent characteristics that contribute to 
their environmental and socioeconomic vulnerabilities (Briguglio, 1995, Boruff, et al. 2007). As pointed out 
by Kelman (2017), the relative small size of islands might lead to large proportional impacts from even small 
events, but small-size also permits kinship-based systems for dealing with extreme events to link with and 
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strengthen national structures, which might be possible with larger economies. High-localized economies 
associated with isolation also build up the flexibility which larger economic structures cannot embrace. 
Whilst bringing about significant environmental and social challenges, isolation can also lead to the unique 
island environment and culture to nurture prosperity by creative livelihoods based on local tradition, identity 
and history. Vulnerability of island states is always a complex concept with embedded ambiguity, difficult to 
analyze from environmental, social or economic perspective without considering the interconnectedness of 
socioeconomic and environmental elements.  
 
Environmental Vulnerability  
Environmental vulnerability is concerned with the risk of damage to the natural environment (Kaly et al., 
2003). Many small island states are in geologically or meteorologically tumultuous regions near the sea and 
are exposed at a greater rate to natural disasters, including cyclones, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions 
(Méheux, Dominey-Howes, & Lloyd, 2007). Small island states’ smallness of physical size and population 
makes them sensitive to climate change (Pelling & Uitto, 2001). The smallness of small island states’ land 
area also leads to their relatively smaller carrying capacities for natural resources, which results in the 
tightening feedback loops between social and ecological systems. For instance, limited waste absorption 
capacity combined with remoteness leads to high expenditure in exporting wastes off the island, making 
these states more vulnerable to land-based marine pollution (Eckelman et al., 2014; Petridis et al. 2013; 
Ring, 1997; Sarkar et al. 2011). In response to these challenges and concerns, the South Pacific Applied 
Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), alongside their 
partners, developed an Environment Vulnerability Index (SOPAC-EVI) to reflect the extent in which the 
natural environment is prone to damage and degradation (SOPAC, 2005). According to this index, empirical 
results indicate that the 15 most environmentally vulnerable countries are island nations (Kaly et al., 2003).  
 
Economic Vulnerability: 
There are two perspectives from which the economic vulnerabilities of small island states are interpreted 
(Briguglio, 2014). The first perspective conceptualizes economic vulnerability as inherent to islands’ 
structure, mitigated only through resilience policy measures (Atkins, Mazzi, & Easter, 2001; Briguglio, 1995, 
2014; Briguglio, Cordina, Farrugia, & Vella, 2009). The second perspective challenges empirical assertions 
that islands are inherently vulnerable, and purports that islands have inherent coping strategies (Armstrong 
et al., 1998; Armstrong & Read, 2002, 2006; Baldacchino, 2006; Bertram, 2006; Bertram & Watters, 1985; 
McElroy, 2006; McElroy & Hamma, 2010). From either perspective, the small island states’ inherent 
characteristics are incorporated in discussion on either resilience policies or coping strategies.  
 
The defined smallness of these island states is closely linked to their limited natural resources, which is 
reflected in their distinctive island economic profiles with overdependence on international trade, foreign 
aid, remittance, or the growth of one sole sector (Bertram & Watters, 1985; Baldacchino, 2000; McElroy, 
2006). Such an economic profile differs from that of the more conventional economies in its skewed balance 
of payments and the imbalance between strategic imports and exports (Bertram & Poirin, 2007; Martinico-
Perez, Fishman, Okuoka, & Tanikawa, 2016; West & Schandl, 2013). The overdependence on international 
trade causes an economic challenge because of the higher material and energy turnover required by extra 
transportation from global markets to remote locations. Small island states’ relatively lower GNI per capita is 
usually related to their remoteness from main economies because of the relatively higher cost embedded in 
its economic activities (Armstrong et al.,1998; Briguglio, 1995; Briguglio & Galea, 2003; Guillaumont, 2010). 
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The heavy dependence on strategic imports challenges small island states’ food and energy security because 
food and energy prices are income inelastic, which tend to be worsened by the relatively higher 
transportation cost associated with their remoteness (Briguglio, 2014). This type of resource-dependent 
coastal economy is believed to challenge small island states’ livelihood opportunities especially when 
exposed to external natural or economic hazards (Barker, 2012; Corral et al. 2000; Delaney, 2003; Forster, 
2010; Perch, 2012; Scott et al. 2012).  
 
The small population sizes of small island states also have economic implications. Theoretically speaking, a 
smaller tax-base and the diseconomies for funding basic infrastructure and services might lead to failure to 
satisfy basic social needs. Similarly, the visible lack of economy of scale means the minimum efficient scale of 
output might lead to poorer competition and higher costs (Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, & Read, 1998; 
Armstrong & Read, 2002; Read 2001). However, in the case of small island states, the role population size or 
growth plays in the overall socioeconomic vulnerability should still be analysed in connection to other 
socioeconomic factors. For example, the relationship between urbanization and economic growth of small 
island states might differ from that of more conventional economies where urbanization usually drives 
economic growth. For small island states, population growth with no associated social progress and 
unplanned urbanization because of urban-rural disparity tend to intensify the land-use competition and lead 
to further deterioration of social infrastructure (UN-OHRLL, 2011).  
 
Social Vulnerability: 
Social vulnerability is defined as “the inability of human units (individuals, households or families) to cope 
with and recover from stresses and shocks, their inability to adopt to and exploit changes in physical, social 
and economic environment or to maintain and enhance future generations” (Bernard, 2004 &2007). Small 
island states are considered socially vulnerable due to demographic and social features that make them 
more susceptible to exposure (Brown, 2002; Kambon, 2002). Brown indicates that fertility rates, population 
structure, and migration are all closely related to the social dimension of small island states’ vulnerability 
(2002). Bernard developed the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) that is based on five institutional subs-
systems: education; health; security, social order and governance; resource allocation; and communication 
technology (2004 & 2007). This index was tested with five Caribbean nations resulting in inconsistent and 
limited conclusion to understanding specific small islands social vulnerabilities. This was possibly because of 
the different implications of social factors on vulnerability within the small island contexts of the five 
nations.  
 
Within the development context of small island states, from either the perspective of resilience policies and 
coping strategies, the severity of impacts of environmental hazards can be regarded as a function of the 
corresponding social infrastructure and capacity. Small island states’ smallness in both size and natural 
resource reserves makes them sensitive to the leveraging role financial policies can play in transitioning the 
development to a more sustainable mode. For example, heavy government debts provide short-term 
support for economic growth by providing the capital, but often with long-term negative social implications 
(Andrian, 2013; Bovarnick et al., 2010). Social participation, social capitals and social and climate justice 
embedded in livelihood opportunities, especially for marginalized settlements, are all key elements to be 
incorporated into small island states’ social vulnerability studies when exposed to the increasing climate 
change-related natural disasters, such as flooding, typhon and hurricane (Hyman, 2014; Pelling, 1998; Popke 
et al. 2014; Smith & Rhiney, 2015). In summary, rather than functioning in isolation, small island states’ 
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socioeconomic and environmental factors are integrated on multi-scale levels within their development 
processes, and into distinct vulnerability profiles.  
 
1.2 Small Island States and Sustainable Development Process 
During the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 
small island states, for the first time, are categorized as Small Island Developing States (SIDS) with inherent 
characteristics and the resulted peculiar vulnerabilities. During the conference, member states agreed to 
commit themselves to addressing issues related to small island states’ sustainable development. Agenda 21, 
adopted during this conference, recognizes the necessity to meet essential human needs, improve quality of 
life, maintain biodiversity, cope effectively and creatively with environmental changes and mitigate the 
threats posed to marine and coastal resources.  
 
The Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA), adopted during the Global Conference on the Sustainable 
Development of SIDS held in Barbados in 1994, defines 14 priority areas1 for actions, recognizing the 
importance of actions in three areas: capacity building and institutional development at the national, 
regional and international levels; collaboration in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies; trade 
and economic diversification and finance. The 22nd General Assembly Special Session, held in September of 
1999 in New York, resulted in the State of Progress and Initiatives for the Future Implementation of the 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS. Out of 14 priority areas, it identified 6 
problem areas requiring urgent actions2. The Special Session also focused on the overall strategies to be 
adopted for the BPOA implementation, with specific attention on resource mobilization and finance, 
sustainable development strategies, resource development, capacity building, globalization and trade 
liberalization, transfer of environmentally-sound technology, development of a vulnerability index, 
information management through strengthening the SIDS Network, and international cooperation and 
partnership.  
 
The Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 2002 identifies small island states as 
a special case both for environment and development. It recognized the constraints imposed on small island 
states by the interplay of adverse factors, despite these nations’ continuous efforts towards sustainable 
development. The consequential Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) identified actions to be 
adopted to accelerate the implementation on national and region levels. The Mauritius Strategy of 
Implementation (MSI), a 10-year comprehensive review of the aforementioned BPOA, is adopted shortly 
after in 2005, during the Mauritius International Meeting, held in Port Louis. The MSI is. Limited financial 
resources and a reduction in official development assistance are recognized as the main challenges faced by 
                                                             
1 The 14 priorities, identified by the BPOA, are the following: climate change and sea- level rise, natural and environmental disasters, management of 
wastes, coastal and marine resources, freshwater resources, energy resources, tourism resources, biodiversity resources, national institutions and 
administrative capacity, regional institutions and technical cooperation, transport and communication, science and technology and human resource 
development.  
 
 
2 The identified areas were respectively: climate change, natural and environmental disasters and climate variability, freshwater resources, coastal 
and marine resources, energy and tourism.  
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small island states in the implementation of BPOA. During the 65th session of the General Assembly held in 
New York in 2010, member states undertook a 5-year review of the Mauritius Strategy for the 
Implementation of the BPOA. Priorities related to monitoring and evaluation were identified and the 
possibility of recognizing small island states as a special category within the UN was discussed. In the Future 
We Want, the outcome document issued by the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, member states 
reiterated the condition of SIDS as a special case for sustainable development in view of their unique and 
particular vulnerabilities and expressed their concerns around small island developing States having made 
less progress than most other groupings, or having even regressed, in economic terms, especially in regards 
to poverty reduction and debt sustainability. Therefore, member states reaffirm their commitment in 
assisting small island states in implementing the Barbados Programme of Action and the Mauritius Strategy. 
The Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States was held in September 2014 in Apia, 
Samoa. The overarching theme of the conference was the sustainable development of small island 
developing states through genuine and durable partnerships. The SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action 
Pathway (Samoa Pathway) adopted at the Conference addressed priority areas for small island states and 
calls for urgent actions and support for their efforts to achieve their sustainable development.  
 
1.3 Small Island States and Climate Change 
 
Since 1896 when it is concluded that industrial-age coal burning will enhance the greenhouse effect, human-
induced climate change has transitioned from being regarded as a beneficial effect to future generation to a 
major change to the stability of the Earth’s ecosystem (BBC, 2013). Rockström and Steffen et al. (2009) 
identify climate change as one core boundary which is connected to all other boundaries and, alone, can 
drive the Earth’s biosystem into a new state. With one-third of the earth’s population living on land that is 
less than five meters below sea level, the threat associated with climate change, such as sea level rise, storm 
surges and coastal destruction, pose existential risks to small island states (UNDP, 2018). Climate change and 
the associated sea level rise, destruction of the coral reefs, loss of biodiversity, drought and flooding all 
severely threaten small island states’ food security and livelihood opportunities such as agricultural 
production, fisheries and tourism. The extreme weather spawned by climate change also destroys small 
island states’ arable and habitable land, real estate and infrastructure with catastrophic social and economic 
implications. Kiribati in the Pacific Ocean has been preparing for its “Migration with Dignity” to confront the 
eventual large loss of habitable land (Walsh, 2017).  
 
Small island states first address climate change as a socioeconomic development issue at the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2007. Since then, small island states begin their plea for greater 
recognition at the UNSC for its mandate on human rights protection, security and integrity of states. With 
resources made available through channels such as Global Environment Facility and others obtained from 
multilateral and bilateral sources, small island states have been undertaking initiatives to take early action 
around climate change. Many small island states have established national climate change committees that 
guide national climate change action plans and mitigation strategies, and initiate education, training, and 
public awareness campaigns designed to engage the general populace on the problem of climate change. A 
series of regional cooperation activities have been initiated to help build capacity for conducting 
vulnerability and adaptation assessments, and to help turn climate change considerations into development 
planning for coping and adapting to the adverse effects of climate change. The Caribbean Planning for 
Adaptation to Climate Change (CPACC) programme is one of such regional initiatives to identify effective 
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climate change adaptation strategies. There are a series of climate adaptation practices identified by small 
island states, including: management and infrastructure development in agricultural sector in Mauritius; 
efficient management of water resources demand and supply and improved monitoring and forecasting 
systems for floods and droughts in Seychelles; human settlement and infrastructure related to hazard 
mapping with improved forecasting and early warning systems and insurance provision in Antigua and 
Barbuda; development of a health surveillance and forecast system and strengthened data collection and 
reporting systems for vaccination campaigns and health education in Saint Kitts and Nevis; protection of 
essential facilities and infrastructure as part of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management strategy in 
countries such as Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Singapore where tourism and related services 
serve as economic pillar; and integrated, sustainable coastal zone resource management in Dominica. 
However, despite the wide range of adaptation options, so far three fundamental constraints have limited 
the choice of options and implementations: inadequate data or information and technical capacity for timely 
and effective adaptation planning; weak institutional capacity and limited financial resources (UNFCCC, 
2005). 
 
As for climate change mitigation, the small island states’ actions toward mitigation can serve as a pilot case 
for the rest of the world (UNEP, 2014a). Small island states are among the first to complete initial national 
communications related to their efforts in Greenhouse Gas emission reduction (UNFCCC, 2005). 38 SIDS 
have ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and a range of regional 
activities and partnerships have been developed, including the South Pacific Sea Level and Climate 
Monitoring Project, the Pacific Islands Global Ocean Observing System (PI-GOOS), the Pacific Climate Change 
Portal, and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) (UNEP, 2014a & 2014b). After the 
22nd Conference of the Parties on Climate Change (COP 22) in 2016, all small island states have 
submitted their intended climate commitments under the Paris Agreement (UNDP, 2018). However, 
since small island states contribute less than 1% to the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, their most 
aggressive mitigation efforts will have almost no impact on global climate change, and instead their inclusion 
revolves around encouraging further global change (Schaik L.V. et al. 2018). A significant number of the 
countries have joined the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to advance action and push for a 
more ambitious global community, with Fiji being the first small island state to participate at a COP 
Conference, COP 23, during November 2017 in Bonn, Germany (UNDP, 2018). Later, during COP 24 
in Katowice Poland, ministers from 44 small island states affected by rising seas and temperatures called 
for drastic action at UN climate talks. They made this request in respond to the IPCC report, unveiled in 
October 2018, that demands global CO₂ emissions drop by a quarter within 12 years to cap warming at 1.5 
C°, which seen as a safer guardrail against catastrophic extreme weather. However, this proposal was 
blocked by the U. S. A., Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kuwait (Agency France Press, 2018).  
  
1.4 Gaps within Research on Small Island States’ Vulnerability and Sustainable Development  
So far, the understanding of island vulnerability has not benefited from the integrated, multi-scaled, social-
ecological understanding of vulnerability as conceptualized in global environmental change research. The 
approach of regarding small island states as a distinctive group with a linear relationship between being 
small and remote and being vulnerable fails to recognize that vulnerability is path-dependent and historically 
embedded (Turner et al. 2003a). Static indicators applied to assess small island states’ vulnerability suffer 
from a lack of feedback loops, assuming that it is not an interactive system and subjectively assigning value 
judgments to indicators. For example, SOPAC-EVI, the environmental vulnerability index that ranks 15 small 
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island states on a scale of vulnerability, tends to hold all environmental stressors as equally harmful with no 
consideration about the coupled social and environmental systems and the two-way feedback loops within 
the diverse social systems (Singh et al. 2013). Such an approach fails to acknowledge that environmental 
stress on the social system can be very contextually-based, varying with different social systems and 
structures (Barker, 2012; Briguglio, 2014; Collymore,2011; Corral et al. 2000; Delaney, 2003; Forster, 2010; 
Gould, 2015; Hyman, 2014; Kambon, 2009; Pelling, 1998; Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Perch, 2012; Popke et al. 
2014; Rahmstorf, 2012; Scott et al. 2012; Smith & Rhiney, 2015UNEP, 2002). The approach of focusing too 
much on small island states’ geological fragility when faced with climate change also tends to depoliticize 
many other prominent development challenges and shift the necessary attention from the more 
fundamental reasons for the transformation of small island states’ structural limitations into vulnerabilities 
when exposed to external hazards (Kelman, 2014 & 2017). Such an approach masks the fact that the so-
called developed state of the “West” in a sense can be attributed to the “underdeveloped state” of the “rest” 
in the binary discourses of development (Banerjee, 2003; Hall, 1992; Adams, 2001).  
Barnett and colleagues have been influential in challenging discourses on the vulnerability of small island 
states by examining the complexity of island systems (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Barnett et al., 2008; 
Barnett & Waters, 2016). The socially constructed ideas of inherent smallness and remoteness do not 
necessarily dictate islands to a state of vulnerability. External drivers such as colonialism, capitalism and 
religious conversion to Christianity all eroded small island states’ traditional coping strategies for extreme 
weather events, food shortages or drought, and detracted away from traditional forms of resilience like 
inter-community cooperation, settlement patterns and housing construction (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; 
Barnett & Waters, 2016). Faced with political, economic and religious interferences and environmental 
hazards such as human-induced climate change, social elements, such as poverty, social equity, gender, 
fertility rate, population structure and migration, are all interacted with their inherent characteristics in 
determining the small island states’ systematic vulnerability (Attzs, 2008; Brown 2002; Kampecialbon, 2002; 
Lopez-Marrero & Wisner, 2012; Verrest,2013; Winchester & Szalachman, 2009). 
 
Despite decades of sustainable development efforts and support from international collaborations, it is 
acknowledged that with other grouping, small island states have made less progress and even regressed in 
economic term. A framework within which their socioeconomic and environmental performances and the 
interactions can be analyzed is needed to identify the vulnerable aspects of their development process for 
prioritized actions. This is where this thesis aims to contribute.  
 
1.5 Study Area 
It is in fact difficult to homogenize small island states’ vulnerability and their sustainable development 
because of the diverse socioeconomic contexts varying in individual countries (Alonso et al., 2014). There 
exist four lists of small island states, categorized from political, economic, institutional and pragmatic 
perspectives (Blancard & Hoarau, 2012). Referencing these lists, this thesis selects five nations within the 
Caribbean region, as shown in Figure 1 below, to study the interactions between environmental and social 
performances of these five nations and their contextualized interconnections, aiming to explore systematic 
vulnerabilities embedded in their development processes and identify the key element to the transition to 
sustainability.  
 
The Caribbean is a region of North America that consists of the Caribbean Sea, its islands, and the 
surrounding coasts. Geopolitically, the Caribbean islands are usually regarded as a sub-region of North 
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America, which is organized into 30 territories and sovereign states, overseas departments and 
dependencies. Its total area is 2,754,000 km² with only 239,681 km² as land area. The Caribbean Sea 
averages 2,200 m in depth plunging to 7,100 m in the Cayman trench and receives run-off from eight major 
river systems. The Caribbean islands range in size from 91 km2 (Anguilla) to 110,860 km 2 (Cuba) with highly 
varied topographies and geologies, including low-lying limestone and coral reef atolls and volcanic outcrops, 
and flora and fauna. The coastal ecosystems are a mixture of mangrove, sea-grasses and coral reefs while 
the terrestrial ecosystems are made up of 34 ecoregions all with high levels of endemism. Freshwater 
supplies are highly varied with Barbados as one of the world’s top ten most arid countries. Its total 
population is around 43.6 million, with the density of 151.5 persons/km². The climate of the Caribbean 
region is tropical to subtropical with rainfall varying with elevation, size and water currents. The region enjoys 
year-round sunshine, with dry and wet seasons each taking 6 months of the year (UNEP, 2014b; WRI, 2017). 
The geographical location of the Caribbean region makes it sensitive to climate change. Scientific analysis 
shows climate of the Caribbean region is already changing in ways that seem to signal the emergence of a 
new climate regime, with “unfamiliar”, “unprecedented” and “urgent” trend of change. Using Hurricane Irma 
and Matthews as examples, the severity of such regime shift can be reflected by the overnight intensification 
from a tropical storm to a category five hurricane with devastating intensity that lasts for several days (Taylor, 
2015).  
 
Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean 
 
https://www.wri.org/resources/maps/caribbean-region 
 
In 2016 Jessica Faieta, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and UNDP Regional Director for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, terms the Caribbean region as being structurally and environmentally 
vulnerable because of its high and increasing exposure to natural hazards, as well as open and trade-
dependent economies with limited diversification and competitiveness. She emphasizes the sustainable 
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development in the Caribbean demands “multidimensional progress” that entails overcoming structural 
obstacles beyond traditional measurements of living above or below the poverty line. For these small island 
states in the Caribbean, sustainable development demands social progress to be incorporated with the 
preservation of environment. However, despite their structural limitations and the acknowledged 
vulnerabilities when exposed to climate change, most of territories in the Caribbean region, with a few 
exceptions such as Haiti, rank relatively high in the United Nations’ Developing Index ranking and belong to 
the high and upper middle-income groups (ChartsBin,2016). The seemingly high HDI ranking and per capita 
income might mask potential weaknesses, from both environmental and social perspectives, that tend to 
jeopardize their social foundation and sustainability. Such GDP-based indicators not only, in general, fail to 
incorporate elements related to the global challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, poverty, 
natural resources depletion, human health and quality of life but specifically also do not consider many of 
the small island states’ specific features (UNEP, 2014a; Blancard & Hoarau, 2013). There requires a 
framework that can assess small island states’ development process by adequately capturing the interactions 
between cultural and social characteristics, priorities, unique natural environment and other non-monetary 
values.  
 
1.6 Research Questions  
This is the first study that aims to assess the environmental and social performances of five Caribbean 
nations and their contextualized interconnections, by using both biophysical and social indicators identified 
within the Safe and Just Space Framework (SJS). Two main questions guide this research: 
 
1) Using indicators developed within the Safe and Just Space (SJS) framework, what are the environmental 
and social performances of the five selected Caribbean nations, and how do these performances interact?  
  
2) Based on the analysis of these five Caribbean small island states’ systematic vulnerabilities, what might 
be the key element of their transition to sustainability? 
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis begins with the Literature Review (Section 2), exploring the link between a nation’s vulnerability 
and sustainability of its development process to indicate why the vulnerability assessment preconditions the 
sustainable development study, followed by a theoretical background of studies on a variety of conceptual 
frameworks through which vulnerability is defined and analyzed. Section 3 describes in detail the 
development of the methodology used to evaluate environmental and social vulnerabilities and identify what 
might hinder these small island states’ transition to sustainability. The results from the methodology are 
presented in Section 4, followed by discussion in Section 5 and conclusions of the key results in Section 6.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW:  
The need to improve human well-being and social equity whilst reducing environmental risks and ecological 
scaricities requires a new vision for economic and social progress, also known as sustainable development 
(Steffen et al. 2011a & 2011b). The emergence of sustainable science is an effort to work towards an 
understanding of the duel objectives required to achieve social outcomes while also sustaining life-support 
functions of the coupled human-environment system (Turner et al. 2003a). The vulnerabilities of this coupled 
human-environmental system can be interpreted as both environmental vulnerabilities like stress on the 
ecosystem beyond its absorbing capacity, and social vulnerabilities like the failure to provide social 
foundation to the whole population. Aligning with this, the goal of sustainable development is to reduce 
both environmental and social vulnerabilities by connecting human development to the capacity of the 
bioshphere to sustain essential ecosystem services (Folke et al. 2011). To achieve this goal, a conceptual 
framework that can make vulnerability analysis consistent with the key concerns of sustainable development 
is needed. Such a framework helps account for the vulnerabilities with diverse and complex linkages on 
multidimensional scales and enable the identification of prioritized action areas for vulnverability reduction 
to facilitate a more sustainable development process.  
 
2.1 Vulnerability Assessment and the Coupled Socioecological Framework 
 
Dimensions and Factors Embedded in Vulnerability Assessment  
Generally, vulnerability is defined as the probabilities of suffering from harm or being exposed to damage 
(Matson, Clark, & Andersson, 2016) while differentiating between human-induced risk and environmental 
hazards (Adger, 2006; Adger & Winkels, 2014; Turner et al., 2003b; Blaikie, et al., 2004). Vulnerability is 
applied widely and spans a variety of disciplines, interpreted from a wide range of perspectives, including 
livelihoods and development (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Scoones, 1998; Sen, 1999), hazards (Watts & 
Böhle, 1993), global environmental change (Smit & Wandel, 2006; Turner et al. 2003a) and resilience 
(Holling, 1973, 2001).  
 
Scholars such Brooks (2003), Brook et al. (2013), Luers et al. (2005), Füssel (2004), Downing & Patwardhan 
(2004) and Metzger et al. (2005) suggest four fundamental dimensions in the description of a vulnerable 
situation: System, Attribute of Concern, Hazard, and Temporal Reference. Füssel (2006) summarises that 
“system” means the system through which vulnerability covers the coupled human-environmental interface, 
like a specific population group, an economic sector, a geographical location or a natural system. “Attribute 
of Concern” means the valued attribute(s) of the system that is/are exposed to a hazard. The United Nations 
(2004) defines hazard as “a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may 
cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation”. Temporal reference means the point of time or time-period at/during which the vulnerability 
of the system is being accessed. 
 
Before categorizing vulnerability factors, two largely independent dimensions from which vulnerability 
factors can be interpreted, sphere (or scale) and knowledge domain, need to be explained (Füssel,2006). 
Sphere is about the attributes of being endogenous, such as geographical boundaries, or exogenous, such as 
the external power to influence. Sphere can shift with the scope of the assessment, in that endogenous 
factors on national level become exogenous ones when the assessment shifts to local level. Knowledge 
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domain is associated with different branches of study area, including either natural and physical science or 
social science that covers economic resources, power distribution, social institutions and cultural practices. 
Knowledge domain determines the spheres of vulnerabilities of interest, and the vulnerability factors from 
different categories, either endogenous or exogenous. Where cross-disciplinary research is required, 
knowledge domains can also overlap.  
 
Within the broader sphere of being endogenous or exogenous, vulnerability factors can be further 
categorized into “external stressors” and “internal factors”, or “biophysical /natural factors” and 
“socioeconomic factors”. External factors are usually socioeconomic ones that are normally covered by 
human ecology, political economy, and entitlement theory. Internal factors are mainly agency-oriented 
factors that are more often investigated by access-to-assets models, crisis and conflict theory, and action 
theory approaches (Bohle, 2001). Scholars tend to distinguish the external stressors to which a system is 
exposed from the internal factors that determine the impacts on the system (Chambers, 1989; Ellis, 2000; 
Sanchez-Rodriguez 2002, Pielke & Bravo de Guenni, 2003; Turner et al. 2003b). However, with the shift of 
knowledge domains, the categories of external and internal factors may also shift. For example, United 
Nations (2014) define physical, economic, social and environmental factors as internal because the focus is 
on the internal properties of the systems rather than those of the external stressors. On the contrary, Moss 
et al. (2001) regard physical-environmental and socioeconomic dimensions and their external assistance as 
external factors because the focus is on the characteristics of external stressors and the level of expected 
assistance.  
 
With the shift of knowledge domains and the associated shifting perspectives from which vulnerability 
factors are analysed, the correlation between vulnerability factors of different categories also vary. For 
example, Klein & Nicholls (1999) believe “natural vulnerability” determines socioeconomic vulnerability 
whilst Brooks (2003) thinks “social vulnerability maybe viewed as one of the determinants of biophysical 
vulnerability”. Cutter (1996) regards “biophysical” and “social” as being independent to each other. With the 
existence of the different knowledge domains from which vulnerability can be assessed, the concept of 
vulnerability presents a paradox of aiming to measure vulnerability yet being unable to offer a precise 
definition (Birkmann, 2006). There is no standard or “best” conceptualization or definition of vulnerability 
that fits all assessment contexts (Füssel, 2006; Gerlitz et al., 2016). The conceptual framework by which 
vulnerability is assessed varies in accordance with the shift of study context. Considering the social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development, a framework that acknowledges the two-way 
feedback loop between the biophysical system and human activities is needed for vulnerability assessment 
to precondition for decision-making on sustainable development strategies.  
 
Integrated Approach in Vulnerability Assessement Framework 
Two most notable integrated apparoches in vulnerability assessment are the hazard-of-the-place model 
(Cutter, 1996) and the coupled social-ecological system vulnerability framework (Turner et al., 2003a).  
 
Cutter (1996) defines vulnerabilty as the likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and 
adversly affected by a hazard. It is the interaction of the hazards of people with the social profile of 
communities. The hazard-of-the-place model merges the traditional view of vulnerability as either a pre-
existing biophysical condition, or potential exposure to a biophysical risk with the social condition 
predisposing certain responses to environmental threats. Within this model, vulnerability is conceived as 
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both a biophysical risk as well as a social response, but within a specific area or geographic domain. The 
place can be a geographic space where vulnerable people and places are located, or a social space, where 
certain groups of peole are deemed the most vulnerable. Interpreted within this framework, there has been 
no homogenized vulnerabity, instead, vulnerability factors interact to produce place-specific vulnerability. 
Such vulnerability tends to change over time in accordance to changes within contexts where human 
activities interact with environmental hazards.  
 
The coupled socioeconomic framework incorporates human wellbeing, ecosystem service, and the 
interactions between human activities and the ecosystem. Human wellbeing is defined as an aggregate of 
basic material needs, health, security, good social relations, and freedom of choice and actions (Dolley, 
2005). On the one hand, the distribution of human welfare generated by ecosystem services depends on the 
range of temporal and spatial scales across which social goods, both private and public, are made available, 
and are associated with (or hindered by) a variety of property rights and other institutional arrangements. 
The gainers and losers in any environmental change situation vary depending on not only the type and scale 
of ecosystem service provided, but also the mix of stakeholders involved, the socio-economic characteristics, 
and the socio-cultural context. Such embedded complexity determines that ecosystem conservation has 
both environmental and social dimensions, encompassing not just efficiency and effectiveness criteria, but 
also equity, justice and legitimacy criteria, among other ethical concerns (Adger et al. 2001; Paavola 2005). 
On the other hand, the social efforts to benefit from the ecosystem will have impacts and eventually affect 
the level and quality of services and goods provided by the ecosystem. Schleyer et al. (2017) define 
ecosystem service as the interdependencies between social and nature factors. They argue that ecosystem 
service is neither about nature nor about human wellbeing, but about the mutual dependencies between 
nature and human wellbeing. However, different scientific disciplines and different science and society 
groups do not come to agreement on these mutual dependencies. Instead of being a static outcome, human 
wellbeing is a dynamic process with interactions between human and the ecosystem, nature and society.  
 
Turner et al. (2003a) credit the dual objectives of sustainable development for achieving human wellbeing 
and sustaining the earth’s life support systems to the balanced functioning of the coupled socio-ecological 
systems. The socioecological framework focuses on the long term role healthy socioecosystems can play in 
the sutaianble provision of human wellbeing, economic development and poverty alleviation across the 
globe (Turner & Daily, 2008). Within this framework, sustainability and vulnerability are closely related since 
both can be predicted on the synergy between the human and biophysical subsystems as these subsystems 
are affected by processes operating at different spatiotemporal and social scales. Analysis of vulnerability 
preconditions sustainable development in the sense that such analysis reveals the lack of balanced 
coordination between the ecosystem and human interventions during the development process, as well as 
the possible cause for such lack of synergy. Vulnerability, within this framework, is registered not only by 
exposure to hazards but also resides in the sensitivity and resilience of the system as the result of the 
interactions between social and environmental factors. Such exposure and interactions are contextually 
sensitive and therefore, vulnerability is place-based and needs to be understood as a product of interactions 
between multiple biophysical and human processes, which responds in a stochastic and nonlinear way and 
produces multiple feedbacks across different spatiotemporal scales (Turner et al. 2003b).  
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2.2 Other Conceptual Frameworks for Vulnerability Assessment 
Besides the integrated vulnerability framework that is assessed by interactions between environmental and social 
performances, there are other conceptual frameworks, listed below, within which vulnerability can be explored 
from different perspectives, with possible overlaps between each framework.  
  
Risk-Hazard Framework 
The risk-hazard approach is the framework that is usually applied in technical literature, covering areas such 
as natural disaster study, epidemiology and macroeconomics. It is usually used to assess the risks of either 
physical systems or groups of people when exposed to hazards of certain types and magnitudes (Burton et 
al., 1978; Kates, 1985, Downing & Patwardhan, 2004; Füssel, 2006). Within this framework, hazard is defined 
as “a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that is characterized by its 
location, intensity, frequency and probability” (UN DHA, 1993; United Nations 2004). Risk is interpreted as 
“expected losses due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period” (Adams, 2001) and 
“expected loss resulting from interactions between natural and human-induced hazards and vulnerable 
conditions” (United Nations, 2004). Vulnerability is the relationship between the severity of hazards and the 
degree of damage caused” (UN DHA, 1993; Coburn et al., 1994; United Nations, 2004). There does not exist 
clear boundary between risk and vulnerability since both are defined as loss or damage when exposed to 
hazards, with no special focus on the relationship between human behaviour and the level of its 
vulnerability. Human vulnerability is usually described as “exposure to hazards” (Hewitt, 1997) or “being in 
the wrong place at the wrong time” (Liverman, 1990). In line of this, hazards, risk and vulnerability are 
stationary, rather than evolving with the interaction between human and ecosystem.  
 
Figure 2: Risk-Hazard Framework (Turner et al. 2003b) 
 
 
In Region of Risk: A Geographical Introduction to Disasters,  
Hewitt (1997) explores the field of risk and disaster from three perspectives: hazards, vulnerability and active 
perspective. Vulnerability is depicted as a concept to identify a “distinctive” view of risk and disaster. The 
focus of vulnerability analysis is not on the “severity of the damaging agent” but on “the conditions that 
influence” the relevant groups’ “protection and coping capacities”. Human actions are depicted as the desire 
to reduce human misery and material loss when exposed to nature or human-induced hazards, such as war, 
crime, or violence, rather than to reduce the level of exposure to hazards. Other research that applies this 
approach includes The Environment as Hazards (Burton et al. 1978); The Interaction of Climate and Society 
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(Kates, 1985); Assessing Vulnerability for Climate Adaptation (Downing & Patwardhan, 2004); Climate, 
Change and Risk (Downing et al. 2001); Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (Coburn et al. 1994); Risk (Adams, 
1995); The Need for Rethinking the Concepts of Vulnerability and Risk from a Holistic Review and Criticism 
for Effective Risk Management (Cardona, 2003); Defining Risk (Kelman, 2003) and Vulnerability and Risk: 
Some Thoughts from a Political and Policy Perspective (Sarewitz et al. 2004). Liverman (1990) states, “Since it 
seems unlikely that we will marshal the resources to prevent all global changes or to compensate everyone 
for their impacts. We need more precise estimates of who is vulnerable to decide where, when and how 
most effectively to focus our responses”. Therefore, rather than deliberately ignoring the active role people 
can play in reducing their exposure to hazards, the risk-hazard approach focuses more on the relatively short-
term solution to reduce damage of materials or loss of lives.  
 
Political Economy Approach 
The framework of political economy assesses vulnerability from the perspective of people, considering things 
like, who is the most vulnerable and why. Different from the risk-and-hazard approach that interprets human 
vulnerability when exposed to hazards from the perspective of physical systems such as location and built 
infrastructure, the political economy approach emphasizes people’s coping and adaptation capacity as a 
result of their entitlements to resources, related to power structure and sociopollitical system. Vulnerability 
within this frameowrk “refers exclusively to people and it is based on an explanatory model of socioeconomic 
vulnerability to multiple stresses” and is defined as “the state of individuals, groups or communities in terms 
of their ability to cope with and adapt to any external stress placed on their livelihoods and well-being” 
(Adger & Kelly, 1999; Füssel, 2006). The relationship between ecosystem and political economy are usually 
interpretted as adaptive risk management associated with political and social power relations, resource 
consumption, and global economies (Smit & Wandel, 2006; Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Sen, 1981; Walker, 
2005). People’s adaptive capacity, termed also as coping capacity, response capacity or resilience, is assessed 
by access to entitlements and resources. Therefore this approach prevails in studies related to food security, 
poverty and development (Downing, 1991; Adger, 2000; Adger et al. 2001, Füssel, 2006).  
 
Another definition for vulnerability within this framework is “the degree to which different classes in society 
are differentially at risk” (Susman et al. 1984). According to Liverman (1999), the theory of “social 
marginalization” shows how the “flow of resources out of a region, land expropriations, exploitative labor 
conditions, political oppression and other processes associated with colonialism and/or capitalism,” have 
made poor peole more vulnerable and further degraded their environment. Albala-Bertrand (1995) 
concludes that, “poor societies and poor people within society generally are more vulnerable, suffer greater 
costs and have less capacity to take compensating action, than richer society or households”. This framework 
is sometimes called the neo-Marxist approach because of its emphasis on the impacts of social classes of 
vulnerability. Adopting the ‘’astructural” appraoch, Garcia (1981; 1982; 1986) diagnoses the climate 
anomalies by analyzing the historical evolution of social systems in various regions and demonstrates how 
certain groups have become too disadvantaged and exploited to cope with the exposed hazards. De Castro 
(1975), Watts (1983) and Spitz (1977) also adopt this approach, emphasizing the strong links between 
development and the patterns of famine and suffereing in their literature. Within this framework, an 
individualu’s coping capacity is restricted to his access to entitlement which is determined by his power or 
position in the social structure (Franke & Chasin, 1980; Copans 1975; Lappe & Collins, 1979; Sen, 1981). One 
key feasure of this approach is its belief that the coping capacity of individuals or groups is shaped and 
restrained by social, political and economic processes at higher scales (Smit & Wandel, 2006). Therefore the 
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role of individuals or groups to cope with hazards are still passive, confined by their social positions within 
the overall power system.  
  
Figure 3: Political Economy Analysis Framework (Bekele, 2017) 
 
 
Pressure – and – Release Model 
The pressure-and-release (PAR) framework is mainly applied to understand the different dynamics of 
vulnerability and the phases of interaction between vulnerability and hazard. Simiar to the risk-and-hazard 
framework, pressure-and-release model also defines risk as the product of hazard and vulnerability (Blaikie 
et al. 1994). What differs these two models is, instead of simply describing people’s vulnerabilty when 
exposed to hazards and the resulted risks, the presure-and-release model aims to explore the global root 
causes, regional pressures, and local, vulnerable conditions that can be attributed to the evolution of 
vulnerability. Within this framework, vulnerability is composed of three levels: root cause, dynamic pressure, 
and unsafe condition. The root causes are related to economic, demographic and political processes, which 
can be interpreted as the function of economic and politicial structures, legal definition of rights of idelogical 
order and distribution of power. Joseph (2005) regards limited access to economic or political power as the 
root cause for vulnerability during a disaster and believes vulnerability is at the foundation of risk and 
recovery practices. The dynamic pressures are processes that transform the root causes into vulnerability 
when faced with unsafe conditions, including the specific forms in which vulnerabilities are expressed in time 
and space in conjunction with hazards. Release is used to conceptualize the mitigation of vulnerability and 
hazard impacts, which is to reverse the mechanism or process that translates the root causes of vulnerability 
into unsafe condition (Blaikie et al. 1994). Sometimes the access to resources model, which expands on the 
dynamics of changing decisions, options, livelihood opportunities, available resources and choices made by 
the population that is impacted by disaster(s) is used to complement the pressure-and-release model 
(Blaikie et al. 1994; Nirupama, 2012).  
 
Awal (2015) integrates climate change shocks and stresses in the conceptual framework of pressure-and-
release. Lack of access to political power and resources, insecure livelihoods, environmental degradation and 
ineffective disaster risk reduction practices are identified as the root causes for increasing climate 
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vulnerability. It concludes that by coordinating disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, 
social safety net service might help relieve some climate change-related pressures. The framework of 
pressure-and-release is used to systematically evaluate Haiti in the context of the 2010 major earthquake 
(Martin, et al., 2010). In this research, vulnerability is evaluated from the perspectives of root causes, 
dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions with the assumption that disasters are caused by the intersecting 
of the process-generated vulnerability and exposure to hazards.  
  
Figure 4: Pressure-and-Release Framework (Blaikie et al. 1994) 
 
 
The pressure-and-release model is also applied in the area of epidemiology to identify the multiplicity and 
interaction of causes for the distribution and prevalence of human diseases (MacMahon et al., 1960). To 
identify environmental health indicators, Kjellström & Corvalan (1995) designed the Driving-Forces Pressure-
State Effects-Action (DPSEA) framework by adding the element of “effect” into the traditional Pressure-and-
Release model. “Effect” is incorporated because of the considerable impacts of changes in the state of 
environmental on health status or quality of life. It is argued by the researchers that in the case of the 
indicators being developed to assist informed decision-making for targeted actions, “action” should replace 
“response” since “response” tends to be construed as a passive reaction.  
 
As its guidance for environmental review, OECD (1993) adjusts the pressure-and-release framework into the 
pressure-state-response (PSR) model to identify the environmental risk indicators. The PSR framework is 
based on the concept of causality in which human activities exert pressures on the environment and change 
its quality and the quantity of natural resources. The society responds to such human-induced changes 
through environmental and economic policies. Pressures refers to socio-economic activities and associated 
processes or products, such as emissions or biochemical flows, with impacts upon the ecosystem. Pressures 
lead to change in the state of the environment that requires responses in the forms of technology or policies. 
In its 1993 report, OECD points it out thatthat the feedback loop within this framework is between human-
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induced environmental changes and further human interventions as response to such environmental 
changes through policies. Vulnerability assessment within such a framework tends to suggest a linear 
relationship in human-environment interaction without incorporating the more complex relationships in 
ecosystems and in environment-economy interactions. Blaikie et al. (1994) state the main weakness of the 
pressure-and-release model is that the generation of vulnerability is not integrated with the ways in which 
natural hazards have impacts on people. Within this framework, hazards are isolated from causal forces of 
vulnerability.  
 
Resilience approach 
The approach of assessing vulnerabilty by focusing on the concept of “resilience” can find its root in ecology 
(Füssel, 2006). The Resilience Allicance Group defines vulnerability as “the propensity of social and ecological 
systems to suffer harm from exposure to external stresses and shocks. It involves exposure to events and 
stresses, sensitivity to such exposures, and resilience owing to adaptive capacity measures to anticipate and 
reduce future harm”. It defines the resilience framework as an approach to managing natural resource 
systems that considers social and ecological influences at multiple scales, incorporates continuous changes 
and acknowledges the potential of certain degree of uncertainly to increase a system’s resilience to 
disturbance and the system’s capacity to adapt to change (Resillience Alliance, 2010). Füssel (2006) points 
out that an important feasure of the resiliece approach is its consideration of the dynamic aspects of 
vulnerabiltiy since resilience denotes the ability of a system to return to an earlier stable state after 
perturbation.  
 
Within this framework, Proag (2014) defines vulnerability as the degree to which a system may react 
adversely during a hazardous event. The concept of vulnerability implies a measure of risk associated with 
the physical, social and economic aspects and implications resulting from the hazardous event. He 
categorizes resilience into both hard resilience, the direct strength of structures or institutions when placed 
under pressure, and soft resilience, the ability of systems to absorb and recover from the impact of 
disruptive events without fundamental changes in function or structure. The distinction between social and 
ecological resilience and the validity of the integration of social and ecological dimensions have generated 
many discussions. The complexity embedded in adopting resilience within the social dimension can be traced 
to the fact that, different from an ecosystem, people have the capacity to consciously influence future 
outcomes and alter the interconnectedness for the existing benefits of certain social groups. Adger (2000) 
defines social resilience as the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and 
disturbance caused by social, political and environmental changes, and ecological resilience as the 
characteristic of ecosystem to maintain itself in the face of disturbance. He acknowledges the link between 
social and ecological resilience, especially for social groups that depend on ecological resources for 
livelihoods. However, it remains unclear whether the resilience of the ecosystem will enable resilient 
communities when faced with external perturbations.  
 
Brown (2014) states that resilience, as a concept, is “everywhere in contemporary debates about global 
environment debates. She points out, from many human geographers’ points of view, what is missing is the 
social, political and cultural dynamics with which resilience can be associated. Brown’s research on resilience 
is focused on three emerging topics, community resilience, transformations and resilience as an organizing 
concept for radical change. She concludes there lacks analysis of social difference and resilience and tensions 
between normative and analytical stances on resilience are continuing. It is argued that ecological models of 
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resilience are antipolitical and this framework fails to accommodate the critical roles of politics when 
interpreting adaptation to changed environment or relationship (Evans, 2011; Swanstrom. 2008). Smith et al. 
(2010) talk about politics embedded in socioecological resilience and sustainable socio-technical 
transactions. They emphasize questions over who governs, whose system framings count, and whose 
sustainability and resilience are prioritized within the sphere of socioecological system. In the process of 
extending resilience thinking to society, the existence of social divisions and inequalities are downplayed and 
the initiative of adapting to the "status quo" is fundamentally conservative because it tends to protect the 
interests of those who benefit from the current structure at the expense of resilience of the rest. A social 
system with its supportive political structure can purposefully postpone the effects of ecological disruption to 
itself, spatially or temporally, causing greater disruption being imposed on people elsewhere or elsewhen 
(Catton, 1982). The exercise of power and privilege in society, which leads to the disproportional 
concentration of control of environment and resource decision-making, exerts great pressure on specific 
group's resilience. Besides "resilience of what", it is equally worthwhile to ask, "resilience for whom" 
(Freudenburg,2005).  
 
Figure 5: Resilience Assessment Framework (Resilience Alliance, 2010) 
 
 
Sustainability Livelihood Approach 
Chambers and Conway (1992) elaborate the concept of sustainable livelihoods as being about the idea of 
capability, equity and sustainability, each of which is both end and means. The key concepts embedded in 
this framework include poverty, vulnerability and livelihood. This framework provides an actor-centered 
concept of vulnerability that originates in development studies and builds on entitlement theory, with a rural 
propensity (Chambers, 1983; DFID, 1999; Sen, 1981; Sen 1984). It departs from the rural focus on agriculture 
and recognizes a variety of means through which an individual or household can make a living. Within this 
framework, vulnerability is the susceptibility to circumstances of not being able to sustain a livelihood or a 
livelihood at the cost of natural society. It is associated to external shocks and internal capabilities, including 
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accesses to materials and social resources and activities required for a means of living, which are framed by 
institutional contexts. In contrast, sustainability means the ability of an individual or household to cope with 
and recover from stress and shocks, maintain and enhance the capabilities and assets without undermining 
the natural resource base. Such interchange is moderated by value considerations and contestations, 
property relations, and configurations of power within institutional contexts (Arce 2003; de Haan & Zoomers 
2005). 
 
UNDP has been a strong advocate for the application of sustainable livelihood framework. In its 2017 
Guidance Note, it categorizes different aspects for consideration related to the application of this framework 
in development practices. Firstly, an understanding of vulnerability in a specific context is needed. Secondly, 
it requires an effective strategy to protect livelihoods, followed by an analysis of different types of capitals 
needed by the strategy, which include human, social, natural, physical and financial capitals. Human capital 
represents the intellectual and physical capabilities of people, including the experiences, skills and health 
that enable the populations to fulfil livelihood objectives. Social capital means social capacity, especially on 
local levels including networks, associations, authorities and officials that can provide the necessary support 
and guidance to the population. Natural capital refers to the stocks of naturally occurring resources like soil 
and water that can be consumed to create additional benefits, such as food chains or protection against soil 
or coastal erosion, to support livelihoods. Physical capital refers to the basic infrastructure and production 
processes to support livelihoods. Financial capital means financial resources that populations can employ to 
achieve their livelihood objectives.  
 
Figure 6: Sustainable Livelihood Framework (Murray & Ferguson, 2001) 
 
 
Murray & Ferguson (2001) follow the UNDP structure in discussing how women can transit out of poverty 
though sustainable livelihoods. They name the three dimensions of sustainable livelihoods as assets, 
vulnerability context and techniques and interventions. The five assets are the same as the five capitals 
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identified in the UNDP Guidance, jointly representing the populations’ capacity to cope with the challenges 
and satisfy their needs on a sustained basis. There are factors related to individual households and factors 
embedded in broader social contexts, both of which cause and perpetuate the vulnerable situation. 
Therefore, besides efforts to build assets on individual household scales, changes are also required on 
organizational, community and policy levels. Techniques and interventions refer to human activities that 
enable the population to build up assets required by sustainable livelihoods, which occur on both individual 
level to help low-income households build up livelihood assets and the higher and broader level for the 
overall technical improvement.  
 
Social Metabolism Framework 
Social Metabolism Framework aims to interpret environmental problems from social, economic and cultural 
perspectives. Within the framework of social metabolism, there are two basic concepts, socio-economic 
metabolism and colonization of nature, by which the notion of sustainable development is related to the key 
characteristic of the individual societies from socio-economic and cultural perspectives (Fischer-Kowalski, 
1997; Fischer-Kowalski & Haberl,1998, Fischer-Kowalski & Haberl, 1999). Fischer-Kowalski & Haberl (1998) 
define social metabolism as the process in which social systems convert raw materials into manufactured 
products, services and finally into waste. There are two aspects from which a society’s metabolism can be 
interpreted, material throughput and energy throughput. Material throughput includes the input and output 
related to the provision of nutrition, shelter, clothing, and buildings that follows the law of conservation of 
mass. The energy throughput means the energy turnover corresponding to the sum of the biological energy 
requirements of the members of the society. Any society’s material and energy input per capita per year is 
determined, to a large extent, by the mode of production and the associated life style, which is categorized 
as the characteristic metabolic profile of a society. Socio-economic metabolism can be categorized into basic 
metabolism and extended metabolism. Basic metabolism means the material and energy flow between 
natural reproduction of resources, such as air, water and biomass, and natural recycling mechanisms that 
transform the releases from social metabolism into useable inputs again. The key sustainability issue related 
to this scale of metabolism is resource depletion when the rate of natural resource consumption exceeds 
that of natural resource reproduction. Extended metabolism refers to the mobilization of resources, such as 
fossil fuels, metals and other minerals, from geological locations into social energy flow. The extended 
metabolism, supported by technical innovation, can alleviate resource scarcity temporarily until the 
geological deposits are exhausted. Before the ultimate resource depletion, the mobilization of materials 
from subterrestrial sinks into biosphere disrupts the biogeochemical processes, which may overcharge the 
capacity of ecosystems for gradual evolutionary adaptation.  
 
Colonization is defined as the conundrum of social activities that deliberately change important parameters 
of natural systems and actively maintain them in a state different from the conditions that would prevail in 
the absence of such interventions (Fischer-Kowalski, 1997, Fischer-Kowalski, 1999). Colonization of the 
natural system can be interpreted as the human invasion of the natural system to maximize social benefits 
by ensuring future material and energy flow. The maximization of human benefits goes beyond basic 
metabolism for survival that prevails in hunter gatherer and early agrarian societies. It requires continuous 
effort and materials to keep the colonized natural system in a socially devised state. Every innovation related 
to the control of the natural system leads to further social investment and therefore, more demanding 
control efforts (Sieferle & Müller-Herold, 1996). With no fundamental shift in the understanding about 
 
 
22 
 
human wellbeing, the colonization process tends to evolve at an ever-accelerating pace with no 
consideration of capacity of the natural system.  
 
Figure 7: Social Metabolism Framework (Fischer-Kowalski & Haberl, 1999) 
 
 
Different from hunter gatherer and early agrarian societies that are restricted by the dilemma between 
increasing metabolism and depleting natural resources, industrial societies ensure their high material and 
energy throughputs by far-reaching exchanges and transport. Therefore, for industrial societies, the 
development towards sustainability demands scaling down per capita in terms of socio-economic 
metabolism, and lessening the level of colonization of the natural system. Fischer-Kowalski & Haberl (1998) 
provide a positive feedback-loop between quality of life, prosperity and metabolism and emphasize the 
importance of delinking metabolism from quality of life and prosperity, for the sake of sustainability. It is not 
economic prosperity or growth that stresses the ecosystem, but the growth in physical amounts of materials 
and energy a society processes. To delink metabolism from prosperity, instead of providing goods, more 
services should be provided to mitigate the direct growth impulse. In addition, material and energy 
throughputs will decrease if resource efficiency of technology improves quicker than the economy grows. 
However, without redefining quality of life and delinking it from metabolism, the benefits achieved from 
increased efficiency might be outbalanced by excessive consumption due to lower material and energy 
prices associated with improved efficiency.  
 
The focus on delinking metabolism from quality of life reflects the cultural dimension of the social 
metabolism framework. Fischer-Kowalski & Haberl (1998) believe quality of life is mediated by modes of 
living, culturally defined models of a good life, and the modes of social distribution of goods and property. 
Within this framework, time is applied as an indicator related to quality of life and the overall social 
metabolic flow. Firstly, the shortage of time might prompt certain consumption behaviours that might lead 
to excessive consumption of materials and energy. For example, people tend to hire taxis or choose ready-
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made meals because they do not have time for a more healthy or sustainable life style. Secondly the amount 
of disposable time spent in socializing and recreational activities is also closely related to the energy and 
material turnover. On a broader scale, what is regarded as mainstream social and recreational activities is 
determined by the overall cultural context. With the gradual dissolution of traditional values and exposure 
to an omnipresence of markets, bureaucracies and the media, as well as dwindling affection and social 
support, people tend to make increasing amount of effort to gain self-fulfilment and social recognition 
through excessive consumption, leading to a spectacular expenditure of energy and materials. To achieve a 
mindset shift that can support the overall reduction of material and energy turnover, Fischer-Kowalski & 
Haberl (1998) suggest the cultural and social shift of both individual lifestyle and the broader social system, 
such as vegetarianism, reduction of working hours, and a more equal income distribution model, which all 
share common areas with the recent concept of “degrowth” (Kallis, 2018). 
 
2.3 Analytical Framework: Planetary Boundaries (PB) and Safe and Just Space (SJS) 
As discussed earlier within this section, there does not exist standard definition for vulnerability or one 
correct conceptual framework by which vulnerability can be assessed. The choice of framework varies in 
accordance with the shift of the sphere of research and knowledge domain. Considering the need to 
facilitate small island state’ development to a more sustainable mode, a framework that acknowledges the 
two-way feedback loop between biophysical system and human activities is needed to precondition 
decision-making on sustainable development strategies. The coupled socioecological system developed by 
Turner et al. (2003a & 2003b) provides the conceptual framework within which vulnerability responding to 
both environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development can be assessed. Analytical 
frameworks within this broader framework that recognize the interactions between ecosystem and human 
activities have been developed to operationalize vulnerability assessment by linking environmental and social 
performances. Among these analytical frameworks, Planetary Boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009) and Safe 
and Just Space (Rawarth, 2012) are two famous ones that have gained increasing international recognition.  
 
Planetary Boundaries Framework (PB) 
Rockström and Steffen et al. (2009) initiate the Planetary Boundary framework, which defines the zone 
within which humanity can safely operate, as an approach to guide global transition to sustainability. Since 
then, the Planetary Boundaries framework has become a reference point in high-profile publications and 
initiatives on global sustainability (Nykvist et al. 2013), including the United Nations High-Level Panel on 
Global Sustainability, the OECD report Towards Green Growth (OECD 2011) and the UNEP GEO 5 Report 
(UNEP 2012). Within the PB framework, the social impact of transgressing boundaries is regarded as a 
function of the social-ecological vulnerability of the affected societies. Rockström et al. and Steffen et al. 
(2009) identify nine interdependent planetary boundaries, including boundaries for Ocean Acidification, 
Biochemical Flows, Freshwater Use, Land-System Change, Biosphere Integrity, Climate Change, Stratospheric 
Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading and Novel Entities. These nine boundaries define a safe 
operating biophysical space for human operations and the transgression of one may shift the position of 
other boundaries or cause them to be transgressed. Climate Change and Biosphere Integrity are identified as 
two core boundaries, the shifting of which can cause the shifting of other boundaries. Four out of these nine 
boundaries, Climate Change, Biosphere Integrity, Land-System Change and Biochemical Flows have been 
exceeded. The process of human life has revealed repeated planetary-scale tipping points and the current 
risk of long-term damage to Earth systems that support humanity is increasing (Hughes et al.,2013; Steffen et 
al. 2015).  
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Chandrakumar & McLaren (2015) explore the linkages between the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and Planetary Boundaries, using the Drive-Pressure-State-Impacts(s)-Response (DPSIR) framework3. The 
study demonstrates there is a substantive overlap between the SDGs and the Planetary Boundaries 
framework and suggests the science-based thresholds listed in PB be adopted as a complementary set of 
environmental boundaries for the SDG indicators. Mohajan (2015) emphasizes the scientific impact of the 
framework is based on the earth system’s biological, physical and chemical structures, and suggests 
Planetary Boundary framework be applied as the basis for sustainable development policy.  
 
Stockholm Resilience Centre states that the quality infrastructure of the Earth system, which is secured by 
the planetary boundaries, plays a key role in sustainable development (Cornell & Downing, 2014). Therefore, 
the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals depends on the balanced relationship between 
humanity and biophysical system from local to global scales. Steffen et al. (2011c) point out that despite 
planetary boundaries being explicitly designed for the global scale, efforts to reduce ecosystem degradation 
at local scales have become even more important because of the feedback loops between the global and 
local levels. Here arises the question of whether it is feasible and scientifically appropriate to downscale the 
planetary boundaries for regional or national vulnerability analysis.  
 
Efforts to address decision-making on local levels within the PB framework, have happened and are on going. 
Commissioned by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Nykvist et al. (2013) tested whether the 
concept of Planetary Boundaries can be applied to assess the international dimensions of Sweden’s national 
environmental quality goals. They developed a methodology to downscale the planetary boundaries into a 
corresponding set of meaningful national boundaries and identify appropriate data series that consider both 
territorial (i.e., domestic production-related) and consumptive (i.e., domestic consumption-related) 
performances. The differentiation between ‘territorial” and “consumptive” performances aims to reflect 
emissions and the consumption of natural resources embedded in trade. Pisano & Berger (2013) provide an 
overview of the planetary boundaries framework and reflect on possible associations of planetary 
boundaries with sustainable development. They discuss the opportunities for adopting this framework for 
sustainable development both within the context of international governance and on national and regional 
levels. McLaughlin (2018) analyses the differences of planetary boundaries between global and local scales 
where many impacts and solutions originate. Hӓyhӓ et al. (2016) believe PB framework provides the 
quantitative limits to the anthropogenic perturbation of crucial Earth system processes and mark out a 
biophysical safe operating space for human interventions. To operationalize the planetary boundaries on 
decision-making level, they develop a framework that addresses the “biophysical, socioeconomic and ethical 
dimensions” of bridging across scales. This framework provides a “constantly applicable approach” to 
translate the planetary boundaries into fair shares of earths safe operating space on national and sub-
national levels. Fanning & O’Neill (2016) define biophysical ceilings by translating the planetary boundaries 
into 10 indicators on national and sub-national levels in a biophysical framework that links the sustainability 
of resource flows from the biosphere to final consumption. The set of 10 indicators provides a quantitative 
guidance that can be applied on local levels for prioritizing environmental pressures that need to be reduced 
for biophysical stability. Hoornweg et al. (2016) believe the achievement of global sustainable development 
                                                             
3 DPSIR is a framework that is parallel to the Coupled Socioecological Framework within which vulnerability can be assessed. The fact 
it can be used to analyze the relationship between Planetary Boundaries and Sustainable Development indicates the possible 
overlaps between different frameworks because of the overlaps between knowledge domains.  
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goals subject to planetary boundaries are mostly determined on municipal level because it is the human 
activities on city level that drive cultures, economies, material use and waste generation for the aggregated 
effects on higher levels. The modified methodology proposes biophysical boundaries from a city’s 
perspective and incorporates socioeconomic boundaries derived from Sustainable Development Goals. 
Trialed for five cities, Toronto, Shanghai, Sao Paulo, Mumbai and Dakar, this locally applied quantitative 
methodology captures the complexity of infrastructure systems and external pressures on planetary 
boundaries on urban levels that can be upgraded to either national or global levels.  
  
Safe and Just Space (SJS) 
Coupled with rapid human-induced environmental changes, the prevalence of poverty, hunger and social 
inequality has brought unprecedented attention to the challenge of achieving both social and environmental 
sustainability. It calls for an analytical framework, incorporating both planetary boundaries and social 
wellbeing, within which the pathway to equitable and sustainable development can be identified (Leach, et 
al. 2013). Hoornweg et al. (2016) derive socioeconomic boundaries from Sustainable Development Goals and 
incorporate them into biophysical boundaries to assess the level of sustainable development on the 
municipal level. Raworth (2012 & 2017) incorporates social well-being and equity into the Planetary 
Boundary framework and creates a Safe and Just Space (SJS) between the environmental ceiling, i.e., the 
planetary boundaries based on normative perceptions of risk and desirability of staying within the Holocene, 
and social foundation.  
 
It has been argued that there are a finite number of basic human need satisfiers that are universal, satiable 
and non-substitutable. These need satisfiers might vary between individuals and cultures and determine the 
levels of human wellbeing. However, they arguably share certain characteristics that allow empirical 
measurement (Gough, 2015). Before Raworth, there existed two main theories on human needs, both 
developed in the early 1990s. Max-Neef (1991) differentiates between needs, which are regarded as 
universal, and need-satisfiers, which might vary depending on social structure and cultural context. He 
identifies 9 fundamental human needs, including substance, protection, affection, understanding, 
participation, leisure, creation, identify and freedom. Doyal & Gough (1991) insist on the universal goal of 
“minimally impaired participation” for human activities. To achieve this goal, physical health and autonomy 
of agency, which covers concepts such as mental health, cultural understanding and opportunities to 
participate, are critical. Doyal & Gough (1991) agree with Max-Neef (1991) on the universality of the basic 
needs but argue the universal characteristics of some needs-satisfiers can also be empirically determined. 
Doyal & Gough (1991) identify 11 satiable and non-substitutable “intermediate needs”, including nutritional 
food and clean water, protective housing, a non-hazardous work environment and living environment, 
appropriate healthcare, security in childhood, significant primary relationships, physical and economic 
security, safe birth control and child bearing and basic education. Out of 80 submissions of national 
governments during the Rio + 20 Conference on Sustainable Development, Raworth (2012) selects 11 social 
priorities to include in the social foundations as basic human needs, which overlap substantially with the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. These social priorities include Food Security, Income, Water 
and Sanitation, Health Care, Education, Energy, Gender Equality, Social Equality, Voice (population living in 
countries perceived not to permit political participation or freedom of expression), Jobs and Resilience 
(population facing multiple dimensions of poverty). These basic needs identified by Raworth overlap 
considerably with what Max-Neef (1991) and Doyal & Gough (1991) propose and are more “democratic” and 
“closely aligned with contemporary policy” (O’Neill, et al., 2018).  
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Raworth (2012) states in her work that there are important characteristics that planetary boundaries and 
social thresholds share. Firstly, both planetary boundaries and social thresholds serve as the fundamentals of 
sustainable development. Secondly, social and environmental ceilings are developed through widely agreed 
social norms. And thirdly, staying within biosphere boundaries and reaching social thresholds matter for both 
the global and the local scale. One significant difference between the planetary boundaries and social 
thresholds is their initial states of stress. The aim, for planetary boundary, is to move backward into the pre-
industrial “safe space,” but for social threshold, it is to move forward into the “just space” that not all 
humanity has reached by now. The desired relationship between planetary boundaries and social foundation 
is the resource use, or, the level of pressure on the biosphere or environment. This should be high enough to 
meet basic needs, but not so high as to exceed the planetary boundaries. The Safe and Just Space framework 
aligns with the duel objectives of sustainable development in both environmental and social dimensions. 
Figure 8 below presents the safe and just space, defined by Raworth, in the shape of a double-layered 
“doughnut”.  
 
Figure 8: A Safe and Just Space for Humanity to Thrive In: A First Illustration (Oxfam) 
 
 
Within this framework, the social foundation forms an inner boundary, below which is multi-dimensional 
human deprivation. The environmental ceiling forms an outer boundary, beyond which is environmental 
degradation from a variety of ecological perspectives. The “doughnut-shaped” area between the two 
boundaries lies the environmentally safe and socially just space where inclusive and sustainable 
development can take place for human prosperity. The Safe and Just Space Framework has gained global 
recognization since the premmises of Planetary Boundaries and the Safe and Just Space frameworks are 
considered socially well-embedded in the sustainable development discourse (Pisano & Berger, 2013). 
Hoornweg et al. (2016) incorporate socioeconomic elements into the planetary boundaries in their analysis 
of sustainable development on municipal levels. Cole et al. (2014) downscale the “Safe and Just Space” 
framework to a national level, creating a barometer that combines 20 indicators for environmental stress and 
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social deprivation, tracking and assessing the progress of national sustainable development in South Africa. 
They conclude that social and environmental concerns are intrinsically scale-dependent and local 
circumstances need to be taken into consideration if priority areas need to be identified for action on 
national levels. Targeting two Chinese rural localities, Dearing et al. (2014) propose a framework to define 
the safe and just operating space for humanity that lies within the environmental ceilings and social 
wellbeing and equity for application. One popular set of research conducted within this framework was A 
Good Life for All within the Planetary Boundaries by Dan O’Neill and colleagues (2018) that quantifies the 
consumption of natural resources and emission flow that occur in the processes of satisfying basic human 
needs in 152 countries. This thesis builds on the approach in O’Neill et al.’s research (2018), developing the 
research methodology that assesses five Caribbean small island states’ social and environmental 
vulnerabilities and explores the key element to a more sustainable development mode.  
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This thesis aims to analyze the systematic vulnerabilities of five Caribbean small island states by assessing 
their environmental and social performances and the interactions between these performances within 
individual countries’ development processes. Among a wide range of frameworks in which vulnerability can 
be interpreted, the Safe and Just Space framework is selected to conduct a vulnerability assessment because 
it addresses both environmental and social aspects, incorporating the two-way feedback loops between 
biophysical and human systems. This thesis builds on O’Neill et al.’s (2018) approach in assessing individual 
countries’ environmental and social performances by using indicators identified within the SJS framework. By 
comparing five individual Caribbean nations’ performances with the planetary boundary and social threshold 
values, their systematic vulnerabilities can be assessed and the root cause that hinders the transition to a 
more sustainable mode can be explored.  
 
The thesis uses O’Neil et al.’s approach as a starting but deviate in several aspects because of difference in 
research scope and certain characteristics specific to these five island nations. Firstly, besides the most recent 
data, I collected data for the period between 1995 and 2008 to identify possible trend of change. Secondly for CO₂ 
emission, besides the emission from burning of fossil fuels, I include emission from burning of biomass. For 
biochemical flow, besides the flow amount from application of synthetic fertilizers, I include the flow from 
farm animals. Finally, all values related to biochemical flows are from Eora MRIO. At this database values of 
domestic contribution to biochemical flows are only for the year 2000. To get the upscaled per capita value 
for 2011, O'Neil and colleagues estimate a factor to multiply with the relevant 2000 value. In their 
estimation, the population increase between 2000 and 2011 is neglected. The population increase is an 
element that should be incorporated into the estimation of the factor since it is the per capita value they aim 
to upscale. I took a few measures to incorporate the population increase into the estimation of the factor 
used for upscaling. 
 
3.1 Selection of Five Caribbean Nations 
Five small island states in the Caribbean region, Trinidad & Tobago, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti and 
Cuba, were selected for this research. These five nations were selected because from the demographic and 
socioeconomic perspectives, such as land area, population size, nature of economy, socioeconomic status 
and political system, these nations present a holistic and diverse regional profile. These five nations form an 
arch shape in the Caribbean region, covering 88.9% of the region’s land area and 87.8% of its population4. In 
terms of economic status, this selected group includes one country that belongs to the high-income group, 
Trinidad & Tobago, three upper-middle-income countries, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Cuba, and one 
low-income country, Haiti (UNDP, 2018b). From the perspective of energy structure, it includes Trinidad & 
Tobago and Jamaica, where fossil fuels play a dominating role and Haiti, where biomass is still the main 
energy source, and countries such as Cuba and Dominican Republic where, in association with economic 
growth, fossil fuels has been playing an increasingly important role, compared with that of bio-mass. 
Considering political system, this selected group includes Cuba, one of the few socialist countries under one-
party leadership where the political system and the resulted social structure play an important role in its 
development process. Table 1 presents basic demographic and socioeconomic information (CIA, 2018).  
                                                             
4 This covers 19 countries in the Caribbean region with 2017 data from the World Bank, not including values for Anguilla, Montserrat 
and St. Barthelemy.  
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Despite the diversity embedded in their socioeconomic status and energy structure, these countries share 
similar structural limitations such as the exposure to climate change-related natural disasters, heavy 
dependence on strategic imports and the dominating role played by the service sector in the economy. The 
analysis of individual nations’ social and environmental vulnerabilities can demonstrate the impact of 
contextualized interactions between environmental and social factors on sustainable development, and 
present a regional profile with the required diversity.  
 
3.2 The Selection of Indicators, Definition and Value Calculation  
Instead of indicating a one-way relationship between the consumption of resources and the satisfaction of 
human needs, O’Neill et al. (2018) manage to reflect the dependence of social outcome on the functioning of 
the ecosystem and its mitigation of the transgression of the planetary boundaries. Their research extends the 
Safe and Just Space frameworks by representing the connection between resource use and social outcomes 
in terms of “provisioning systems” which consist of infrastructure, technologies, efficiencies and institutional 
capacities, communities and markets. The provisioning system provides the development context and 
mediates the impacts of pressure associated with social outcomes on biophysical resources. The nature of 
individual countries’ provisioning system or more generally its development context, reflects the relationship 
between the resource use and emission flow and the achievement of social outcomes, determining each 
country’s position within the safe and just space of the “doughnut.”  
 
Table 1: Demographic and Socioeconomic Status of the Five Caribbean Small Island Developing States  
 Cuba Dominican Republic Haiti Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago 
Population 11,147,407 10,734,247 10,646,714 2,990,561 1,218,208 
Land Area (sqkm) 109,820 48,670 27,560 10,831 5,128 
GDP per capita ($) 12,300 16,900 1,800 9,200 31,400 
GDP Composition 
Agriculture 3.9% 5.5% 21.9% 7.6% 0.4% 
Industry 21.5% 33.8% 20.8% 23.2% 48.6% 
Service 74.2% 60.8% 57.3% 69.2% 50.8% 
Export ($) 2.885 billion 10.33 billion 960.1 million 1.31 billion 10.19 billion 
Import ($) 10.84 billion 19 billion 3.621 billion 5.82 billion  9.668 billion 
 
O’Neill et al. (2018) use 18 indicators designed to measure environmental and social performances to assess 
vulnerabilities embedded in an individual country’s development process. They compare individual countries’ 
biophysical and social performances to downscaled planetary boundaries and social thresholds. The 7 
environmental indicators include four out of the nine biosphere boundaries initiated by the Steffen et al. in 
2009: climate change, land system change, fresh water consumption and biochemical flows. Besides, two 
separate footprint indicators, ecological footprint and material footprint, are also included. Climate change is 
represented as CO₂ emissions and land system change as the embodied Human Appropriation of Net Primary 
Product (eHANPP). The environmental indicator values for each country are consumption-based and account 
for international trade. Compared with the production-based values that only include the amount of 
emissions embedded in domestic production, the consumption-based values reflect the responsibility for the 
ecological effects of both production and consumption and lengthen the link between consumption and its 
consequences (Zsófia, 2013). For social performance, O’Neill et al. (2018) identify 11 social outcome 
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indicators, including Life Satisfaction, Healthy Life Expectancy, Nutrition, Sanitation, Energy (Access to 
Electricity), Education, Income, Equality, Democratic Quality, Employment and Social Support, which vary 
only slightly from Raworth’s (2012) social foundation indicators. Each threshold value corresponding to 
individual social outcome constitutes “a reasonable assessment of a level of performance consistent with 
meeting basic needs” (O’ Neill et al. 2018). Table 2 and Table 3 below provide brief definition of each 
indicator, as well as the boundary and threshold values. 
 
Table 2: Definition and Boundary Values for Environmental Performance Indicators  
 Definition Boundary Value 
CO₂ Emission The remaining amount of accumulated CO₂ 
emission until 2100, in total 2900 Gt CO₂, 
to ensure the probability of >66% of 
limiting the human-induced temperature 
increase to less than 2°C relative to the 
period of 1861–1880 by 2100 (IPCC, 2014).  
 
By 2011, about 1000Gt CO₂ remains as the 
emission amount available by 2100. The per capita 
boundary value of 1.61 t CO₂ per year is the result 
of dividing 000 Gt CO₂ with the 2011 world 
population (O’Neill et al. 2018).  
Biochemical 
Flow 
The maximum amount of phosphorous and nitrogen flow that leaches into surface water because 
of human interventions before pushing marine and aquatic systems across ecological thresholds 
of their own.  
Phosphorous 
Flow 
The boundary is defined as a flow of 6.2 Tg phosphorous leaching per year from fertilizers (mined 
P) to erodible soils (Steffen et al. 2015). The per capita boundary value of 0.89 kg per year is the 
result of 6.2 Tg by the 2011 world population.  
Nitrogen Flow The boundary is 62 Tg N per year from industrial and intentional biological N fixation (de Vries et 
al. 2013). The per capita value of 8.9 kg N per year is the result of dividing 62 Tg N per by the 
2011 world population.  
Blue Water The maximum amount of consumptive use 
of blue water without regime shifts in the 
functioning of flow-dependent ecosystems 
(Steffen et al. 2015).  
The per capita boundary value per year is 574 m³, 
dividing the maximum annual global withdrawal of 
4000 km³ of blue water (Rockström, et al., 2009) 
by the 2011 global population 
eHANPP The embodied Human Appropriated Net 
Primary Production because of green 
plants’ photosynthesis 
2.62 t C per person per year. 
Ecological 
Footprint 
The amount of biologically productive land 
and sea area needed by a population to 
produce biotic resources and the 
absorption of the generated CO₂ emission 
(Borucke, et al. 2012)  
1.72 global hectares per person per year, the total 
of 12 billion hectares of biologically productive 
land and water available on Earth in 2013 (Global 
Footprint Network, 2015), divided by the 2013 
population. 
Material 
Footprint 
The amount of used material extraction 
(minerals, fossil fuels, and biomass) 
associated with the final demand for goods 
and services, regardless of where that 
extraction occurs.  
7.2 t per person per year, the value of not 
exceeding 50 Gt per year (Dittrich et al. ,2012) 
divided by 2011 world population (O’Neill et al., 
2018)  
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Table 3: Definition and Boundary Values for Social Performances Indicators  
  
Definition 
 
Threshold Value 
 
Life Satisfaction People’s self-assessment of their 
social wellbeing (Gallup World 
Happiness Report, 2015).  
6.5 out of a scale of 0 – 10, with 0 
indicating not satisfied at all and 10, 
very satisfied (O’Neill, et al. 2018) 
Healthy Life Expectancy  The number of years that an 
individual is expected to live in good 
health (without major debilitating 
disease of infirmity).  
65 
Nutrition Average calorific intake of food and 
drink per person per day, measured 
in kilocalories (kcal).  
2700 kcal per person per day 
Sanitation The percentage of population who 
have access to improved sanitation. 
95% 
Energy The percentage of population who 
have access to electricity. 
95% 
Education General Enrollment Rate in 
Secondary Education  
95% 
Income The percentage of population that 
lives on more than $1.90 a day. 
95% 
Equality Social wealth distribution assessed 
by Gini Index. 
70% (1- Gini Index of 30%) 
Democratic Quality The unweighted average of two 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Voice & Accountability and Political 
Stability & Absence of Violence 
(Kaufmann et al. 2010).  
0.8 (for a scale between -2.5 and 2.5) 
Social Support The percentage of population who 
believe they have someone to rely 
on when necessary  
90% 
Employment The percentage of employed 
population among available labor 
force.  
94% 
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The next section provides information on more detailed definition of each environmental and social 
indicator, the calculation of both the boundary and threshold values and the values relevant to individual 
countries’ performances.  
 
CO₂ Emission  
CO₂ emission is directly related to the 13th Sustainable Development Goal of taking urgent action to combat 
climate change and its impacts. Besides the amount of CO₂ emission can also be used to assess the level of 
population’s access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy, the 7th Sustainable Development 
Goad and the sustainability embedded in the consumption and production pattern, the 12th Goal of the 
Sustainable Development. CO₂ emissions, used to represent climate change, is defined as the remaining 
amount of accumulated CO₂ emission until 2100, in total 2900 Gt CO₂, to ensure the probability of >66% of 
limiting the human-induced temperature increase to less than 2°C relative to the period of 1861–1880 by 
2100 (IPCC, 2014). By 2011, about 1900 Gt CO₂ had already been emitted, with 1000Gt CO₂ remaining as the 
emission amount available by 2100. The per capita boundary of 1.61 t CO₂ per year in O’Neill et al.’s research 
(2018) is to divide the total remaining 1000 Gt CO₂ with the 2011 world population, around 7 billion5.  
 
To get the per capita CO₂ emission value for individual countries, consumption-based CO₂ emission footprint 
data from Eora MRIO are used in O’Neill et al.’s research (2018). Eora MRIO database provides both 
production-based and consumption-based emission values. Production-based value is termed as 
“Territorial,” meaning CO₂ emission from domestic production. Consumption-based CO₂ emissions, termed 
as the footprint values, includes the sum of territorial emission and emission embedded in imported goods, 
subtracted by the amount embedded in exported goods. There is also a category of emissions termed as 
“emissions from Direct Consumption”, the part of emission from household activities, such as heating and 
cooking, which is not included in domestic production. The total CO₂ consumption-based emission value, or 
the footprint value, for each country, is the total of the consumption-based emission value and the amount 
from household activities, for instance, emission from direct consumption. In Eora MRIO, the most up-to-
date territorial data is from 2008, while the emission amount embedded in trade was updated in 2015.  
 
Because of its research scope covering 152 countries, O’Neill et al. (2018) use the “footprint” values from 
Eora MRIO. The footprint values were calculated using the “territorial”, “import”, “’export” and “direct 
consumption” values provided at Eora MRIO. Considering the situation specific to these five states, I also 
adjust the type of data that should be included in the calculation. The following paragraph provides more 
detailed information.  
 
1) CO₂ emissions and CO₂ b emissions: 
According to the Eora MRIO database, CO₂ emissions includes both CO₂ emissions from burning of fossil 
fuels, and CO₂ b Emission from burning of biomass. Only CO₂ emissions from the burning of fossil fuels is 
included in O’Neil et al.’s research when estimating individual countries’ emission value. Despite that lower 
income countries start using more modern forms of energy, biomass and waste still account for 14% of 
worldwide energy output (World Atlas, 2017). The approach of neglecting the emissions from biomass 
burning is not appropriate for countries such as Haiti where the emissions from biomass burning is 5 times 
                                                             
5 In O’Neill et al.’s research (2018) the 2011 world population is estimated as 7 billion without indicating the source of data. I my 
calculation of individual country’s performance, population data is from the open database at the World Bank.  
 
 
33 
 
the emission from the burning of fossil fuels in Cuba, even though the two values appear to be similar. Such 
an approach fails to fairly represent the contribution to global GHG emission from countries with similar 
energy structure to that of Haiti and Cuba.  
 
In my thesis, both emissions from the burning of biomass and fossil fuels are included for a more accurate 
presentation of the CO₂ emissions contribution from the five Caribbean states. For each state, the following 
calculation applies: 
 
Consumption-based CO₂ emission (per capita) = (Consumption-based CO₂ emission + Consumption-based 
CO₂ b emission)/Population 
Consumption-based CO₂ emission = Territorial + Import – Export + Direct Consumption  
Consumption-based CO₂ b emission = Territorial + Import – Export + Direct Consumption  
 
2) Negative values for emission amount embedded in imported goods  
3) There are some negative values in the Eora MRIO database when certain countries’ CO₂ and CO₂b 
emissions in imported goods are concerned. Confirmed by the database provider, these values are treated as 
faulty values and have been adjusted to zero. Because of the negative emission values embedded in 
imported goods, the “footprint” values in Eora MRIO are lower than the actual footprint values. Table 4 
includes the states covered by this thesis with the negative imported emission values: 
 
Table 4: Countries with Negative Imported CO₂ Emission Values in Eora MRIO 
 
CO₂ Emission  
Country Year 
Trinidad & Tobago 1995 – 2015 
Dominican Republic 1999 – 2005 
CO₂ b Emission  
Cuba 1995 – 2005; 2008 – 2015 
Dominican Republic 1995 – 2010 
Haiti 1995 – 2015 
 
Biochemical Flow 
Biochemical Flow as the planetary boundary is defined as the maximum amount of phosphorous and 
nitrogen flow that leaches into surface water because of human interventions before pushing marine and 
aquatic systems across ecological thresholds of their own. The assessment of the amount of the Biochemical 
Flows into the aquatic systems is essential to the achievement of the 14th Sustainable Development Goal of 
Life Below Water because the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources is closely related not 
only to fishery but also to the stress on the overall aquatic system.  
 
As for phosphorous flow, the boundary has been designed to avert widespread eutrophication of freshwater 
systems, at a flow of 6.2 Tg phosphorous leaching per year from fertilizers (mined P) to erodible soils (Steffen 
et al. 2015). O’Neill et al. (2018) estimate the boundary value by dividing the annual 6.2 Tg by the 2011 world 
population to get the per capita annual value of 0.89 kg. In terms of nitrogen flow, the boundary for 
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eutrophication of aquatic ecosystem is estimated at 62 Tg N per year from industrial and intentional 
biological N fixation, using the most stringent quality criterion (de Vries et al. 2013). O’ Neil et al. estimate 
the per capita value as 8.9 kg N per year by dividing the boundary value of 62 Tg N per year by the 2011 
world population. O’Neill et al. (2018) use consumption-based phosphorous and nitrogen flow data, i.e., the 
footprint data, from Eora MRIO. The definitions for “territorial”, “import”, “export”, and “footprint” are the 
same as those related to the CO₂ emission6. Due to situations specific to these selected countries, the type of 
data that should be included has been adjusted, as well as the calculations themselves. The following section 
provides detailed information on the calculation of individual countries’ performances relevant to this 
indicator.  
  
1) Phosphorous Flow 
The underlying phosphorus fertilizer data provided in Eora MRIO were compiled by Potter et al. (2010) and 
are available from the NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). The phosphorus 
territorial data were based on estimates from the harvested area for the period 1997–2003, and fertilizer 
application rates for the period 1994–2001. There is only territorial data for the year 2000 in Eora MRIO 
datasets whilst data related to trade volumes are updated to the year 2015.  
 
O’Neill et al. (2018) account for the difference in time periods between the phosphorus (territorial) data (ca. 
2000) and the year considered in their study (ca. 2011), by scaling up the phosphorus data with a factor of 
1.42 to account for the difference in temporal scale. The factor of 1.42 is the current global phosphorous use 
of 14.2 Tg P per year, as reported by Steffen et al. (2015), divided by the 10.00 Tg P per year of the Eora MRIO 
global phosphorous use in the year 2000. There is one outstanding issue associated with this “scaling-up” 
approach because it fails to consider the population increase between 2000 and 2011 when per capita value 
is calculated. Besides, it is not appropriate to apply the same factor to reflect the change of phosphorous 
flow associated with the time scale for individual countries with different agricultural profiles.  
 
The second outstanding issue embedded in O’Neill et al.’s approach (2018) is when calculating the 
phosphorous flow, they only include contributions from synthetic fertilizer but ignore the flow from farm 
animal manure that is either used as organic fertilizer or left unattended on the pasture. This approach does 
not suit four out of five Caribbean countries, namely Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Trinidad & Tobago. 
They are still included in this thesis though because the contribution to phosphorous flow from farm animals 
in these countries exceeds the amount of flow from the application of the synthetic fertilizers. Table 5 below 
lists the countries and the amount of flow embedded in imported goods, using both synthetic fertilizer and 
manure, which are negative for different periods of time. As a result, the footprint values provided in Eora 
MRIO for these countries tend to be lower than the actual values for the period when the values embedded 
in imported goods are negative. The data provider suggests treating negative values as zero.  
 
Calculation of Phosphorous flow from Individual Nations 
To get a relatively more accurate per capita domestic phosphorous flow footprint value for the period 
between 1991 and 2015 by using the Eora MRIO 2000 value, the following steps have been taken in this 
thesis, varying between different countries.  
 
                                                             
6 There has been no biochemical flow from household activities (i.e. contribution from direct consumption in Eora MRIO).  
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Table 5: Countries with Negative Phosphorous Flow Embedded in Imported Goods 
Phosphorous Flow from Fertilizer  
Dominican Republic 2003 – 2004 
Haiti 1998 – 2006 
Phosphorous Flow from Manure 
Cuba 1995 – 2015 
Dominican Republic 1995 – 2009 
Haiti 1995 – 2015 
 
Cuba & Dominican Republic:  
The following data were collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ open 
database (FAOSTAT, 2018) between 1995 and 2015:  
--- Amount of phosphate fertilizer used as nutrients in agricultural use 
--- Amount of manure that is used as organic fertilizer in agricultural use 
--- Amount of manure that is left on the pastor  
 
The calculation includes comparing the amount of phosphate fertilizers used as agricultural nutrients and the 
amount of manure used as organic fertilizers and left on the pastor of individual years between 1995 and 
2015; with the corresponding values from 2000, and considering the population change between each 
individual year and 2000. In this way, the factors by which the individual years’ per capita phosphorous flow 
from both fertilizer and manure can be estimated based on the 2000 values, assuming that the proportion of 
phosphorous leaching into erodible soil remains constant. Using Cuba as an example, the following steps are 
taken to get the 2014 footprint value of phosphorous flow from only synthetic fertilizer:  
 
• Divide the amount of phosphate fertilizers used as agricultural nutrients in 2014 by the 2000 value 
and get ratio A (there is ratio A for each individual year) 
• Divide the population of 2014 by 2000 population and get ratio B (there is ratio B for each individual 
year) 
• Divide ratio A with ratio B and get Factor C (there is a Factor C for each individual year) 
• Multiply Factor C with the per capita territorial value of phosphorous flow from fertilizer in 2000 to 
get the 2014 value 
• Multiply the 2014 per capita value of phosphorous flow from fertilizer with the 2014 population to 
get the territorial value of phosphorous flow on a national level 
• Sum up the territorial value with the value embedded in imported goods and subtract the amount 
embedded in exported goods to get the footprint value of phosphorous flow from the application of 
synthetic fertilizer and divide the result by the 2014 population to get the final per capita value 
 
By taking the same approach, Cuba’s 2014 consumption-based phosphorous flow (footprint value) from 
manure, either used as organic fertilizer or left unattended on the pasture, can be calculated. By adding the 
footprint value of phosphorous flow from synthetic fertilizer with the value from manure, Cuba’s 2014 
consumption-based phosphorous flow value is calculated. In this way, per capita footprint value of 
phosphorous flow from both synthetic fertilizer and manure is calculated for each year between 1995 and 
2015. The same approach has been taken for Dominican Republic to calculate the final per capita footprint 
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value of phosphorous flow from both synthetic fertilizer and manure for each individual year between 1995 
and 2015. 
 
Haiti 
For Haiti, data related to the use of phosphate fertilizers are available only for the period between 1995 and 
2002 at FOA. Several extra steps were taken to get a more accurate factor, by which the per capita footprint 
value of phosphorous flow from fertilizers and manure for each individual year between 1995 and 2015 can 
be calculated. Using the phosphorous flow from synthetic fertilizer as an example, the follow steps are taken 
in this thesis:  
 
• To collect data related to the use of phosphate fertilizers in each individual year between 1995 and 
2002 
• Divide the value of each year with that of 2000 to get ratio A (there is ratio A for each individual year) 
• Divide the population of each individual year with that of 2000 to get ratio B (there is ratio B for each 
individual year) 
• Divide ratio A with ratio B to get Factor C (there is Factor C for each individual year) 
• Factor C is the factor by which the per capita territorial value of phosphorous flow from fertilizer of 
each individual year between 1995 and 2002 is estimated by multiplying Factor C with the value of 
2000 
• Use the average per capita territorial value of phosphorous flow from fertilizer between 1995 and 
1998 as the “beginning value” and the average per capita territorial value of phosphorous flow from 
fertilizer between 1999 and 2002 as the “end value” to calculate the Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(CAGR) 
• By using the Compound Annual Growth Rate for the per capita territorial value of phosphorous flow 
from fertilizer, the corresponding per capita territorial value for each individual year between 2003 
and 2015 is estimated 
• The national territorial value of phosphorous flow from synthetic fertilizer between 1995 and 2015 
can be estimated by multiplying the per capita value of each year by the corresponding population 
size 
• Sum up the territorial value with the value embedded in imported goods and subtract the amount 
embedded in exported goods for each individual year to get the footprint value of phosphorous flow 
values from the application of synthetic fertilizer and divide the result by the population of the 
relevant year to get the final per capita value (there is no phosphorous flow from direct 
consumption, i.e., household activities) 
 
The same approach is taken in this thesis to calculate the per capita footprint of phosphorous flow from 
manure of farm animals for each individual year between 1995 and 2015 in Haiti. The total of the per capita 
value of phosphorous flow from synthetic fertilizer and manure for a specific year is Haiti’s final per capital 
footprint phosphorous flow for that year.  
 
Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica 
The territorial phosphorous flow from both fertilizers and manure is zero for Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica. 
The value of zero means there is no recorded territorial phosphorous contribution in 2000 in these two 
countries, either from the application of synthetic fertilizer or farm animal manure, at Eora MRIO. This 
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contradicts with FAO data that indicate the amounts of phosphate fertilizers applied and the amount of 
manure, when used both as organic fertilizer or left unattended on the pasture, in both Trinidad & Tobago 
and Jamaica in 2000. In this thesis, domestic contribution in these two countries is treated as zero. As a 
result, the estimated phosphorous flow values for these two countries are lower than the actual values.  
 
2) Nitrogen Flow 
The underlying nitrogen fertilizer data provided in Eora MRIO are also compiled by Potter et al. (2010) and 
available from the NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). The nitrogen territorial data 
are based on estimates of harvested area for the period 1997–2003, and fertilizer application rates for the 
period 1994–2001. There is only territorial data for 2000 in Eora MRIO datasets, while data related to trade 
volume (both import and export) are updated to 2015 at Eora MRIO database.  
 
O’Neill et al. (2018) take the same approach to account for the differences in time periods between the 
nitrogen (territorial) data (ca. 2000) and the year considered in the study (ca. 2011). They scale up the 
nitrogen data to match current global nitrogen use (150 Tg P y-1) as reported by Steffen et al. (2015). 
However, the factor used for the scaling up is not indicated in their paper. Just as with the calculation of the 
phosphorous flow change, the same outstanding issue remains. The change is calculated based on the 2000 
value because their approach fails to incorporate the increase of population between 2000 and 2011 when 
estimating the per capita value. Secondly, O’Neill et al. (2018) only include the nitrogen fixation that leaches 
into erodible soil from the application of synthetic fertilizers, but neglect the leaching from farm animal 
manure that is either used as organic fertilizer or left unattended on the pasture. In Trinidad & Tobago and 
Jamaica, the leaching of nitrogen fixation from manure embedded in imported goods exceeds the amount 
from the application of synthetic fertilizers. Therefore, the practice of neglecting the flow from farm animal 
manure fails to represent the true contribution of nitrogen flow in these two countries.  
 
The nitrogen flow from both synthetic fertilizer and manure embedded in imported goods are negative at 
Eora MRIO for Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti for periods between 1995 and 2015. The negative values 
are treated as zero as suggested by the data provider. The actual N fixation embedded in imported goods 
might probably be higher than zero and therefore the footprint values presented in this thesis might be 
lower than the actual values for years when the imported values are recorded as being negative. Table 6 lists 
detailed information.  
 
Table 6: Countries with Negative Nitrogen Flowerbed in Imported Goods  
Phosphorous Flow from Fertilizer  
Dominican Republic 2003 – 2004 
Haiti 1998 – 2006 
Phosphorous Flow from Manure 
Cuba 1995 – 2015 
Dominican Republic 1995 – 2009 
Haiti 1995 – 2015 
 
Finally, the domestic nitrogen flow amount from synthetic fertilizer and manure for Trinidad & Tobago and 
Jamaica is recorded as zero for the year 2000 in Eora MRIO. Despite the actual status of their agricultural 
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sectors, there should be nitrogen fixation that leaches into the erodible soil because of the domestic 
synthetic fertilizer application and farm animal manure7, as indicated by the FAO data.  
 
The calculation of the final per capita footprint value of nitrogen flow between 1995 and 2015, including the 
contribution from both the application of synthetic fertilizers and farm animal manure, is the same as the 
calculation of the per capita footprint phosphorous flow for each of these five Caribbean states. 
 
Blue Water 
Blue water is defined as water from rivers, lakes, reservoirs and renewable stores (Falkenmark, 1997). The 
application of blue water as an environmental indicator can be traced to two Sustainable Development 
Goals, the 6th Goal of Water and Sanitation and the 11th Goal of safe, resilient and sustainable cities and 
human settlement. The boundary is defined as the maximum amount of consumptive use of blue water 
without regime shifts in the functioning of flow-dependent ecosystems (Steffen et al. 2015). The boundary 
value for blue water is the maximum annual global withdrawal of 4000 km³ of blue water (Rockström, et al., 
2009), and the per capital boundary value estimated by O’Neill et al. (2018) is 574 m³ per year by dividing the 
maximum amount of 4000 km³ with the 2011 global population.  
 
Recent research complements the blue water consumption boundary, 4000 km³ y⁻¹, originally proposed by 
Rockström et al. (2009) with a basin-scale boundary in recognition of the heterogeneity in hydrological 
characteristics of river basins around the world (Weiskel, et al. 2014). The basin-scale boundary draws on the 
concept of minimum “environmental flow requirements” needed by healthy riparian/coastal ecosystems and 
incorporates the monthly flow variation to reflect seasonal changes in freshwater availability by tracking 
monthly flows (Pastor, et al. 2014). However, due to the lack of monthly basin-scaled data that include blue 
water consumption embedded in international trade of water-intensive products, the original 4000 km³ y⁻¹ 
boundary value is used in the thesis, consistent with the approach taken by O’Neill et al. (2018).  
 
National water use data in the thesis are obtained from the Water Footprint Network (WFN, 2018), which are 
an average for the period 1996–2005 (the most recent period available). The data measured the 
consumption and pollution of blue water related to the domestic water supply, plus virtual-water imports 
and minus virtual-water exports, and therefore is a consumption-based measurement. The blue water data 
were scaled up to match current global freshwater use (2600 km3 y-1), as reported by Steffen et al. (2015). It 
is not indicated by O’Neill et al. (2018) in their research what factor is used when scaling up the national blue 
water consumption value to reflect changes associated with the time-scale. The average global blue water 
consumption between 1996 and 2005 is 943325 Mm³/year8. By dividing Steffen et al. (2015)’s estimation of 
2600 km³ in 2011 with 943325Mm³, incorporating the population increase between 2005 and 2011, I work 
out the factor of 2.56, by which the possible 2011 values for the five nations can be scaled up based on the 
average value between 1996 and 2005.  
                                                             
7 FAO indicates in 2000, the amount of phosphate fertilizer application as nutrients in Trinidad & Tobago was 686 tons, and 7278 Tons 
for the amount of nitrogen fertilizer application as nutrients. The total amount of manure both as organic fertilizer and left on the 
pasture was 3121 Tons in 2000. For Jamaica, the amount of phosphate fertilizer used as nutrients was 5200 tons and 9900 tons for 
nitrogen. The total amount of manure was 9291 tons. However, FAO collected such data from a variety of sources, such as survey and 
national statistics, and the data values over the years do not indicate a clear trend.  
8 Data Source: Water Footprint Network, the same data source for the consumption-based blue water value used in this thesis. 
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eHANPP 
The original planetary boundaries framework proposes a maximum of 15% of ice-free land being used for 
crops as the measure for change in land use (Rockström, et al. 2009). A more recent land-system change 
boundary is defined as a minimum of 75% of global original forest cover (Steffen et al. 2015). However, the 
distribution of forests varies substantially among countries, and the area of forested land associated with the 
consumption of goods and services is a difficult indicator to measure. A more nuanced indicator, Human 
Appropriation of Net Primary Production” (HANPP) has been developed that integrates land-system change, 
biosphere integrity, freshwater use and biogeochemical cycles and measure land use intensity (Running, 
2012). It measures the amount of biomass harvested through agriculture and forestry, as well as biomass 
that is killed during harvest, but not used, as well as biomass that is lost due to land use change (Kastner, et 
al. 2015). Built on HANPP, embodied Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production (eHANPP), a 
consumption-based resource indicator, is developed to incorporate biomass change embedded in trade and 
reveal the portion of biomass change that can be traced back to the final consumers (Haberl et al. 2012). 
Haberl et al. (2012) believe only half of the variation in national eHANPP can be explained by differences in 
national land-use system, which suggests a considerable influence of trade on the national land use intensity. 
O’Neill et al. (2018) adopts national eHANPP in their research to recognize the role played by trade in land 
use intensity on national level. The assessment of eHANPP is closely related to the 15th Sustainable 
Development Goal of protection, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainable 
management of forests and the halting and reversion of land degradation and biodiversity loss.  
 
To fully understand eHANPP as an indicator for biomass change, it is necessary to explain some basic 
concepts related to it. Haberl, et al. (2014) defines Net Primary Production (NPP) as the amount of biomass 
produced by green plants through photosynthesis per unit of time (usually one year) and space. ΔNPPLC is 
the change of biomass because of land use conversion, such as forest being cleared off for more croplands. 
NPPh means the biomass flow as a result of the extraction or destruction of a fraction of the NPP for human 
purposes (i.e. through biomass harvest or grazing of livestock). Human Appropriation of Net Primary 
Production (HANPP) is the amount of productivity of ecosystems that is appropriated by human, including 
ΔNPPLC , the part of NPP that is appropriated by the replacement of pristine ecosystems with human-
modified landscapes and NPPh, the part of NPP that is removed from ecosystems as food, feed, fiber or 
bioenergy projection (Haberl et al. 2007; Imhoff et al. 2004; Kastner, et al., 2015; Vitousek et al., 1986). 
eHANPP can be interpreted as the consumption-based HANPP on national level, it is the sum of the domestic 
production-based HANPP and the part of HANPP embedded in imported goods, subtracted by the amount 
embedded in exported goods. eHANPP reflects the impact of international trade on human appropriation of 
the net primary production as a result of green plants’ photosynthesis. On a global level, the annual HANPP 
and eHANPP amounts are the same, both representing the appropriation of net primary production of 
human intervention.  
 
Running (2012) indicates that per year only 5 GT NPP, represented as NPP potential or NPPpot, remains 
available for further appropriation by human activities. The 2007 global HANPP, based on Kastner et al.’s 
(2015) estimate, is 13.2 Gt C y-1, which is 10% lower than other published data, since this value does not 
include NPP change embedded in human-induced fires and infrastructure. The boundary value for biomass 
available for human activities, 18.2 Gt C per year, is calculated as the sum of NPPpot and the already 
appropriated NPP of 2007. The annual per capita boundary value for biomass change, 2.62 t C, is estimated 
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by dividing the total value of 18.2 Gt C by the 2011 world population, which is roughly equivalent to 33% of 
NPPpot, 5 GT NPP (O’Neill, et al. 2018). 
 
The eHANPP data for the five subject nations in the Caribbean region are provided directly by Dr. Kastner 
upon request. Kastner also provided the eHANPP data relevant to 152 countries for O’Neill et al. (2018) in the 
unit of dry matter. Suggested by Dr. Kastner, a factor of 0.5 is applied when converting the dry matter into 
carbon fixation9 to remain consistent with the unit used by O’Neill et al. in their research (2018). The most 
recent eHANPP data provided by Dr. Kastner are for 2007.  
 
Ecological Footprint 
The concept of ecological footprint (EF) is initially conceived by Rees & Wackernagei (1996) and defined as 
the total area of productive land and water required continuously to produce all the resources consumed 
and to assimilate all the wastes produced, by a defined population, wherever on Earth that land is located. It 
is a land-based surrogate measure of the population's demands on natural capital that measures the amount 
of biologically productive land and sea area needed by a population to produce biotic resources and the 
absorption of the generated CO₂ emission (Borucke, et al. 2012; Rees & Wackernagei, 1996). As an 
environmental indicator, ecological footprint is permeated into the majority of Sustainable Development 
Goals because of its relevance to climate change, land and marine resources use and the overall integrity of 
the ecosystem. The ecological footprint is the sum of six components, including cropland, forest land, fishing 
grounds, grazing land, built-up land, and carbon, which can be compared to the total amount of available 
area of biologically productive land and sea area (O’Neill, et al. 2018). There are about 12 billion hectares of 
biologically productive land and water available on Earth, according to data from 2013. The per capita 
boundary value, 1.72 global hectares, is estimated by dividing the total 12 billion hectares by the number of 
people alive in that year (Global Footprint Network, 2015). The per capita ecological footprint values of the 
five Caribbean small island states between 1995 and 2014 used in the thesis are from the Global Footprint 
Network, the same source for data used by O’ Neil et al.  
  
Material Footprint 
Material footprint, also known as “raw material consumption” (RMC), measures the amount of used material 
extraction (minerals, fossil fuels, and biomass) associated with the final demand for goods and services, 
regardless of where that extraction occurs. Being a fully consumption-based measure, it includes the 
upstream (embodied) raw materials related to imports and exports (Wiedmann et al. 2015). As an 
environmental performance indicator, material footprint is directly related to sustainable development 
because the footprint level determines the overall stress on the ecosystem, material consumption and 
resulted emission. The non-exceeding value of 50 Gt per year, as suggested by Dittrich et al. (2012), is 
adopted as the boundary value and the per capita value of 7.2 t per year. This was estimated by dividing 50 
Gt by the 2011 world population by O’Neill et al. (2018). Data for each national material footprint in this 
thesis are from Eora MRIO, the same source used by O’ Neil et al. which is based on Wiedmann et al.’s 
research (2015). The definitions for “Territorial”, “Import” and “Export” material consumptions are the same 
as those related to CO₂ emissions and biochemical flow. There has been no recorded material consumption 
embedded in household activities. The territorial values are updated to the year 2008 and the material 
consumption embedded in trade has been updated until 2015.  
                                                             
9 As confirmed by Dr. Kastner, one ton of dry matter equals 0.5 ton of carbon fixation.  
 
 
41 
 
Some data errors exist since the material consumption values embedded in imported goods are negative for 
some countries for certain periods between 1995 and 2015. Table 7 below lists detailed information. 
Confirmed by the data provider, all negative values are treated as zero in this thesis. The material footprint 
values used in this thesis might be lower than the actual values for countries that heavily depend on 
imported goods but have recorded negative values of material consumption embedded in imported goods10. 
  
Table 7: Countries with Negative Value of Material Consumption Embedded in Imported Goods  
Country Year (when the material consumption embedded in 
imported goods is negative and adjusted to zero) 
Cuba 1996 – 2002; 2004 
Dominican Republic 2001 – 2005 
Haiti 1995 – 2009 
Jamaica 1995 – 2015 
Trinidad & Tobago 1995 – 2015 
 
The calculation of material footprint for each individual country is the sum of territorial material, 
consumption and consumption embedded in imported goods, subtracted by the amount of material 
consumption embedded in exported goods. The result is divided by the population size of the relevant year 
to get the per capita value. 
 
Life Satisfaction 
A single life satisfaction measure, known as the Cantril life ladder, is used when measuring life satisfaction 
(O’Neill et al. 2018). The English-language wording of the question is: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps 
numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for 
you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder 
would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” This question is copied from the Gallup World Poll, 
as published in Gallup’s 2015 World Happiness Report. The value for life satisfaction, or “Subjective 
Wellbeing” in the World Happiness Report, is the national average response to the question of life 
evaluation. The sample size ranges between 2000 and 3000 for individual countries and the 2015 score is the 
3 or 2-year average survey result for each country.  
 
Usually a score of 7 out of 10 is chosen to indicate a “high” level of subjective human wellbeing (ONS, 2015). 
A value of 6.5 out of 10 is chosen to represent the minimum threshold for the life satisfaction indicator by 
O’Neill et al. (2018). The lower threshold is adopted because scores derived from the Cantril ladder question 
are found to be 0.5 points lower on average than scores derived from the question used by many statistical 
agencies (O’Neill, et al.,2018). The researchers use relevant values in the Gallup 2015 World Happiness 
Report to assess individual countries’ life satisfaction. In this thesis, data values from the 2018 Gallup World 
Happiness Report are used, which include the 2017 results for Trinidad & Tobago, Dominican Republic and 
Jamaica.  
 
                                                             
10 As shown later in this thesis, these five countries are heavily dependent on imported goods for food supply. Therefore, there 
should be biomass consumption embedded in imported goods.  
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Healthy Life Expectancy  
This indicator is closely related to life expectancy at birth, which on average is nine years lower than overall 
life expectancy (with a standard deviation of 1) (O’Neill et al., 2018). In their research, healthy life expectancy 
values are from the Gallup 2015 World Happiness Report, which are based on data from the World Health 
Organization, World Development Indicators, and statistics published in academic articles. O’Neill et al. 
(2018) set the threshold at 65 years for a healthy life. In 2011, 40% of the countries for which data were 
available for this indicator achieved this threshold. In this thesis, the more up-to-date data in the 2018 Gallup 
World Happiness Report are used.  
 
Nutrition 
Nutrition is measured by O’ Neill et al. using the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s “food supply” 
indicator (FAOSTAT, 2014). This indicator is measured in kilocalories (kcal) per capita per day and represents 
an average calorific intake of food and drink. It is stated in O’Neill et al.’s research (2018) that the 
physiological requirements for an average adult range between 2100 and 2900 kcal per day. However, 
considering the caloric requirements connected with labor or athletic activities, this limit can easily be 
exceeded. They consider an average of 2500 kcal per person per day as an individual minimum average level, 
below which is facing undernourishment. A value of 2700 kcal per person per day is used by O’Neill et al. 
(2018) as a population-wide threshold, to allow for some inequality in distribution. In this thesis, data values 
between 1995 and 2013 are collected from FAOSTAT (2014) for the five subject Caribbean states. 
 
Sanitation  
This indicator measures the percentage of the population that has access to improved sanitation facilities. It 
is argued by Raworth (2012) that 100% of the population should have access to improved sanitation because 
it is a fundamental aspect of a life free of deprivation. The target adopted in the Millennium Development 
Goals to provide about 80% of the global population with access to improved sanitation has been achieved 
(UN, 2015). O’ Neill et al. use the threshold of 95% of the population having access to improved sanitation 
because of the recognized difficulty associated with extending universal access to the last 5% of a population, 
often located in very rural areas. In this thesis, data was collected from the same data source, World 
Development Indicators, for values between 1995 and 2015 for the five Caribbean small island states.  
 
Energy (Access to Electricity) 
This indicator measures the percentage of population that has access to electricity. A threshold value of 95% 
of the population having access to electricity is used by O’Neill et al. (2018). In this thesis, the same indicator 
is used, and data are from the same source, World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2015a). Values 
between 1996 and 2015 are collected for the five subject states in the Caribbean.  
 
Education 
O’Neill et al. (2018) measure individual countries’ performances in education by using the Gross Enrolment 
Rate in Secondary Education. This refers to the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population 
that are of secondary-school age. This indicator is selected because it is suggested without more subject or 
skill-oriented education during teenage years, young people tend to be not only ill-prepared for tertiary 
education or the workforce, but are also more likely to be attracted to activities with negative effects on well-
being, such as juvenile delinquency, teenage pregnancy and radicalization by militants (Cohen, 2008). In 
addition, based on evidence from developing countries, women completing secondary education have, on 
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average, at least one child fewer per lifetime compared to women who complete only primary education. 
Secondary education seems to have the potential to reduce population growth (Holsinger & Cowell, 2000). A 
threshold value of 95% of Gross Enrolment in secondary education is applied by O’Neill et al. (2018). The 
gross enrolment rate data used in O’Neill et al.’s research (2018) are from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015a). This thesis collects data from the same source, with proxy data 
for Haiti.  
 
Income 
This indicator measures the percentage of the population that lives on more than USD $1.90 a day. A 
threshold value of 95% is used in Good Life for All within the Planetary Boundaries, given the fact that not 
many countries report this indicator above 95%. Using $1.90 a day as a standard is more associated with 
countries that have the target of eradicating extreme poverty (O’Neill, 2018). Data sparsity is a serious issue 
for this indicator when the five subject states are concerned. Dominican Republic is the only country with 
data available between 2000 and 2015. Jamaica has data for only 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2004. There are no 
data relevant to this indicator for Trinidad & Tobago, Cuba and Haiti at the World Bank database. Different 
measures have been taken to get proxy values for these three nations.  
 
Social Support 
The social support indicator used in O’Neill et al.’s research (2018) measures whether or not people have 
someone to count on in times of need. This indicator is selected because it is believed that having social 
support is essential to achieving long, happy and healthy lives (Cobb, 1976). Social support is assessed by 
measuring whether people believe they have someone to rely on in times of difficulty or need. Relevant data 
are from the Gallup 2015 World Happiness Report, which is the national average binary response (0 or 1) to 
the question, “If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever 
you need them, or not”. In O’Neill et al.’s research (2018), a value of 0.9 or 90% is chosen as the minimum 
threshold for this indicator. The relatively lower threshold value is chosen to accommodate availability 
heuristic, which is biased towards emotionally charged, memorized, differentiate, long-term and short-term 
lack of social support (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This thesis used data from the same source, however, 
instead of data from the 2015 Gallup World Happiness Report, values from the more recent 2018 report are 
used.  
 
Democratic Quality 
This indicator used by O’Neill, et al. (2018) is comprised of an unweighted average of two Worldwide 
Governance Indicators: Voice & Accountability and Political Stability & Absence of Violence (Kaufmann et al. 
2010). Voice & Accountability and Political Stability & Absence of Violence indicators are built upon multiple 
sources, such as household surveys and interviews with experts, firms, and nongovernmental organizations, 
and are scaled between roughly -2.5 (poor democratic quality) and 2.5 (strong democratic quality), along 
which a threshold value of 0.80 is chosen. This is the approximate value for the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The reason why the score of these two countries is chosen as the threshold value is that that 
democratic systems of these two countries are by no means ranked as the highest performing but are 
nonetheless well-known in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. To be consistent, instead of using the 
original data values for the two indicators from the World Bank Database and calculating the unweighted 
average, this thesis uses values from the 2018 Gallup World Happiness Report since O’Neill et al. (2018) use 
values from the 2015 report.  
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Equality 
Social wealth distribution is used to assess equality by O’Neill et al. (2018) in line with the belief that more 
equal societies have fewer health and social problems than less equal ones (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). The 
Gini coefficient, the value estimated by using equivalized (square root scale) household disposable income 
(the amount of income after tax and transfers) is used to measure the distribution of societal wealth. 
Following the rationale of a higher value of the social indicators representing better performance, O’Neill et 
al. (2018) calculate equality as one minus the Gini coefficient11, the higher the GINI index, the lower social 
equality. In O’Neill, et al.’s research (2018), a maximum Gini coefficient of 0.30 is used in the calculation of 
the threshold value of equality. This value of 0.30 falls in between the Gini coefficients associated with “low” 
and “medium” total income inequality (0.26 and 0.36, respectively), as characterized by Piketty (2014). The 
threshold value for equality therefore is 0.70 or 70%, calculated as 1 minus the selected maximum Gini 
coefficient of 0.30 or 30%. When assessing equality, O’Neill et al. (2018) use data from the October 2014 
release (v5.0) of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Frederic Solt dataverse, 2014). This 
thesis uses data from the same database, however, instead of using the version 5.0, a more center version of 
6.1 (which was released in October 2017) is used (Frederic Solt dataverse, 2016).  
 
Employment 
Employment is measured by O’Neill et al. (2018) because of the important role it plays in enabling social and 
economic autonomy (Doyal & Gough, 1991). It is assessed as one minus the unemployment rate, with the 
unemployment rate as the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment. An unemployment rate of 6% is used as the threshold value by O’Neill et al. (2018) since it is 
roughly equivalent to the average non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) for OECD 
countries (OECD, 2000). Therefore, the threshold value of employment rate is set at 94% of its working 
population being employed. O’Neill et al. (2018) use data from harmonized unemployment rates from World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015a) to assess the employment situation of individual 
countries covered by their research. In this thesis, the 1995- 2016 harmonized unemployment data related to 
the five Caribbean states are collected from the same database and the employment ratio is calculated by 
subtracting 1 with the relevant unemployment ratio. 
 
Assessment of Individual Countries’ Environmental and Social Performances 
In O’Neill et al.’s research (2018), each country’s environmental performances are assessed by dividing each 
indicator’s most recently available value, with the boundary value. A ratio larger than 1 indicates the country 
exceeds the boundary value, while a ratio less than 1 means the country performs within the boundary. The 
actual value of the ratio signifies the magnitude of individual countries’ stress on the ecosystem.  
 
As for social performances, individual countries are assessed by dividing each social outcome indicator value 
with the threshold value. A ratio larger than 1 indicates the country satisfies the relevant social outcome and 
a ratio less than 1 means the country currently fails to achieve the goal. The actual value of the ratio signifies 
the degree by which individual countries succeed or fail in their efforts to achieve the social outcomes.  
                                                             
11 A Gini Coefficient of 0 indicates total equality, with everyone having the same amount of wealth, while a value of 1, means one 
person owns all social wealth. The higher the value, the less equal the society (a lower value of the Gini Coefficient indicates better 
performance). Therefore, equality is estimated by 1 minus the Gini Coefficient, rather than the Gini Coefficient, to be consistent with 
the estimation of other indicators.  
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My thesis adopts the same approach, using data relevant to individual countries’ environmental and social 
performances from the same sources. Besides the assessment of the most recent environmental and social 
performances, contingent to data availability, the trend of change for the period between 1995 and 2017 or 
alternatively, between 1995 and 2008, depending on data availability, has also been analyzed.  
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4 RESULTS 
Individual countries’ environmental and social performances are compared with the biosphere boundaries 
and social outcome threshold values. The section below is to present findings relevant to each individual 
country.  
 
4.1 Trinidad & Tobago  
As shown in Figure 9, Trinidad & Tobago exceeds 6 out of 7 planetary boundaries and achieves 5 out of 11 
social outcomes. The only planetary boundary Trinidad & Tobago has not exceeded is the one associated with 
blue water, based on the estimated 2011 value. Table 8 below quantifies the level of stress on the ecosystem 
and the extent to which social outcomes have been satisfied.  
 
Figure 9: Trinidad & Tobago’s position within the Safe and Just Space of the Doughnut  
 
 
 
The 2008 CO₂ emissions footprint and material footprint values of Trinidad & Tobago are 34 times and 9 
times the boundary values respectively. The CO₂ emissions from burning of fossil fuels is 40 times the 
amount from burning of biomass. After reaching its peak in 2009, the country’s ecological footprint starts 
decreasing until 2014, when the value is still more than 4 times the boundary value. Trinidad & Tobago 
exceeds the biochemical boundaries for both phosphorous and nitrogen flows. Both phosphorous and 
LS: Life Satisfaction 
LE: Healthy Life Expectancy 
NU: Nutrition 
SA: Sanitation 
IN: Income 
EN: Energy 
ED: Education 
SS: Social Support 
DE: Democratic Quality 
EQ: Equality 
EM: Employment  
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nitrogen flows are values embedded in imported goods because data related to domestic contribution is not 
available.  
 
Table 8: Environmental and Social Performances of Trinidad & Tobago 
Environmental Performances: 
A ratio <1 means the country functions within the boundary level; a ratio > 1 means the country exceeds the 
boundary level. Areas shaded in red means areas where the country exceeds the boundary level.  
 Boundary Level 
(per capita per year) 
Trinidad & Tobago’s 
Performance 
(per capita per year) 
Ratio 
(Trinidad & Tobago 
performance/ Boundary 
Value) 
CO₂ Emission 1.61 t 52.24 t 32.45 
Phosphorous Flow 0.89 kg 1.92 kg 2.15 
Nitrogen Flow 8.9 kg 9.36 kg 1.05 
Blue Water 574 m³ 282 m³ 0.49 
eHANPP 2.62 t C 2.84 t C 1.08 
Ecological Footprint 1.71 gha 6.69 gha 4.80 
Material Footprint 7.2 t 69.57 t 9.66 
Social Performances:  
A ratio < 1 means the country fails to achieve the social outcome; a ratio >1 means the country satisfies the 
social outcome. Areas shaded in green means areas where the country fails to satisfy the social outcomes. 
 Threshold Value Trinidad & Tobago’s 
Performance 
Ratio 
(Trinidad & Tobago 
performance/ 
Threshold value) 
Life Satisfaction  6.5 6.192 0.95 
Healthy Life Expectancy 65 61.738 0.95 
Nutrition  2700 3052 1.13 
Sanitation  95% 91.5% 0.96 
Access to Electricity 95% 100% 1.05 
Income 95% 100% 1.05 
Education 95% 85.51% 0.9 
Social Support 90% 91.6% 1.01 
Democratic Quality 0.8 0.288 0.36 
Equality 70 58.46 0.84 
Employment  94% 95.29% 1.01 
 
From the social perspective, Trinidad & Tobago exceeds the threshold values for nutrition, income, energy, 
social support and employment. As for Income, there is no recent data available related to the percentage of 
population in Trinidad & Tobago who lives on more than $ 1.90 a day. This thesis follows O’ Neill et al.’s 
assumption that, as a member of the high-income country (World Bank, 2018), 100% of Trinidad & Tobago’s 
population lives on more than $1.90 a day. Trinidad & Tobago’s score for life satisfaction decreases from 6.7 
in 2008, above the threshold value of Cantrill score of 6.5, to approximately 6.2 in 2013, 0.3 point below the 
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threshold value of 6.5. Since 2012, the value remains relatively consistent until 2017. Its score for social 
support drops from 88.7% in 2006 to 85.8% in 2008. Since 2008 it starts to rise until reaching the highest 
value of 91.6% in 2017, slightly higher than the threshold value of 90%.  
 
Although healthy life expectancy has increased from 60.2 in 2006 to 61.3 in 2017, Trinidad & Tobago has not 
met the threshold value of 65. Data on gross enrolment in secondary school are not available for Trinidad & 
Tobago for most years between 1995 and 2015, except 2004 when the value is recorded as 85.5%, 10% lower 
than the threshold value of 95%. Trinidad & Tobago’s equality value ranges between 0.59 and 0.58 during 
the period of 1997 – 2005, with the most recent value being 83% of the threshold value of 0.7. In general, its 
equality value is relatively constant between 1997 and 2005, with gradual decrease between 2002 and 2005. 
After increasing from 0.19 in 2006 to 0.33 in 2011, Trinidad & Tobago’s score for democratic quality 
decreases to 0.29 in 2013, 36% of the threshold value of 0.8. The employment rate has been increasing 
between 1995 and 2016, and in 2016, about 97.8% of the total labour force were employed. It starts the 
slight downward trend in 2016 and decreases by 2.7% to 95.2% in 2018.  
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4.2 Dominican Republic  
As shown in Figure 10, Dominican Republic exceeds 4 out of 7 planetary boundaries, including CO₂ emissions, 
phosphorous flow, eHANPP and material footprint, and operates marginally within the boundary of nitrogen 
flow and ecological footprint. From social perspective, Dominican Republic achieves 3 out of 11 social 
outcomes: energy, income and employment. 
 
Figure 10: Dominican Republic’s position within the Safe and Just Space of the Doughnut 
 
The 2008 CO₂ emissions from the burning of fossil fuels and biomass is nearly three times the planetary 
boundary value. It increases from 4.02 ton per person in 1998 to 4.39 ton per person in 2003 and then 
decreases to 4.18 ton per person in 2005. This increase resumes in 2006 and reaches 4.73 ton per person in 
2008. As for household activities, CO₂ emissions from the burning of biomass was around 1.6 times the 
amount of the emissions from the burning of fossil fuels between 1995 and 2003. Starting from 2004, 
emissions from the household burning of biomass increased until 2008. The CO₂ emissions from the 
household burning of fossil fuels remained constant between 1995 and 2008. Both phosphorous and 
nitrogen flow from the application of synthetic fertilizer and farm animal manure were relatively constant 
between 1995 and 2015. The amount of nitrogen flow, from both synthetic fertilizer and manure embedded 
in imported goods, increased by 235%, from 6866 ton in 2010 to 16145 ton in 2011. The amount of 
phosphorous flow, embedded in imported goods, has similar trend of change but on a smaller scale. 
 
 
LS: Life Satisfaction 
LE: Healthy Life Expectancy 
NU: Nutrition 
SA: Sanitation 
IN: Income 
EN: Energy 
ED: Education 
SS: Social Support 
DE: Democratic Quality 
EQ: Equality 
EM: Employment  
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Table 9: Environmental and Social Performances of Dominican Republic  
Environmental Performances: 
A ratio <1 means the country functions within the boundary level; a ratio > 1 means the country exceeds the 
boundary level. Areas shaded in red means areas where the country exceeds the boundary level.  
 Boundary Level 
(per capita per year) 
Dominican Republic 
Performance 
(per capita per year) 
Ratio 
(Dominican Republic 
performance/ Boundary 
Value) 
CO₂ Emission 1.61 t 4.74 t 2.94 
Phosphorous Flow 0.89 kg 1.58 kg 1.77 
Nitrogen Flow 8.9 kg 8.27 kg 0.93 
Blue Water 574 m³ 334.08 m³ 0.58 
eHANPP 2.62 t C 2.78 t C 1.06 
Ecological Footprint 1.71 gha 1.59 gha 0.99 
Material Footprint 7.2 t 12.68 t 1.76 
Social Performances:  
A ratio < 1 means the country fails to achieve the social outcome; a ratio >1 means the country satisfies the 
social outcome. Areas shaded in green means areas where the country fails to satisfy the social outcomes. 
 Threshold Value Dominican Republic’s 
Performance 
Ratio 
(Dominican Republic 
performance/ 
Threshold value) 
Life Satisfaction  6.5 5.605 0.86 
Healthy Life Expectancy 65 63.496 0.98 
Nutrition  2700 2614 0.97 
Sanitation  95% 84% 0.88 
Access to Electricity 95% 100% 1.05 
Income 95% 98.1% 1.03 
Education 95% 77.17% 0.81 
Social Support 90% 89.44% 0.99 
Democratic Quality 0.8 0.239 0.30 
Equality 70 55.41 0.79 
Employment  94% 94.22% 1.00 
 
Material footprint in Dominican Republic fluctuated between 1995 and 2008. It was relatively constant 
between 1995 and 2001, and then increased from the per capita value of 11.61 t in 2001 to 17.15 t in 2002, 
an increase of 147%. The value started decreasing in 2002 until 2006 when it fell to 11.61 t, roughly the same 
as the 2001 value. It resumes increasing in 2007, with the 2008 value 1.76 times the boundary value. 
Material consumption embedded in imported and exported goods was constant between 1995 and 200012. 
The value embedded in imported goods increased to 37 million ton in 2011, nearly 6.6 times the 2001 value. 
After 2011, the total material consumption embedded in imported goods has been decreasing, from 37 
                                                             
12 No relevant data for the period between 2001 and 2006 for Dominican Republic at Eora MRIO.  
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million ton in 2011 to 31 million ton in 2015. Both the eHANPP and ecological footprint values were constant 
between 1995 and 2007, 1995 and 2014, respectively. Its most up-to-date eHANPP value in 2007 exceeds the 
boundary value by 6% and its ecological footprint in 2014 is marginally lower than the boundary value.  
 
From the social perspective, in 2016, 100% of its population has access to electricity. Its per capita daily 
intake of calorie increased from the 2256 kcal in 1995 to 2614 kcal in 2013, an annual increase rate of 0.88% 
but still lower than the threshold value of per capita 2700 kcal. Sanitation improved from 75.2% of the 
population having access to improved sanitation in 1995 to 84% in 2014, an annual increase rate of 0.62%, 
still lower than the threshold value of 95%. Gross enrollment rate in secondary school increased from 40% in 
1995 to 78% in 2007. The ratio has remained almost static since then with the most updated data being 77% 
in 2016, 19% lower than the threshold value of 95%. Healthy life expectancy increased from 61.6 in 2005 to 
63.5 in 2017, an increase of 1.9 during a 12-year period, but still 1.5 years lower than the threshold value of 
65.  
 
Despite the fluctuations between 1995 and 2015/2016, the most recent data indicates that Dominican 
Republic exceeds the threshold values for both income and employment. Its equality value was only 79% of 
the threshold value of 0.7 in 2015. Dominican Republic’s most recent democratic quality score in 2016 was 5 
times the 2011 value, however, still only 30% of the threshold value. Its value for life satisfaction has been 
fluctuating during the 12-year period between 2005 and 2017 with the highest score of 5.6 in 2017, only 86% 
of the threshold value. Its social support value was the highest in 2005 with nearly 92% of its population 
believing they have someone to rely on when necessary. It dropped to its lowest value of 84.6% in 2006, and 
gradually increased to 89.4% in 2017, approaching the threshold value of 90%.  
 
 
  
 
 
52 
 
4.3 Jamaica 
As shown in Figure 11, Jamaica exceeds four out of seven planetary boundaries and achieves five out of 11 
social outcomes. Table 10 quantifies the level of stress on the ecosystem and the extent to which social 
outcomes are satisfied.  
 
Figure 11: Jamaica’s position within the Safe and Just Space of the Doughnut 
 
 
Jamaica’s CO₂ emissions from the burning of fossil fuels and biomass was constant between 1995 and 2005, 
about five times the boundary value. It increased gradually from the per capita value of 6.58 t in 2005 to 8.04 
t in2007, four times the boundary value, followed by a slight decrease of 0.43 t to 7.61 t in 2008, still 4.7 
times the boundary value. CO₂ emissions embedded in imported goods fluctuated between 1995 and 2015, 
with a trend of a two-to-three-year increase, followed by a two-to-three-year decrease with the peak value in 
2008. It decreased sharply in 2009 and resumed gradual increase in 2011. The 2015 value was approximately 
the same as the 1995 value. For data related to its domestic contribution to biochemical flow, both 
phosphorous or nitrogen, is unavailable at Eora MRIO. The biochemical flows of Jamaica between 1995 and 
2015 included emission values only embedded in imported goods. Phosphorous flow from fertilizers and 
manure that is embedded in imported goods were relatively constant between 1995 and 2015. The nitrogen 
flow from fertilizers and manure decreased by 17% from 1995 to 2015.  
 
 
LS: Life Satisfaction 
LE: Healthy Life Expectancy 
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EQ: Equality 
EM: Employment  
 
 
 
53 
 
Table 10: Environmental and Social Performances of Jamaica  
Environmental Performances: 
A ratio <1 means the country functions within the boundary level; a ratio > 1 means the country exceeds the 
boundary level. Areas shaded in red means areas where the country exceeds the boundary level.  
 Boundary Level 
(per capita per year) 
Jamaica Performance 
(per capita per year) 
Ratio 
(Jamaica performance/ 
Boundary Value) 
CO₂ Emission 1.61 t 7.61 4.73 
Phosphorous Flow 0.89 kg 1.21 1.36 
Nitrogen Flow 8.9 kg 5.83 0.65 
Blue Water 574 m³ 230.4 0.4 
eHANPP 2.62 t C 2.56 0.98 
Ecological Footprint 1.71 gha 1.77 1.20 
Material Footprint 7.2 t 21.9 3.04 
Social Performances:  
A ratio < 1 means the country fails to achieve the social outcome; a ratio >1 means the country satisfies the 
social outcome. Areas shaded in green means areas where the country fails to satisfy the social outcomes. 
 Threshold Value Jamaica Performance Ratio 
(Jamaica performance/ 
Threshold value) 
Life Satisfaction  6.5 5.89 0.91 
Healthy Life Expectancy 65 65.819 1.01 
Nutrition  2700 2746 1.02 
Sanitation  95% 81.8% 0.86 
Access to Electricity 95% 98.2% 1.03 
Income 95% 98.3% 1.03 
Education 95% 80.6% 0.85 
Social Support 90% 91.3% 1.01 
Democratic Quality 0.8 0.294 0.37 
Equality 70 42.79 0.61 
Employment  94% 88.3% 0.94 
 
eHANPP is relatively constant between 1995 and 2001. It rises from per capita 2.66 Ct in 2001 to 3.06 Ct in 
2002, and after experienced a temporary drop to 2.68 Ct in 2003, it increased to the peak value of 3.12 Ct in 
2004. It started decreasing in 2005 and the 2007 value was per capita 2.56 Ct, marginally below the 
boundary value. Jamaica’s ecological footprint is relatively constant between 1995 and 2006. In 2007, it 
jumped to per capita 2.12 gha from 1.64 gha in 2006, followed by the abrupt drop to 1.4 gha in 2008. It 
started increasing in 2009 and in 2011 it almost resumed its 2007 value. It started decreasing again in 2012 
and in 2014, its ecological footprint was per capita 1.77 gha, slightly higher than the boundary value of 1.72 
gha. Its material footprint underwent three periods of gradual change. The first period was between 1995 
and 2000, during which the material footprint was relatively constant, with the 2000 per capita value 94% of 
the 1995 value. The second period was between 2000 and 2006, during which the material footprint 
gradually increased to the 2006 per capita value of per capita 24.1 t, an increase of 28% compared with the 
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2000 value. The third period was between 2006 and 2008, during which the footprint value decreased by 9% 
to the most up-to-date value of per capita 21.9 t in 2008, three times the boundary value.  
 
From social perspective, Jamaica’s healthy life expectancy in 2006 was 63.7 and it increased to 65.8 in 2017, 
exceeding the threshold value of 65 by 1.26%. In 1995, only 80.26% of the population had access to 
electricity. In 2016, 98.2% of the population had access to electricity, exceeding the threshold value of 95% 
by 3.4%. In 1995, 80.3% of its population had access to improved sanitation. After 21 years, the percentage 
increased by 1.87% to 81.8% of its population having access to improved sanitation. The change of nutrition 
value can be divided into three stages. The first stage was between 1995 and 2000 when the per capita 
calorie intake increases from 2684 kcal per day to 2729 kcal per day, slightly higher than the threshold value 
of 2700 kcal per day. The second stage started with a 2.4% increase from 2000 to 2001 and remained 
constant until 2007. The third stage was between 2007 and 2013 when the per capita calorie intake value 
dropped by 1.7% in 2008 and remained constant until 2013. The most recent 2013 value of per capita 2746 
kcal per day is almost the same as the 2000 value, slightly higher than the threshold value.  
  
Between 1995 and 2003, the gross enrollment rate in secondary school in Jamaica is approximately 85%. The 
situation improved gradually until 2009 when the rate increased to 94.53%, nearly approaching the threshold 
value of 95%. However, it started decreasing in 2010 and in 2015, the rate dropped to 80.60%, 5% lower than 
the 1995 level. Between 1998 and 2007, the situation of Jamaica’s labor market was improving with the 
employment rate increasing from 84.5% in 1998 to 90.3% in 2007. It deteriorated in 2008 and dropped to 
only 84.7% in 2013. Since 2014 the situation started improving and in 2017, 88.3% of the labor force were 
employed, still 5.7% lower than the threshold value.  
 
In 2004, 98.3% of Jamaica’s population lived on more than $ 1.90 a day. The change of its equality can be 
divided into two stages. The first period was between 1996 and 1999, during which social equality was 
increasing. Starting from 1999, it started its downward trend until 2004, when the value dropped to 0.43, 
61% of the threshold value. democratic quality of Jamaica increased from 0.15 in 2006 to 0.36 in 2004, 
followed by a drop to 0.29 in 2015, satisfying only 36% of the threshold value. People in Jamaica were most 
satisfied with life in 2006 with a score of 6.2. The value drops to only 5.4 in 2011, followed by an increase to 
5.7 in 2013. The score drops again to 5.3 in 2014 and gradually increased to the most recent value of 5.9 in 
2017. In 2006, 90.91% of its population believed they had someone to rely on in times of difficulties. The 
score dropped to only 85.5% in 2011. After 2011, the score started its gradual increase until in 2014, about 
91.3% of its population believed they could depend on friends or families when necessary, marginally higher 
than the threshold value of 90%.  
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4.4 Haiti 
As shown in Figure 12, Haiti exceeds 1 out of 7 planetary boundaries and achieves none of the 11 social 
outcomes. Table 11 quantifies the level of stress on the ecosystem and the extent to which social outcomes 
are satisfied.  
 
Figure 12: Haiti’s position within the Safe and Just Space of the Doughnut 
 
 
CO₂ emissions from burning of fossil fuels and biomass were relatively consistent between 1995 and 2001. 
Since 2001, the emission value increased gradually and in 2008 it exceeded the boundary level by 32%. The 
main source for CO₂ emissions in Haiti is burning of biomass and the amount of CO₂ emissions from burning 
of biomass is five times the amount from burning of fossil fuels. CO₂ emissions from the burning of biomass 
increased by 27% from per capita 1.4 t in 1995, to per capita 1.78 t in 2008. CO₂ emissions from the burning 
of fossil fuels in Haiti increased by 55% from per capita 0.22 t in 1995 to per capita 0.34 t in 2008. CO₂ 
emissions from the burning of fossil fuels embedded in imported goods decreased between 1995 and 2003. 
Starting from 2003, it started increasing until it reached its peak value in 2010. CO₂ emissions from the 
household burning of fossil fuels was relatively constant between 1995 and 2008. CO₂ emissions from the 
household burning of biomass was relatively constant between 1995 and 2004. Since 2004, it started 
increasing and in 2008 the CO₂ emissions from the household burning of biomass increased by 39%, 
compared with its 2004 value. In 2008, CO₂ emissions from the household burning of biomass was 31 times 
the amount of CO₂ emissions from household burning of fossil fuels. 
 
LS: Life Satisfaction 
LE: Healthy Life Expectancy 
NU: Nutrition 
SA: Sanitation 
IN: Income 
EN: Energy 
ED: Education 
SS: Social Support 
DE: Democratic Quality 
EQ: Equality 
EM: Employment  
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Table 11: Environmental and Social Performances of Haiti  
Environmental performances: 
A ratio <1 means the country functions within the boundary level; a ratio > 1 means the country exceeds the 
boundary level. Areas shaded in red means areas where the country exceeds the boundary level.  
 Boundary Level 
(per capita per year) 
Haiti Performance 
(per capita per year) 
Ratio 
(Haiti performance/ 
Boundary Value) 
CO₂ Emission 1.61 t 2.13 1.32 
Phosphorous Flow 0.89 kg 0.66 0.74 
Nitrogen Flow 8.9 kg 4.12 0.46 
Blue Water 574 m³ 195.33 0.34 
eHANPP 2.62 t C 2.16 0.82 
Ecological Footprint 1.71 gha 0.67 0.38 
Material Footprint 7.2 t 2.90 0.38 
Social Performances:  
A ratio < 1 means the country fails to achieve the social outcome; a ratio >1 means the country satisfies the 
social outcome. Areas shaded in green means areas where the country fails to satisfy the social outcomes. 
 Threshold Value Haiti Performance Ratio 
(Haiti performance/ 
Threshold value) 
Life Satisfaction  6.5 3.824 0.59 
Healthy Life Expectancy 65 53.347 0.82 
Nutrition  2700 2091 0.77 
Sanitation  95% 27.6% 0.49 
Access to Electricity 95% 38.69% 0.29 
Income 95% 46.1% 0.41 
Education 95% 42.2% 0.44 
Social Support 90% 64.7% 0.72 
Democratic Quality 0.8 0 0 
Equality 70 43.8 0.63 
Employment  94% 85.9% 0.91 
 
The biochemical flow, both the phosphorous and nitrogen flows, have been relatively constant for the past 
20 years. Phosphorous flow from the application of fertilizer embedded in imported goods increased 
between 2007 and 2010, with the 2010 value 47 times that of 2007. Nitrogen flow from the application of 
fertilizer embedded in imported goods presented a similar trend to that of phosphorous flow, which 
increased between 2007 and 2010 and remained constant between 2010 and 2015. Haiti’s material footprint 
between 1995 and 2000 was relatively constant until it jumped by 21% in 2001, after which it increased 
gradually with the average annual increase rate of 0.76%. Data related to material consumption embedded in 
imported goods into Haiti are not available between 1995 and 2009 at Eora MRIO. The amount embedded in 
imported goods in 2010 is six times that of 2011. The value embedded in imported goods between 2011 and 
2015 has been relatively constant. Haiti’s ecological footprint was relatively constant between 1995 and 2014 
with a difference of per capita 0.67 t during the period of 19 years. Similarly, Haiti’s eHANPP increases from 
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per capita 2.32 C t in 1995 to per capita 2.68 C t in 2000. Since 2000, it started decreasing gradually until 
reaching the value of per capita 2.16 C t in 2007.  
 
It is stated in the 2016 Human Development Report that the percentage of population in Haiti that lives on 
less than $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is 53.9% (UNDP, 2016b). The assumption in this thesis is in 2011 around 
46.1% of the population in Haiti lived on more than $1.90 a day. The healthy life expectancy in 2006 was 50, 
and it increased to 53 in 2017, an average annual increase rate of 0.5%. There were no data available for 
Haiti’s gross enrolment ratio in secondary school at the World Development Indicator, for the period 
between 1995 and 2015. It is stated in a 2008 UNICEF report that the gross enrolment ratio in secondary 
school in Haiti was 20.8% in 1991 (UNICEF, 2008). This value coincides with the value of 20.2% in 1992 
provided by Nations Encyclopedia (2011). Table 12 below lists the gross enrollment ratio in secondary school 
in Haiti between 1991 and 1996 from National Encyclopedia. It is obvious between 1991 and 1996 that the 
gross enrollment ratio in secondary school in Haiti increased with a relatively steady annual increase rate of 
5% - 3%. Assuming annual increase rate remains constant, the gross enrollment ratio in secondary school in 
Haiti is estimated as 42.15% in 2011.  
 
Table 12: Gross Enrolment Rate in Secondary School in Haiti 
Year Gross Enrollment Ration 
Secondary 
1991 20.2% 
1992 23.5% 
1993 25.1% 
1994 26.5% 
1995 27.3% 
1996 28.2% 
 
Haiti’s per capita calorie intake per day was only 77% of the threshold value in 2013. In 1995 only 19.2% of its 
population had access to improved sanitation, and 20 years later, the ratio increased to 27.6% in 2015, an 
annual increase rate of 2.1%. In 1995, 31.3% of its population had access to electricity, with an average 
annual increase rate of 1.5%, the ratio increased to 41% in 2016. The employment rate was 85.9% in 2012 
but dropped by 49% to only 43.8% in 2014. Its equality value is 0.46 in 2001, 66% of the threshold value of 
0.7. In 2012, it decreased to 0.42, 63% of the threshold value. In 2006, the democratic quality of Haiti was -
1.053. There has been gradual increase since then and by 2017 the ratio increased to -0.735, with the 
threshold value being 0.8. For the two indicators that comprise the democratic quality, political stability & 
absence of violence and voice and accountability, both have minus values for the past 20 years. The highest 
social support ratio in Haiti is in 2012 when 74.9% of the population felt they had people to rely on when 
necessary, but it dropped to its lowest value of 55.4% in 2014. The most recent value was 64.7% in 2017, only 
72% of the threshold value. People were most satisfied with life between 2011 with the score of 4.8, 74% of 
the threshold value. It dropped to the lowest value of 3.4 in 2016 and increased to the most recent value of 
3.8 in 2017, 58% of the threshold value.  
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4.5 Cuba 
As shown in Figure 13, Cuba exceeds 5 out of 7 planetary boundaries and achieves 7 of the 11 social 
outcomes. Table 13 quantifies the level of stress on the ecosystem and the extent to which social outcomes 
are satisfied.  
 
Figure 13: Cuba’s position within the Safe and Just Space of the Doughnut 
 
 
CO₂ emissions from the burning of both fossil fuels and biomass declined between 1995 and 2008, with 
periodic fluctuations. The per capita value in 2008 was 5.76 t, decreasing by 25% compared to the 1995 
emission value. However, this was still 3.58 times the boundary level at per capita 1.61 t. CO₂ emissions from 
the burning of fossil fuels was relatively constant between 1995 and 2007. It increased by 14% from per 
capita 3.82 t in 2007 to 4.35 t in 2008. CO₂ emissions from the burning of biomass decreased between 1995 
and 2004 with fluctuations. Since 2004, it has decreased until 2008, when the per capita is 1.41 t, a decrease 
of 62% compared with the 1995 value. CO₂ emissions from household activities was relatively constant 
between 1995 and 2008. Before 2004, the amount of CO₂ emissions from the household burning of biomass 
equaled the amount of emissions from the household burning of fossil fuels. Since 2004, CO₂ emissions from 
the household burning of fossil fuels gradually exceeded the amount from the household burning of biomass. 
CO₂ emissions from the burning of fossil fuels embedded in imported goods into Cuba increased until its 
peak value in 2008. It then decreased by 32% in 2009 and remained relatively constant until 2015. 
 
 
LS: Life Satisfaction 
LE: Healthy Life Expectancy 
NU: Nutrition 
SA: Sanitation 
IN: Income 
EN: Energy 
ED: Education 
SS: Social Support 
DE: Democratic Quality 
EQ: Equality 
EM: Employment 
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Table 13: Environmental and Social Performances of Cuba 
Environmental Performances: 
A ratio <1 means the country functions within the boundary level; a ratio > 1 means the country exceeds the 
boundary level. Areas shaded in red means areas where the country exceeds the boundary level.  
 Boundary Level 
(per capita per year) 
Cuba Performance 
(per capita per year) 
Ratio 
(Cuba performance/ 
Boundary Value) 
CO₂ Emission 1.61 t 5.76 3.58 
Phosphorous Flow 0.89 kg 1.39 1.56 
Nitrogen Flow 8.9 kg 7.57 0.85 
Blue Water 574 m³ 270.59 0.47 
eHANPP 2.62 t C 4.52 1.73 
Ecological Footprint 1.71 gha 1.91 1.19 
Material Footprint 7.2 t 13.79 1.92 
Social Performances:  
A ratio < 1 means the country fails to achieve the social outcome; a ratio >1 means the country satisfies the 
social outcome. Areas shaded in green means areas where the country fails to satisfy the social outcomes. 
 Threshold Value Cuba Performance Ratio 
(Cuba performance/ 
Threshold value) 
Life Satisfaction  6.5 5.418 0.834 
Healthy Life Expectancy 65 66.327 1.02 
Nutrition 2700 3409 1.263 
Sanitation  95% 93.2% 0.981 
Access to Electricity 95% 100% 1.053 
Income 95% 30% 0.316 
Education 95% 100% 1.053 
Social Support 90% 96.96% 1.077 
Democratic Quality 0.8 0 0 
Equality 70 62 0.886 
Employment  94% 97.4% 1.046 
 
Both phosphorous and nitrogen flows, from the application of synthetic fertilizer and farm animal manure, 
were relatively constant between 1995 and 2011. Its phosphorous flows value was 1.56 times the boundary 
value and its nitrogen flow was 15% lower than the boundary value. The highest material footprint of Cuba 
was that of the 1995value, which was 2.25 times the boundary value. It decreased by 25.8% in 2008, 
however, it was still 1.67 times the boundary value. Cuba’s eHANPP in 2007 was per capita 4.52 C t, 1.73 
times the boundary value, being the highest among all five Caribbean countries covered by this research. 
Ecological footprint increases from per capita 1.7 t in 1995 to 2.09 t in 2010, an increase of 22.9%. It then 
decreased to per capita 1.91 t in 2014, a decrease of 8% compared with the 2010 value.  
 
From a social perspective, Cuba is dichotomous. Their stats exhibit 100% of the population having access to 
electricity, free medical service and a 100% gross enrolment ratio in secondary schools; however, their 
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average monthly income is USD $32 and they have a daily ration for food supplies. No data on Cuba’s poverty 
or income situation are available at the World Bank database. By using the 2016 Cuba average monthly salary 
of CUO 740, equivalent to $29.6 (Trading Economics, 2016), a daily salary of $1.35 can be calculated. Boston 
Consulting Group states in its research paper, Understanding the Evolving Cuban Consumer, that 75% of 
households in Cuba earn less than $1000 a year (BCG,2016), equivalent to per day $2.74. However, this has 
no indication on the size of the household and the percentage of salary spent to meet basic daily needs. The 
United Nations Development Programme states 5.6% of the total employment as “working poor” in Cuba are 
at $3.10 a day (UNDP, 2018b) in its Cuba country profile. In this thesis, it is assumed that around 30% of the 
Cuban population lives on more than $1.90 a day, based on data provided by Boston Consulting Group.  
  
In terms of its equality, no value is available for Cuba for any periods between 1995 and 2015. Myra Espina, a 
Havana professor, is quoted to say that Cuba’s Gini index of income inequality rose from 0.24 in 1986 to 0.28 
in 2000 (Frank, 2008). Based on this, in this thesis an equality value of 62% is assumed for Cuba, covering 
89% of the threshold value and the highest value among the five nations covered by this research. In 1995, 
84.1% of its population had access to improved sanitation and after 20 years, the ratio rose to 93.2%, the 
highest value among the five selected Caribbean states, though still 1.8% lower than the threshold value. 
Cuba’s health life expectancy is 66 years, the highest among the five selected nations. Both its social support 
and employment rate scores are the highest among the five countries, with 97% of its population feeling 
they had people to rely on when necessary and 97.4% of its working population being employed in 2017.  
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5 DISCUSSIONS 
This thesis follows the rationale of vulnerability assessment preconditioning sustainable development in the 
sense that both environmental and social vulnerabilities challenge the dual objectives of sustainable 
development. In terms of vulnerability assessment, this thesis regards vulnerability as the product of 
interactions between multiple biophysical and human processes, acting upon the coupled socioecological 
systems with multiple feedbacks across scales. By using environmental and social indicators identified within 
the Safe and Just Space framework, this thesis adopts a place-based approach to assess the environmental 
and social performances of five Caribbean small island states and their contextualized and multi-dimensional 
interactions. In this way, this thesis reveals what might have hindered these five nations’ transition to 
sustainability by analyzing their vulnerabilities from both environmental and social perspectives and explores 
what might be key element for the transition to sustainability. Table 14 presents an overall assessment of 
these five nations’ environmental and social performances from which a positive relationship between high 
level of stress on the ecosystem and the achievement of most social outcomes can be can be identified. 
 
5.1 Trinidad & Tobago 
Being a high-income country by United Nations Human Development Index standards, Trinidad & Tobago fails 
to satisfy 6 out of 11 social outcomes and exceeds 6 out of 7 planetary boundaries. Its 2008 per capita CO₂ 
emission and material footprint values are more than 30 and 9 times the boundary values respectively. 
Assessed by the sharp contrast between the heavy stress on the ecosystem and the relative lack of social 
progress, Trinidad & Tobago’s development process does not look promising, especially within the context of 
climate change and the associated global GHG emission mitigation.  
 
It is stated in the Review of the Economy 2017 issued by the Government of Trinidad & Tobago (Government 
of TTD, 2017), starting from 2013, petroleum sector’s contribution to its GDP decreases from 37.9% to 33.7% 
in 2017. The decrease of 11% coincides with the decrease of 8% of its GDP per capita from 2103 to 
2017(World Bank, 2017). Despite government’s efforts to boost economic diversification, petroleum sector 
still plays a major role in Trinidad & Tobago’s economy, the stagnation of which inevitably leads to lack of 
economic growth with wider social and environmental implications. The heavy economic dependence on the 
energy sector pivots the multi-metric interactions between its environmental and social performances.  
 
The economy of Trinidad & Tobago is featured as a “dual economy”, i.e., the benefits of large investments in 
the energy sector do not easily distribute over to the rest of the economy (Artana, et al.,2007). This is also 
termed as “Dutch Disease”, which in the case of Trinidad & Tobago, rather than contributing to the overall 
economic development, the natural resource abundance and growth of the oil and gas sector hinder 
economic diversification and social progress and eventually lead to the degradation of the social and 
biological environments. Economy that suffers from the “Dutch Disease” is characteristic of macro-economic 
volatility. Trinidad & Tobago’s economy has a trend of extreme volatility, with its per capita real GDP in the 
last 50 years being one of the most volatile among a group of comparable economies (Artana, et al. 2007). Its 
economic cycles are also characterized by large amplitudes and long recovery periods. The prospect of its 
economic sector’s recovery in the near future is grim because of the maturing oil fields and lower and more 
volatile oil prices in the future and the resulted structural declining of oil products (Jeetendra, 2016). The 
Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago announces officially in 2015 the country is in economic recession and the 
trend continues to 2017 with the GDP annual growth rate of -2.34%(World Bank, 2017). The ecological 
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footprint of Trinidad & Tobago decreases between 2009 and 2014, which, in association with the officially 
acknowledged economic recession, might be related more to the decrease in economic growth than with a 
more green-oriented development mode. Trinidad & Tobago’s CO₂ emission and material footprint have been 
on steady rise between 1995 and 2008, with its 2008 value 34 and 9 times respectively the boundary values. 
Data related to its consumption-based CO₂ emission and material footprint after 2008 are not available at 
Eora MRIO when this thesis is being developed. It is worthwhile to compare the CO₂ emission and material 
footprint values after 2008 with values of previous years to see whether there has been any proportional 
decline associated with the economic depression.  
  
Vulnerabilities associated with the volatility of the global market is coupled with the uncertainty of impacts 
of GHG regulations on oil demand and oil prices over the next 20 years (Sanchez-Sierra, 2005). Any 
international GHG emission mitigation initiatives might lead to further economic stagnation or even 
degeneration unless the country can effectively diversity its economy. Besides, the approaching exhaustion of 
the finite reserves of oil and natural gas also challenge Trinidad & Tobago’s economic and social perspectives. 
Between 1998 and 2007, the timeline until oil exhaustion remained constant at 15 years, indicating that 
discoveries of new oil reserve e might match extraction during this period. However, the scenario is totally 
different when natural gas is concerned. In 1998 there were an estimated 65 years of production left for 
natural gas, but this fell to only 12 years in 2007 as natural gas production increased by 351% from 1998 to 
2007 (Ram, 1012), which indicates not only the increasing dependence on natural gas but also the possible 
lack of efficiency and product diversification and innovation. 
 
The overdependence of Trinidad & Tobago’s economy on the energy sector has permeated into different 
social sectors with environmental implications, which jointly comprise its systematic vulnerability. In O’Neill 
et al.’s research (2018), income is assessed by the percentage of the population that lives on more than $1.90 
a day. There has been no data available for Trinidad & Tobago relevant to this indicator at the World Bank 
database for the period between 1995 and 2017. The assumption is that since the state belongs to the high-
income group, 100% of Trinidad & Tobago’s population should live on more than $1.90 a day. However, 
Trinidad & Tobago might be regarded as a poverty-stricken country if the multi-dimensional aspects of 
poverty are interpreted within its social context. Poverty in Trinidad & Tobago is closely associated with its 
unemployment rate, which is pivoted by the volatile global oil market, and social inequality associated with 
the difficulty in distributing profits from the energy sector for economic diversity and social progress. 
 
According to the Human Development Report, Trinidad & Tobago belongs to the high-income group with a 
GDP per capita of USD 31,577.7 in 2017 (UNDP, 2016b). However, between 1990 and 2001, approximately 
12.4% of its population earns less than $1 per day and 39% on less than $ 2 per day (Cambridge, et al. 2007), 
which might challenge the assumption that currently 100% of its population live on more than &1.90 a day, 
even despite possible income increase during the past 16 years. In Trinidad & Tobago, because the revenues 
from the energy sector do not easily distribute to the rest of the economy, even at the height of the first oil 
boom between 1973 – 1982, its unemployment rate does not fall substantially below 10%. As the 
international oil price declines during the 1980’s, Trinidad & Tobago’s per capita GDP drops by 43.9% from 
1982 to 1992, with the unemployment rate rising from 10% to 20% (World Bank, 1995). Poverty in 1980s in 
Trinidad & Tobago is characteristic of the new phenomenon of the “New Poor”, the group that becomes 
unemployed during the mid-eighties (Cambridge, et al., 2007). Within the context of the volatile oil market,
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Table 14: Overall Assessment of Environmental and Social Performances of Five Caribbean Nations 
  
Trinidad & Tobago Dominican Republic Jamaica Haiti Cuba
CO₂ Emission 32.5 2.94 4.73 1.32 3.58
Phosphrous Flow 2.15 1.77 1.36 0.74 1.56
Nitrogen Flow 1.05 0.93 0.65 0.46 0.85
Blue Water 0.49 0.58 0.40 0.34 0.47
eHANPP 1.08 1.06 0.98 0.82 1.73
Ecological Footprint 4.8 0.99 1.20 0.38 1.19
Material Footprint 9.66 1.76 3.04 0.38 1.92
Life Satisfaction 0.95 0.86 0.91 0.59 0.83
Healthy Life Expectancy  0.95 0.98 1.01 0.82 1.02
Nutrition 1.13 0.97 1.02 0.77 1.26
Sanitation 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.49 0.98
Access to Energy 1.05 1.05 1.03 0.29 1.05
Income 1.05 1.03 1.03 0.41 0.32
Education 0.9 0.81 0.85 0.44 1.05
Social Support 1.01 0.99 1.01 0.72 1.08
Democratic Quality 0.36 0.3 0.27 0 0
Equality 0.84 0.79 0.61 0.63 0.89
Employment 1.01 1.00 0.94 0.91 1.05
Environmental Performances: Individual Country’s performance value/Boundary Value. A Ratio > 1 means the country exceeds the specific boundary 
Social Performances: Individual country’s performance value/threshold value. A ration < 1 means the country fails to satisfy the specific outcome
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poverty in Trinidad & Tobago is closely related with unemployment. Between 1982 and 1992, the declining of 
the international oil price leads to rising unemployment, which in turn causes the decline in real value of 
social sector spending, followed by the resulted retrenchment of workers in the public and other private 
sectors, and ultimately contributes to the increase in poverty (World Bank, 1995). Although Trinidad & 
Tobago’s employment rate in 2018 exceeds the threshold value of 94%, it starts decreasing since 2017, which 
can be related to the economic recession officially declared in 2015, considering the lag time between 
economic depression and its impacts on unemployment. Considering its current lack of effective economic 
diversification (Baldeosingh,2018), the trend of the period between 1982 and 1992 might repeat within the 
overall context of volatile global oil market and Greenhouse Gas mitigation initiatives.  
 
The CIA World Factbook (2014) indicates in 2007 approximately 17% of the nation’s population falls below 
the national poverty line. The Borgen Project, a non-profit organization that addresses poverty and issues, 
discusses the prevalent poverty in Trinidad & Tobago, despite its status as one of the strongest economies in 
the Caribbean region. The disparity between its economic status and the percentage of its population below 
the national poverty line reveals its lack of social equality. Its equality score has been decreasing between 
2002 and 2005, with the most up to date value in 2005 84% of the threshold value. In Trinidad & Tobago, the 
fact that other sectors cannot benefit from the fast growth of its energy sector and the resulted income 
disparity among different sectors play a key role in its social inequality (Bourne, 2008). Social inequality tends 
to worsen the unequal distribution of natural resource rents and further deteriorate its Dutch Disease (Ali & 
Sami, 2016). In turn, the increasing overdependence on the energy sector in Trinidad & Tobago leads to 
higher-level of income disparity and eventually poverty among population who cannot benefit from the 
growth of the energy sector tends to grow.  
 
Another lens through which the poverty situation of Trinidad & Tobago should be interpreted is its heavy 
reliance on strategic imports for its food supply. Its overdependence on the energy sector has led to the 
collapse of its traditional agriculture (Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management, 2014). The 2007 
data indicates that Trinidad & Tobago imported 86% of its food requirements (John & Seetahal, 2008). The 
high reliance on foreign food supplies exposes local consumers to global market forces, with its Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) increasing from 3.5 in 1972 to 140.3 in 2017(World Bank, 2017). The gap between the 
increase of CPI and the increase of per capita income reflects the situation of poverty in Trinidad & Tobago is 
more complex than what can be simply measured by the percentage of population living on more than $1.90 
a day.  
 
With direct impacts on household activities, poverty and inequality can restrain overall social progress by 
negatively influencing the function of other social sectors. No data related to the gross enrollment rate in 
secondary schools are available for Trinidad & Tobago at the World Bank database for the period between 
1995 and 2017. According to Artana et al. (2007), Trinidad & Tobago’s gross enrollment rate increased from 
68.8% at the end of the 1970s to 83.8% in 2004, which is 11.8% lower than the threshold value of 95% and 
only just equal to regional average within the Caribbean, despite its much higher income level within the 
region. It is mentioned by Artana et al. (2007) that the returns for finishing primary education, secondary 
education and non-university tertiary education are quite low in Trinidad & Tobago, compared with the 
average level in the Caribbean, which might explain its relatively low gross enrolment rate in secondary 
school. In contrast, there is a big gap between returns to university and returns to secondary education in 
Trinidad & Tobago. The authors believe within Trinidad & Tobago’s economic structure, the difference in 
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wages is likely to be more related to the differences in GDP composition or economic activities, rather than 
to the differences in the level of education received. Considering the relatively low gross enrollment rate in 
secondary school, it is reasonable to assume the percentage of people who finish higher than secondary 
education might not be high, which might lead to even lower enrolment rate at higher education. In 1996, 
the gross enrollment ratio for higher education was only 8% for males and 7% for females (Education 
Encyclopedia, 2018). These values may be reflective of the lacking supply and demand of a well-educated 
workforce. 
 
In Trinidad & Tobago, revenues from the energy sector fail to contribute to the development of infrastructure 
to support more sophisticated upstream energy industries. Domestic economic activities are mainly focused 
on low-end commodity goods, which might not encourage a more well-educated labor force. The lack of 
market drive explains its unsatisfactory education performance and its high emigration rate, one of the 
highest emigration rates for skilled workers in the Caribbean region (Artana, et al. 2007). The less well-
educated domestic workforce, together with the “brain-drain” resulted from the emigration of skilled 
workers, in turn weakens the production capacity and innovation, which further restricts its production to 
low-end commodities with no associated efficiency. The dominating role plays by the low-end production 
because of the lack of technology and human capital needed by energy and production efficiency can explain 
its high CO₂ emission and material footprint values.  
 
Trinidad & Tobago’s overdependence on its energy sector and the social implication can also be interpreted 
by reviewing its per capita calorie intake per day and its expected Healthy Life Expectancy. Its per capita 
calorie intake per day exceeds the threshold value by 13%. On global level, it might be appropriate to use 
calorie intake as the nutrition indicator, however, in the case of Trinidad & Tobago, calorie intake by itself 
cannot present a whole picture of its average nutritional intake. According to WHO’s 2016 Diabetes Country 
Profile (WHO,2016a), 24.9% of the male and 39.5% of the female are obese in Trinidad & Tobago. The 
Ministry of Health also reports in Trinidad & Tobago, the percentage of deaths due to Chronical Non-
Communicable Diseases (CNCSS), which is closely related to overweight and obesity, is 60%, the highest in 
the Caribbean, (Ministry of Health, 2012). This aligns with its average healthy life expectancy of 61.7, 3.7 
years lower than the threshold level of 65. Obesity is a complex issue that can be interpreted from different 
social and cultural perspectives. However, although it is hard to prove the causal relationship between 
education and obesity, Devaux et al. (2011) present a broadly linear relationship between the number of 
years spent in full-time education and the probability of obesity, with the most educated individuals 
displaying lower rates of the condition. Increasing education at any point along the education spectrum 
might reduce obesity to a similar degree. The relatively unsatisfactory performance in Trinidad & Tobago’s 
education sector and its high death rate caused by CNSS provides an angle through which the social 
implication of its overdependence on the energy sector can be interpreted.  
 
Trinidad & Tobago’s obesity rate also reveals another perspective through which the social implication of its 
reliance on the energy sector can be analyzed. Its food provision depends on strategic imports because of the 
declining of its traditional agriculture. Trinidad & Tobago exceeds the biochemical boundaries for both 
nitrogen and phosphorous flows, but all flows are amounts embedded in imported goods since no domestic 
contribution is recorded at Eora MRIO. Data unavailability itself indicates lack of effective management, 
which can be related to its overall underperformance of its agricultural sector. Trinidad & Tobago are heavily 
reliant on imported fruits and vegetables and consequently, they cannot ensure the availability of many 
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foods essential for a healthy diet. The domestic food consumption consists mainly cereals and sugar crops 
and any price increase of fresh products tends to increase the percentage of cereals and sugar crops in the 
diet (Hawkes, et al. 2010). The CPI increase from 3.5 in 1972 to 140.3 in 2017 (World Bank Database, 2017) 
indicates price increase of imported fresh fruits and vegetables and the possible decreased percentage of 
fruits and vegetables in the diet structure.  
 
Another perspective from which the social implication of its dependence on the energy sector can be 
discussed is its democratic quality. In this thesis, democratic quality is estimated as the unweighted average 
of the scores of two Worldwide Governance Indicators, Voice & Accountability and Political Stability & 
Absence of Violence. The most recent democratic quality score for Trinidad & Tobago is 0.29, 64% lower than 
the threshold value of 0.8. Although the democratic quality score is the unweighted average of those two 
governance indicators, in Trinidad & Tobago, the performances of these two indicators vary, which can be 
linked to the role energy plays in its overall economy. Between 1996 and 2016, the score for Voice and 
Accountability ranges between 0.8 and 0.5 whilst the score for Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
shifts between -0.1 and 0.4. Compared with Voice and Accountability, the country obviously performs much 
worse when stability is concerned. Artrna et al. (2007) attribute Trinidad & Tobago’s weaker institutions to 
“Natural Resource Curse”, as part of the “dual economy” phenomenon, in which most of the government 
revenues come from oil and gas, not from general taxes from more diverse sectors. Democratic politics tend 
to work differently in a weak institutional environment because of the uncertainty associated with weak 
institutional power. The incentives of actors within such a context for compliance with formal rules are 
relatively weaker, which can somehow explain why violent crime rates in the Caribbean region is higher than 
in any other part of the world and why Trinidad & Tobago sees its overall crime rate escalating at a 
phenomenal rate within the past 10 years (Levitsky & Murillo, 2011, Sookram, et al. 2009). After empirically 
evaluating the effect of the criminal justice system and socio-economic conditions on serious crime in 
Trinidad & Tobago between 1970 and 2007, Sookram et al. (2009) suggest crime detection rate, as part of the 
institutional capacity, unemployment rate and tertiary education are all related to Trinidad & Tobago’s 
current high rate of violent crime, all of which can be attributed to its overdependence on the energy sector. 
Its income disparity because of the resulted disillusionment within sectors that cannot benefit from the 
growth of energy sector and are deprived opportunities for economic mobility also contribute to its lack of 
social and political stability (Stiglitz, 2017). Crime and lack of stability have been identified as major 
challenges in Trinidad and Tobago for investment in private sectors, which deters the diversification of its 
economy and further deteriorates the current situation that suffers from the Dutch Disease (IDB, 2013).  
 
As one of the strongest economies in the Caribbean region, Trinidad & Tobago fails to distribute the benefits 
from the energy sector for general social progress. 100% of the population in Trinidad & Tobago have access 
to electricity, which is not surprising considering its high CO₂ emission and heavy dependency on fossil fuel. 
However, the situation with regards to the percentage of population having access to improved sanitation is 
not equally promising. In 1995, 90.3% of the population has access to improved sanitation facilities in 
Trinidad & Tobago. After 19 years, the ratio increases only to 91.5%, still 3.7% lower than the threshold value. 
The annual growth rate of 0.19% might be related to the fact that weakened institutional capacity fails to 
redistribute profits from energy sector for effective improvement in people’s living condition. Faced with the 
unpromising and volatile energy market, the approaching depletion of natural resources on which national 
economy solely depends on, unpredictable imported food price and the unbalanced diet, increasing 
unemployment and inequality, it is not surprising to witness the life satisfaction rate’s decreases between 
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2006 and 2017. Although it is hard to quantify people’s perception of life satisfaction, the decreasing score 
partially reflects Trinidad & Tobago people’s lack of optimism when positioned within an uncertain context.  
 
Country Summary 
Within the analytical framework of Safe and Just Space, Trinidad & Tobago can be categorized as vulnerable if 
the level of stress on the ecosystem is associated with the achievement of social outcomes. By interpreting 
its environmental and social performances, it is clear within its current development process, the satisfaction 
of social outcomes relies on heavy stress on the ecosystem and the transgression of the environmental 
ceiling is closely associated with its social foundation. At the core of Trinidad & Tobago’s vulnerability profile 
is its “dual economy” with overdependence on the energy sector that pivots its unsatisfactory social 
performances and the heavy stress on its ecosystem. Its CO₂ emission and material footprint have been on 
the rise since 1995 and in 2008 the per capita values of these two indicators are 9.1 and 5.3 times the global 
average respectively. In contrast, it only satisfies 5 out of 11 social outcomes. The weakened social 
foundation and deteriorated environment will, in turn, further victimize the economy by depriving it of the 
biophysical and social environments necessary for its transition to sustainability, such as the stability and 
infrastructure to attract investment and well-educated and healthy workforce. Dr. Roger Hosein, the 
economist from University of West Indi attributed Trinidad & Tobago’s failure in economic diversification and 
overdependence on the energy sector in the period between 1999 and 2016 to lack of initiative and capacity 
of the state (Baldeosingh, 2018). As part of the 2020 Voluntary National Review of the High-level Political 
Forum on Sustainable Development Trinidad & Tobago expresses its determination to transit to a more 
sustainable mode (Sustainable Development Goals Forum, 2018). It requires a strong government with 
sufficient strategic thinking to look beyond the short-term benefits and redistribute wealth from the energy 
sector for the necessary economic diversification and mobility.  
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5.2 Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic has been enjoying steady economic progress over the past 25 years. Its average annual 
growth rate between 1993 and 2017 is 5.3%, which makes the country one of the top performers in the 
Caribbean (World Bank Group, 2018a). However, what contrasts with the economic growth is its 
unsatisfactory social progress and pressure on the ecosystem. It exceeds 4 out of 7 planetary boundaries, 
with ecological footprint and nitrogen flow only marginally within the boundaries and achieves only 3 out of 
11 social outcomes. What is behind the disparity between the heavy stress on the ecosystem and lack of 
social progress is its failure to transform benefits from steady economic growth into an improved social 
infrastructure to facilitate both environmental and social progress.  
 
Using income as an example, Dominican Republic exceeds the threshold value, with 98.1% of its population 
living on more than $1.90 a day. However, this only makes sense when we view this value through a lens of 
“absolute poverty”—which refers to poverty defined by a general definition that is valid for all economics—
not necessarily when we look at “relative poverty”—when poverty is interpreted on a country, within its 
social context. In Dominican Republic, the moderate monetary poverty line is $4.70 per day for urban areas 
and $4.20 in rural areas. Taking into account these numbers, when assessed in 2011, 40.4% of the population 
lives below the relative poverty line (World Bank, 2014). The contrast between the average annual GDP 
growth of 5.3% and the percentage of more than 40% of its population living under the national poverty line 
reveals the dissonance between economic growth and social progress with its root cause embedded in its 
development model.  
 
What underpins Dominican Republic’s high economic growth is a series of key economic reforms that 
support generous and widespread tax incentive for the private sectors. In addition, its proximity to the US 
and Canadian markets helps shape FDI inflows (World Bank, 2018). Dominic Republic’s beaches and easy 
ocean access provide it with a natural advantage for a strong touristic sector. The tourism sector accounts for 
15.3% of its GDP and 14% of its employment (Fawcett, 2014). One fundamental weakness of such an 
economic model is the low tax collection constrains the government revenue, which in turn hinders the 
investment into public infrastructure, and consequently the quality of services in education, sanitation and 
health suffers. Economic growth promotes rapid urbanization without either sufficient institutional capacity 
to guide the process or social services to accommodate the associated environmental stress.  
 
Government mandated tax incentives impose constraints on the competitiveness of the labour market and 
innovation that supports better-paid jobs that require a more skilled work force. The lack of opportunities in 
the labor market and the poor quality of public infrastructure and services, combined with its traditional 
closer relationship with the U. S., drive up Dominican Republic’s emigration rate. Dominican Republic’s 
emigration rate is one of the highest in the Caribbean region, with long-term economic, social and 
environmental implications (World Bank, 2014). In a short term, it supports economic growth and helps 
poverty reduction via remittance, which contributes 8% to GDP and lowers the poverty rate by 3%. It also 
helps increase Dominican Republic’s employment rate by reducing the participation of recipients in the 
domestic labour market (World Bank, 2014). However, the economic and social contribution from remittance 
is far from being sustainable. Its contribution to GDP is vulnerable since it is totally subject to the fluctuations 
of the foreign markets. In the long run, remittance tends to increase income disparity and deepen social 
inequality. It is stated in the World Bank report (2014) that nearly 40% of the remittance accrued to the 
households belong to the top income bracket. Finally, remittance does not contribute to the part of national 
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revenue that is invested in public infrastructure and services. Finally, remittance does not contribute to the 
part of national revenue that is invested in public infrastructure and services. The resulted disparity between 
increased public expenditure and less developed social infrastructure and absorbing capacity leads to heavier 
stress on the ecosystem. In a long run, the high emigration rate, together with the unsatisfactory 
performances of its education sector, also tends to worsen the overall poverty situation in Dominican 
Republic. In 2016, its Gross Rate of Enrollment in Secondary Schools is 77%, only 81% of the threshold value. 
The disparity between its steady economic growth measured by GDP-related indicators and the 
unsatisfactory performances of its education sector unveils the government’s inability to invest effectively in 
public sectors. The brain-drain associated with its high emigration rate leads to an even less well-educated 
domestic workforce. Migrants to the U.S. are more educated than those who stay in the country, with 66% of 
migrants who are 25 years old or older having completed secondary education or higher, compared with only 
40% of those who reside in the country (World Bank, 2014). The feedback loops between the quality of the 
labor force and competitiveness of the labor market work both ways. The relatively low quality of the labor 
force restrains the labor market to low-end and less well-paid jobs. Consequently, the lack of competitiveness 
of the labor market drives up emigration and consequently more brain-drain, which leads to even lower 
quality of the labor force and less competitive labor market.  
 
The relationship between the employment rate and economic growth is contextual. Normally we associate 
high employment rate with economic growth, however, in conjunction with other social indicators, we can 
also relate the high employment rate to poverty since the higher employment rate indicates smaller 
percentage of people can afford to live without having jobs. Among the unemployed population of 
Dominican Republic, the percentage of people who are unemployed but available to work and active to seek 
for jobs is higher than those who are unemployed and available to work but are not active to find jobs (World 
Bank, 2018). Besides, the disparity between the employment rate of 98% and 40% of its population living 
under the national poverty line reveals the possible underemployment of its job market. The 
underemployment of Dominican Republic’s job market indicates there is high percentage of population who 
are educated to have better-paid jobs but cannot find appropriate employment (World Bank, 2018). 
Underemployment tends to drive up its emigration rate, which, together with the unsatisfactory 
performances of its education sector, further intensifies the low quality of the domestic labor force. The lack 
of competitiveness of the labor market leads to the lack of economic mobility in Dominican Republic. It is 
stated in the World Bank’s Strategic Diagnose (2018) that between 2000 and 2011, less than 2% of its 
population experience upward mobility13, while 19% slide down in economic status and 79% of the 
population make no economic progress during the period of 11 years. The lack of economic mobility and the 
unbalanced distribution of remittance tend to deepen social inequality with considerable social implications. 
 
One aspect of the social implication associated with Dominican Republic’s social inequality is its 
unsatisfactory score for democratic quality. Between 1995 and 2016, Dominican Republic’s lowest score for 
democratic quality, as an indicator for social stability, is 0.01 in 2010. It is most recent value for this indicator 
is 0.2, 25% of the threshold value. Compared with Voice and Accountability, its performance in Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence is worse with the relevant scores varying between -0.4 and 0.3 between 
1995 and 2016. Alesina & Perotti (1993) talk about the relationship between income distribution and political 
instability. They conclude that income inequality tends to increase social-political instability through fueling 
                                                             
13 Upward mobility means escaping poverty to move into the vulnerable group or moving from vulnerable to middle class (World Bank, 2018).  
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social discontent and lessening social consolidation. The lack of social-political instability and the resulted 
uncertainty will eventually reduce investment and therefore hinders economic growth and mobility. Another 
important governance indicator, Control of Corruption, is not applied in O’ Neil et al.’s research. However, it is 
an important indicator by which Dominican Republic’s social performances are to be assessed. Dominican 
Republic is ranked by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in 2015. Its score for 
control for corruption from the World Bank is -0.8 in 201614. Corruption tends to intensify during 
modernization with the development of new sources of wealth and power and the appearance of new 
classes having new demands on government (Huntington, 2002). The wide-spread corruption between 1995 
and 2016 in Dominican Republic can be linked to the disparity between economic growth and the weak 
government that lacks the capacity for effective monitoring and supervision. Using fiscal decentralization as 
an example, in developed countries, this approach is adopted as an effective means to better respond to 
local population needs and provide greater variety of public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Meriem, Hassan, Ayman 
(2016) insist the decentralization of expenditures has a significant reduction effect on corruption risk in 
emerging and developing countries. However, it is more commonly acknowledged that in emerging and 
developing countries, there might be increased corruption following decentralization. It might be easier for 
local decision makers within a country with relatively weak monitoring mechanism to establish privileged 
personal relationships with the local interest groups (Prud’homme, 1995; Bardhan, 2002). The availability of 
trained local personnel preconditions more efficient decentralized fiscal operations, which local governments 
of emerging and developing countries often lack (Wasylenko,1987). As part of its anti-corruption initiative 
that starts in 2010, the President of Dominican Republic issues a Decree to centralize the procurement of 
medicines in a single government entity in 2015, the operation of which is under the monitoring of a Citizen 
Observatory for Implementation (OCI-IPAC), comprising of 14 civil society organizations (World Bank, 2015b). 
The approach of “centralization” indicates the possible lack of suitable operating context required by 
effective decentralization of expenditure. Its score for the Control for Corruption is -0.8 in 2016 (World Bank, 
2016), 6 years after the Anti-Corruption Participation Initiative launched by the President in 2010, indicates 
the probable failure of this initiative.  
 
Another aspect to analyze Dominican Republic’s social performance is its paradoxical national nutrition 
profile. On the one hand, the per capita calorie intake of Dominican Republic fails to meet the threshold 
value of per capita 2700 kcal per day, which indicates the possibility of the majority of its population failing to 
get sufficient energy intake. On the other hand, Dominican Republic has the overweight rate of 58.4% and 
obesity rate of 23% (WHO, 2016b). Such a paradox can be linked to its embedded social inequality and its 
vicinity, openness and attachment to the western, especially the U.S. market. In developed countries, 
overweight and obesity occur more frequently among the poor, however, the opposite happens in less 
developed countries where in households undergoing nutritional transition, underweight can coexist with 
obesity (Kain, et al. 2003). The increased “westernization” in developing countries like Dominican Republic 
leads to the households with increased income buying energy-intense food (Uauy, et al. 2001; Martorell, et 
al. 2000). Considering the ratio of 40% of its population living under the national poverty line, contrary to the 
trend in more developed countries, people who are overweight or obese in Dominican Republic tend to be 
the relatively wealthy ones who are more likely to be influenced by and have access to the U.S. life style, 
including energy-intensive food.  
                                                             
14 It is 2.2 for both Norway and Denmark, 1.9 for the United Kingdom and 1.3 for the United States 
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HIV/AIDS rate is another health-related challenge on the national level, which is not applied in in O’Neill et 
al.’s research (2018) but is essential when assessing social performances for f the Caribbean region in general 
and more specifically for states such as Dominican Republic and Jamaica where HIV/AIDS rate is closely linked 
to its economic growth. According to a research conducted in 2011 (Padilla, et al.), currently the Caribbean 
region has the highest prevalence on HIV infection outside of sub-Saharan Africa. As of 2007, nearly three 
fourths of the region’s AIDS cases occur in Dominican Republic and Haiti. In Dominican Republic, the disparity 
between the fast growth of its tourism sector and lack of opportunities in other sectors, especially 
agriculture, motivates rural population to migrate to costal tourism zones with higher exposure to HIV/AIDS 
risks. Padilla et al. (2011) regards tourism areas as an epicenter of demographic and social changes linked to 
HIV/AIDS risk, including transactional sex, elevated alcohol, substance use and internal migration. Insufficient 
education restricts the local labor force from taking relatively high-end jobs within the tourism sector. 
Instead, men and women in Dominican Republic are driven by the perception of greater potential 
compensation to get engaged regularly or situationally in sexual exchanges with tourists. According to Padilla 
et al. (2011), the fact that these people also participate in a range of other tourism jobs, including hotel 
work, taxi driving or tour guide services, indicates the fluidity of informal income-generation activities in 
tourism areas and the integration of transactional sex into the broader Dominican tourism economy. The 
high HIV/AIDS rate in Dominican Republic further deprives the country of the necessary social and human 
capital necessary for its long-term development.  
 
From environmental perspective, the economic growth with no proportional social progress inevitably has its 
environmental consequences. Dominican Republic’s CO₂ emission is 2.9 times the boundary value, which 
increases by 17% between 1995 and 2008. In 2008, the household-related CO₂ emission from burning of 
biomass is 2.21 times the emission from burning of fossil fuels. Dominican Republic’s energy market is 
dominated by imported fossil fuels as both primary and secondary sources. The volatility of the oil price is 
one determining factor for the dominating role played by biomass as the main household energy source, 
despite its economic growth. For national production, CO₂ emission from burning of fossil fuels has increased 
by 31% during the same period, which reveals the country’s increasing dependence on fossil fuels with the 
growth of its economy, however, with no associated energy efficiency. The increasingly important role 
tourism plays in the country’s economy will lead to further increase of CO₂ emission and material footprint 
because of the construction of luxury hotels and provisions of a variety of tourism services, considering its 
lack of organizational capacity and technology required by energy and material efficiency (IRG, 2001).  
 
The amount of nitrogen flow, from both synthetic fertilizer and manure, embedded in imported goods, 
increases from 6866 ton in 2010 and 16145 ton in 2011, an 235% increase, which indicates the its heavy 
dependence of strategic imports for its food supply. Despite Dominican Republic’s increasing dependence on 
imported goods as food supply, starting from 2009, agriculture contributes 8% to total national GDP. The 
majority increases in its crop production are attributable to intensification of fertilizer uses (IRG, 2001). It is 
stated in the same report that livestock production also intensifies, which poses threats to water quality from 
manure and processing wastes. The phosphorous flow of Dominican Republic exceeds the threshold value 
whilst the nitrogen flows 93% of the boundary value. Considering the current institutional capacity and the 
education level of its rural labor force, the optimization of fertilizer management remains a tough challenge 
for the country.  
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Country Summary: 
Dominican Republic has been undergoing steady economic growth, but with stagnant social progress and 
considerable stress on its environment. Its satisfaction of 3 out of 11 social outcomes while exceeding 4 out 
of 7 planetary boundaries reveals the vulnerability of the “invalid” economic growth with no proportional 
social progress at the cost of its environment. Within the coupled socio-ecological system, Dominican 
Republic’s lack of social development not only fails to mitigate stress on the ecosystem, but also deprives the 
country of sufficient institutional and human capital necessary for the improvement of its environment and 
social performances.  
 
One root cause for its current systematic vulnerability is its development policy of driving economic growth 
through tax reduction that leads to the lack of investment in public goods and social infrastructure. With 
tourism becoming a primary pillar for its economy, it remains a great challenge for the country whether it has 
the human and institutional capacity required for a more sustainable development mode. It is stated in an 
International Resources Group report that the international tourism is having a detrimental impact on 
Dominican Republic’s coastal resources. With no environmentally sound urban and rural planning, the short-
term profitability brought about by the growth of tourism tends to be outbalanced by further damage to its 
environment and ecosystem. In turn, the degraded environment will not only have direct negative impacts 
on life standards, but will also erode both the economic and social capitals needed for its long-term 
sustainability. For its transition to sustainability, Dominican Republic needs sufficient institutional capacity to 
distribute benefits of its economic growth to the necessary construction of social foundation.  
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5.3 Jamaica 
The World Bank defines Jamaica as an upper middle-income country with the world’s lowest annual growth 
rate, struggling with high public debt and external shocks (World Bank, 2018b). Earnings from remittances 
and tourism accounts for about 15% of its GDP and bauxite/alumina exports have declined, but still account 
around 5% of GDP (Index Mundi, 2018). As one pillar of its economy, Jamaica’s tourism sector differs from 
the rest of the Caribbean in that the US market makes up more than 70% of its visitors. The heavy 
dependence on one sector within one market makes its economy vulnerable to any major external 
fluctuations related to its sole external market. The employment rate of Jamaica in 2007 was 90.3%, the 
highest for the period between 1995 and 2007. It started a downward trend in 2008, dropping to an ultimate 
low of 84.7% in 2013. The fact that the downward trend of its employment rate synchronizes with the 2008 
global financial crisis in the U.S. reflects its overdependence on the U.S. market. As for remittance, this could 
contribute to temporary poverty reduction, but the extent to which a country can benefit from remittances is 
closely related to its institutional capacity and macroeconomic environment (Ratha, 2013). Bauxite might still 
provide a significant contribution to Jamaica’s exports, but it only has a projected lifespan of 40 more years 
(Weis, 2004). In short, Jamaica’s economy is faced with a future beyond its own control. Embedded in such a 
development context are Jamaica’s unsatisfactory environmental and social performances, exceeding 4 out 
of 7 planetary boundaries and satisfying 5 out of 11 social outcomes.  
 
Lying at the core of Jamaica’s vulnerability profile is its weak institutional capacity with multi-dimensional 
social, economic and environmental implications, including marginalized agriculture, fast-growing mass 
tourism with no associated economic growth, and stagnant social progress. Jamaica has been categorized as 
a substantial net importer of livestock-based staples, and the monetary value of imported dairy and meat 
products exceeds the combined earnings from coffee, banana and sugar exports. The lack of growth of 
Jamaica’s traditional agricultural sector in recent years can be partially attributed to its very risky natural 
conditions, which tend to be exacerbated by climate change (Polo et al., 2014). Besides the natural 
environment, the “marginalization of peasantry” and trend of “irrelevance” of agriculture as the result of the 
structural reform, as outlined by The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), also contribute to 
the lack of growth of its traditional agriculture (Thomas-Hope & Jardine-Comrie, 2007; Weis, 2004).  
  
Despite its dwindling contribution to national GDP, agriculture is still the main livelihood in rural Jamaica 
(Polo, et al. 2014). Its marginalization tends to have severe impacts on its rural population, who are already 
victimized by unequal landownership. Jamaica’s land-use matrix, as part of its colonial legacy, has hardly 
evolved since Emancipation in 1838. By the late 20th century, 3% of landowners controlled 62% of Jamaica's 
farmland and roughly 80% of all farmers possessed less than 20% (GoJ, 1992; World Bank, 1993). On top of 
the unequal landownership, the enforced trade liberalization, as part of the structural adjustment, further 
marginalized the rural population because the increased volume of cheap subsidized food imports severely 
constricted local farmers’ access to domestic markets. The forced retreat of the state led to reductions in 
domestic production services where farmers could have received support (Newman & Lefranc, 1994; 
Anderson et al. 1994, Meikle, 1992). Exposed to both limited land ownership and challenges associated with 
agricultural marginalization, the impoverished peasants were driven to turn farmlands into cash crop 
plantations or clear off forests for the plantation of gourmet coffee or bauxite mining (Berglund & 
Johansson, 2004; Lundy, 1999). Such practice has become increasingly widespread because Jamaica’s land 
policy grants landownership if the family land claim is unchallenged over a specific period. Jamaican 
government encourages such efforts because of the mandated export orientation required by the structural 
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adjustment and the country’s desperate need for foreign exchange (Thomas-Hope & Jardine-Comrie, 2007; 
Weis, 2004).  
 
Jamaica’s land-use matrix mentioned above reveals the historical lack of equality within its social system, 
which has been intensified by the fact that despite its declining, agriculture is still the main livelihood in rural 
Jamaica. As a medium high-income country by the World Bank criteria, 98% of Jamaica’s population live on 
more than $ 1.90 a day in 2004. However, the national poverty rate of 14.5% and the fact that the majority 
of its population living marginally close to the national poverty line indicates its social inequality with multi-
dimensional implications (Thompson, 2017). The trend of change related to social equality in Jamaica differs 
from that of the other four countries. Its social equality situation improves between 1996 and 1999, 
however, it deteriorates between 1999 and 2004 with its lowest value in 2004 when the most recent data 
value is available. Besides the declining of its agriculture and its land-use matrix, Jamaica’s “two-layered” 
education system also deteriorates Jamaica’s overall social equality. Jamaica is the only country among the 
five selected ones that experiences decrease in its Gross Enrollment Rate in Secondary School. Starting from 
2009, the performance of its education sector starts deteriorating and in 2015 the Gross Enrollment Rate in 
Secondary Schools reaches its lowest value of 80.6%, 15.8% lower than the threshold value. Its stagnant 
economy during the past decade might have led to less investment, in terms of both time and money, in 
secondary education. Among the population that receive secondary population, its two-tier education 
system restricts the ability of the secondary education to prompt social mobility and reduce inequality 
(Handa, 1996; Levy, 2012). The secondary education in Jamaica is a highly dualistic system where most 
students receive only low quality technical or vocational training. The number of places that offer best 
quality education are limited and highly competitive. Most children that are admitted are from families that 
can afford “extra lessons” to increase their likelihood of admittance. The quality of secondary education in 
Jamaica is closely associated with family income level and further separates the wealthy from the rest of 
population since those who can afford quality education tend to emigrate and bring back remittance to 
further widen the income disparity. Rather than promoting economic mobility and improve social equality, 
education further widens the social and economic gap.  
 
Accompanying its agricultural marginalization is the fast growth of its mass tourism. Jamaica’s vicinity to the 
sea, although exposing the country to climate change-related natural disasters, also endows the country 
with its competitive advantages in mass tourism. The geographical advantage, combined with the 
government’s desperate need for foreign exchange, leads to the fast development of its tourism sector. The 
marginalization of its agricultural sector contributes to the competitiveness of its tourism sector by providing 
the pool of available labour force. The poverty-stricken rural population are attracted by the perspective of 
improving their economic status offered by the tourism sector. Despite its fast growth, however, compared 
with Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba and St. Lucia, Jamaica, although being the largest and most mature and well-
established destination country, has the lowest per capita net receipts (Jayawardena & Ramajeesingh, 2003). 
Jamaica’s foreign exchange leakage from its tourism sector is 40%, in contrast to the average outflow rate of 
10 to 20 percent of the most developed economies (UNEP, 2002). This level of foreign exchange leakage 
reveals the unsustainability of Jamaica’s tourism sector in which the country fails to fully benefit from its 
growth of the tourism at the expense of its own environment. There are multiple factors that contribute to 
Jamaica’s high level of foreign exchange leakage. Although the marginalisation of its agriculture provides the 
pool of the required free labour, the lack of quality education restricts rural labor’s employment to low-end 
manual jobs. Because of the international competition for destination countries and the country’ desperate 
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for foreign exchange, Jamaica has already lost its status as an exclusive resort attracting a relatively smaller 
number of visitors. The compulsory shift to mass tourism has driven the country into a highly developed 
dependency relationship on external market in which the growth of its tourism sector rests with foreign 
agencies because of the lack of domestic human capital. A lot of promotion, recruitment, product design and 
marketing related to mass tourism products occur outside of the country, which leads to the outflow of 
revenues and ultimately the high level of foreign exchange leakage. The country’s heavy dependency on 
imported food supply also serves as one minor but significant determining factor for its foreign exchange 
leakage. A substantial part of the profits generated by the tourism sector have been used to cover the costs 
of expensive imported food, especially meat and dairy products, considering the main composition of its 
tourists (Bélisle, 1984). In the case where the new opportunities provided by tourism cannot keep pace with 
the scale of displacement resulted from the marginalization of the agricultural sector, the social convulsions 
tend to be mitigated by massive emigration (Thomas-Hope & Jardine-Comrie, 2007). Within a decade, about 
one out of twelve Jamaicans emigrate to other countries. The resulted brain-drain has further deprived 
Jamaica of the qualified human capital needed by the more sophisticated part of the activities within the 
tourism sector and deteriorated its foreign exchange leakage.  
 
As mentioned earlier, one aspect of Jamaica’s weak institutional capacity is its inefficient land policy that 
leverages its poverty and social inequality. Another aspect of its weak exercise of authority is its democratic 
quality, the highest score of which is 0.36, 55% lower than the threshold value of 0.8. The two governance 
indicators that comprise of its democratic quality, its Voice and Accountability value is 0.715 in 2016 but the 
value for Political Stability and Lack of Violence is only 0.216. Its weak state power allows relatively higher 
level of freedom of speech and accountability but leads to high level of political instability and presence of 
violence. Crime is regarded as the main public safety issue in Jamaica, with the homicide rates notably higher 
than both the regional and global averages, which poses a serious challenge to its tourism sector. The 
construction of all-inclusive hotels is only a short-term solution that fails to effectively deal with the root 
causes for crime and might eventually intensify social conflicts by excluding the already marginalized 
population from benefiting from its sole fast-growing industry (Boxill, 2004, Levy, 2012; Harriott & Jones, 
2016).  
 
Also associated with the marginalization of its agriculture and the weak institutional capacity is its nutrition 
profile. Assessed by the per capita calorie intake, Jamaica meets the threshold value of per capita 2700 kcal 
per day. However, as Weis (2004) points out, the dominant dietary-epidemiological problem in Jamaica 
might no longer be malnutrition that is usually assessed by per capita daily calorie intake, but rather a 
marked rise in chronic disease-related health problems. Its national overweight and obesity ratios are 58.4% 
and 26.8% respectively and the diabetes ratio is 11.9% (WHO, 2016c). One key contributor to this is the 
“meatification” of diets associated with the declining of its traditional agriculture and the rapid growth of 
fast food chains driven by the high volume of cheap imported goods and pervasive influence of the foreign, 
especially the U.S. market.  
 
Jamaica’s environmental performances collaborate its marginalizing agriculture. For example, its 
phosphorous flows is 1.36 times the boundary value and its nitrogen flows is 65% of the boundary value. 
                                                             
15 It is 1.2 for the UK and 1.1 for the U.S.A., 1.6 for Norway 
16 It is 0.4 f  or both the U. K. and the U.S.A and 1.2 for Norway 
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Both Biochemical Flows are amounts embedded in imported goods because, like Trinidad & Tobago, data 
related to Biochemical Flow from domestic production are not available at Eora MRIO. The lack of data 
indicates possible lack of effective management of its agricultural activities and the resulted heavy 
dependence on strategic imports as food supply. Its most recent eHANPP value is per capita 2.56 C t in 2007, 
slightly lower than the boundary value of per capita 2.62 C t. The fact it decreases from 3.12 C t in 2004 to 
the 2.56 C t in 2007 does not necessarily indicate progress in its performances in preserving the Net Primary 
Product, which is essential for the function of the ecosystem. The fluctuation of its eHANPP value is 
associated with the aggregated feedback of its declining traditional agriculture, the forest clearing off for 
cash crop plantations and mining and its heavy dependence on imported food supply. It is not possible to 
interpret its biomass change based on one value without discussing the interaction of multi-dimensional 
factors embedded in its development process. According to the research conducted by Akunne Okoli (2016) 
as part of his Mater thesis, fiscal and monetary economic shifts imposed by World Bank and IMF’s structural 
adjustment program and the decrease of per person available arable land between 1961 and 2013 are 
possibly positively related to the biomass change in Jamaica and its deteriorating food security (Okoli, 2016; 
Steinberger et al., 2010).  
 
Country Summary: 
Rather than functioning in isolation, biophysical and social factors are all interconnected around a leveraging 
element, which in the case of Jamaica is its weak institutional capacity with the resulted faulty agricultural 
policy and social inequality, all of which contribute to its development profile of stagnant social progress with 
high pressure on its ecosystem. Instead of indicating better or worse environmental performances for 
individual years, its fluctuating trend of change for eHANPP, ecological footprint and material footprint all 
indicate the aggregated impacts of unplanned economic activities on the ecosystem. Jamaica’s CO₂ emission 
is 4.7 times the boundary level in 2008, with the contribution from fossil fuels 5 times that from biomass. The 
contrast between the high CO₂ emission and stagnant social progress in most sectors reveals the lack of 
efficiency in its development process. Considering the fast growth of its mass tourism, it is a tough challenge 
for Jamaica to sustain the benefits from its tourism sectors and ensure the health of its environment. From 
the social perspective, the marginalization of its agricultural sector and high volume of cheap imported goods 
not only deteriorates poverty and inequality but also permeates into other social sector and further deprives 
the country of the human capital required by its transition to sustainability. Jamaica’s fluctuated life 
satisfaction and social support values indicate people’s lack of confidence when exposed to a situation of 
stagnant social mobility and uncertainty. What is needed is strong institutional capacity to reduce social 
inequity and provide quality labour force by offering more livelihood opportunities and quality education, 
especially for the marginalized rural population.  
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5.4 Haiti 
Haiti presents a horrid picture of human development, judged by its social progress and the corresponding 
stress on the environment. Haiti is categorized as the poorest country in the west hemisphere, faced with 
destructive natural disasters and tumultuous political situation17. The 2010 devastating earthquake, with its 
severe socioeconomic and environment “aftershock”, comes on the heels of the destructive hurricane season 
in 2008, only followed by the more devastating Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Hurricane Matthew is reported 
to have caused 585 direct deaths with 546 in Haiti, 34 in the U.S., 4 in the Dominican Republic and 1 in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (Picazo, 2017). There might be other factors associated with the different 
casualty rates, however, the death toll, in a way, does reflect Haiti’s social fragility when faced with natural 
disasters.  
 
Haiti’s social fragility is also revealed by the fact that it not only fails to satisfy any of the 11 social outcomes 
but also as a society, it functions extraordinarily below the threshold level, despite decades of international 
humanitarian efforts. The trend of change related to its life satisfaction and social support values after the 
major earthquake in 2010 clearly indicates optimism in lieu of the large-scaled humanitarian initiatives and 
reconstruction efforts, immediately after the earthquake between 2010 and 2012, and the subsequent 
disillusionment, between 2012 and 2017, caused by lack of true social progress. In contrast to its 
unsatisfactory social performances, in 2008, Haiti exceeded the CO₂ emissions boundary value by 32%. The 
dominating role played by biomass in its energy structure is directly linked to its high rate of deforestation. 
Only 3.52% of its land area in 2015 was covered by forest, in comparison of the global average of around 30% 
(World Bank, 2015). The decrease of its eHANPP between 2000 and 2007 is not necessarily related to 
improvement in terms of biomass preservation. As shown by Figure 14 below, Haiti’s deforestation might 
have led to very limited potential for further biomass consumption. Haiti’s decreasing eHANPP, when 
interpreted together with its failure to satisfy any social outcome, indicates a lack of economic growth and 
social progress, rather than improved efficiency of its production and consumption.  
 
In Haiti’s case, a complex mix of both international and domestic factors and its colonial legacies, as well as 
its geographical location, has led to its current systematic vulnerabilities represented by its unsatisfactory 
position between the environmental ceiling and social foundation. Once France’s most valuable colony in the 
18th century, Haiti is forced to pay enormous reparation between 1825 and 1947 for diplomatic recognition 
and becomes a heavily indebted country. The pressure of paying back the heavy debts is directly linked to its 
deforestation because of the trade of mahogany and other precious hard woods used to reimburse the 
indemnity imposed by France (Maertens & Stork, 2017). In the 20th century the U.S. uses force and 
occupation to ensure Haiti sticks to its repayment schedules (Oxfam 2010). The Haitian-American project of 
manufacturing rubber during the Second World War not only fails to provide any economic benefits but also 
causes the destruction of millions of trees (Maertens & Stork, 2017). Such political and economic evasion not 
only erodes the country’s economic foundation but also weakens its institutional capacity. The weakened 
institutional capacity, as part of its colonial legacy, and the resulted lack of true participation in international 
collaboration serve as major factors that determine its lack of social and environmental progress after 
                                                             
17 Haiti made the headlines in February 2004 when its President Jean-Bertrand Aristide flew into exile and in January 2010 when a 7.3 earthquake 
struck its capital city, Port-au-Prince, killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions. More recently, the international attention focused on the 
cholera outbreaks, the presidential election (postponed several times until early 2017), and category 5 Hurricane Matthew that devastated the south 
of the country in October 2016. http://www.booksandideas.net/The-Real-Story-of-Haiti-s-Forests.html 
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decades of aiding efforts.  
 
As an indicator for governance, Haiti’s score for democratic quality, the unweighted average of Voice & 
Accountability and Political Stability & Absence of Violence, is -0.735. Its endemic corruption also reflects its 
weak monitoring and supervision power. Haiti ranks 177 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and by Brookings Index of State Weakness, Haiti is considered 
the 12th weakest state in the world (Daumerie & Hardee, 2010). Another aspect of Haiti’s weak governance is 
its lack of financial capability to promote revenue mobilization, which considerably restrains the much-
needed development spending in basic infrastructure and services (World Bank, 2016 & 2017). The credit 
imperfections that characterize the Haitian financial market, curtail access to capital of most of Haitian poor 
and constrain the necessary financial capital accumulation to unleash the productive potential and promote 
growth.  
 
Figure 14: Deforestation Comparison: Haiti (left) and Dominican Republic (right) 
 
Another aspect that reveals Haiti’s weak institutional capacity is the urban-rural disparity embedded in its 
development policy. Over 80% of government revenue is drawn from direct taxation of farmers, however, 
Haiti’s overall policies still favor urban commercial development and assembly plants, especially the area 
around the capital area. Haiti’s urban bias leads to soil degradation and deforestation in farmers’ desperate 
but unsupported, both politically and technically, efforts to change their living condition (World Bank, 2017). 
In the late 18th century, Haiti produces 40% of the sugar and 60% of the coffee consumed in Europe. By the 
middle of the 19th century, the over-exploitation of land with no adequate technological support fuels 
significant deforestation and soil degradation (Martin, et al.,2010). Jadotte (2008) states that less than 1% of 
the farms in Haiti use mechanical irrigation and more than 70% of them rely on rainfalls and less than 37% of 
farmers use fertilizers. Haiti does not exceed the boundary value for biochemical flow not because of 
technological innovation or fertilizer optimization but because of inability of its farmers to apply fertilizers for 
production growth. With no sufficient political or economic support, besides over-exploiting the soil for a 
bare subsidence, farmers also turn to forest-derived charcoal as their only source of cooking fuel. It is not the 
poverty-stricken farmers who try to make a bare living but its faulty rural policy that has directly led to Haiti’s 
current severe soil degradation and deforestation (Martin, et al. 2010). The urban-rural disparity also fuels 
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the massive but unplanned and unmonitored migration from rural to urban areas in the farmers’ efforts to 
seek for security and opportunities. 
 
It is stated in the World Bank report (2017) that around the world, urbanization is often positively related to 
the economic growth since the conglomeration of population could provide the required economy of scale. 
In the case of Haiti, rather than by production, its urbanization has been driven by the disparity between 
rural and urban, especially the capital area. The government lacks sufficient institutional capacity and the 
financial capital to effectively manage population density and provide the basic infrastructure. As a result, 
productivity that is usually associated with urbanization has been undermined. Instead, the lack of 
connectivity within the urban areas because of lack of basic infrastructure constrains the mobility of its labor 
market, which in turn leads to high unemployment rate and urban poverty. In 2014, 80% of Haiti’s 9 million 
population live below the poverty line of $2 a day and 54% of this group live in abject poverty (CIA, 2014). 
Not only does its political bias towards urban areas fail to drive growth but also, on top of rural poverty, it 
also leads to urban poverty because of unplanned urbanization with basic infrastructure support.  
 
Haiti’s faulty rural policy and the resulted unplanned urbanization intensifies its social inequality. Jadotte 
(2008) ranks Haiti as the second highest unequal country in the world after Namibia18. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that high levels of inequality might be growth-enhancing because of the alleged higher 
propensity to save of the capital owner relative to the wage earners, Haiti’s embedded inequality affects 
growth negatively. The high-levelled inequality has caused social tensions and political instability, as shown 
by its negative value for democratic quality, which the government with insufficient institutional capacities 
fail to bring under control. This in turn further discourages investment and constrains economic mobility. 
Wide-spread poverty and high income-disparity in Haiti lead to very limited access to quality education of 
those at the lower tail of the distribution. The resulted lack of qualified workforce can be attributed to the 
inflated returns to those limited number of well-educated Haitians. Instead of driving social mobility to 
reduce inequality, education acts a major determining factor in Haiti’s worsening social inequality (Jadotte, 
2008). It is not that the return of education is not high enough to attract investment of time and money. It is 
the wide-spread poverty and the lack of financial support that deprive the Haitian poor of the opportunity to 
achieve economic mobility by receiving education. The relatively better-educated Haitians tend to emigrate, 
and the remittance further deepens the social and economic gaps. The brain-drain further deprives the 
country of the human capital for a more planned and sustainable development. Like an ominous cycle, 
poverty deprives the Haitian poor of quality education and in return, the lack of education further denies the 
poor of opportunities to enhance their economic stance.  
 
The young demographic structure of Haiti, in which the median age is 20 and nearly 70% of its population are 
under 30, is another indication of its wide-spread poverty (Daumerie & Hardee, 2010). One key factor to such 
a young demographic structure is Haiti’s high fertility rate of four children per woman, which is closely 
related to its lack of basic infrastructure and services. Despite the high level of awareness among Haitian 
women of modern contraceptive methods, 57% of women never use any modern family planning methods 
and 38% have an unmet need for family planning (Daumerie & Hardee, 2010). Lack of access to modern 
contraceptive methods and misconceptions about side effects of contraceptives because of limited family 
planning education or health care facilities all lead to Haiti’s high fertility rate. High fertility rate, combined 
                                                             
18 In his study, Jadotte stated at a 95% confidence level the estimated Gini Index lies within the interval [0.6233, 0.6681] 
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with its low healthy life expectancy due to lack of basic social infrastructure, such as health care services and 
access to improved sanitation, results in Haiti’s young demographic structure. The Gallop 2018 World 
Happiness Report records Haiti’s Healthy Life Age in 2017 as 53, which, if interpreted together with the 
percentage of 70% of the population under 30 years old, indicates a small but long-living “elite” group in 
Haiti, another demonstration for its social inequality.  
 
As stated by Daumerie & Hardee (2010), the overrepresentation of one group in a country tends to have 
multi-dimensional social implications. Firstly, a 30-year historical analysis (PAI, 2010) finds that countries with 
very young age structures—those in which 60 percent or more of the population is younger than age 30—are 
the most likely to face outbreaks of civil conflict and autocratic governance. Although there is no proved 
simple causal relationship between age structure and instability, demographics can play an essential role in 
mitigating or exacerbating a country’s development and well-being prospects. Haiti’s young age structure, to 
some extent, can be related to its low social stability and high level of violence. Secondly, a young population 
structure demands intensive investment in human capital, which conflicts with the wide-spread poverty and 
lack of financial support in Haiti. As a result, most of Haitian young are not equipped with the capability to 
improve their personal conditions or contribute positively to the country’s growth (Daumerie & Hardee, 
2010). Haiti’s current age composition means approximately 73% of its population depends on the rest of 
27% that belongs to the labor force. The high unemployment rate of 56.2% means only 15% of its population 
are employed, which makes its economic recovery particularly difficult. The resulted “survival economy” and 
little opportunity to plan for the future lead to decades of large-scaled emigration of those limited number of 
qualified youth (Daumerie & Hardee, 2010). Lack of access to education of the poverty-stricken population 
and the brain-drain caused by the exodus of relatively well-educated youth further deprive Haiti of the 
human capita necessary for its economic recovery and growth.  
 
As the poorest country in the Western hemisphere exposed to severe natural disasters, Haiti has been 
identified as both the “Republic of NGOs” and the “graveyard of development projects” (Ramachandran 
2012; Farmer 2011). Humanitarian aid is essential immediately after the disaster in the provision of rescue, 
food and medical services and supplies. The fact that CO₂ emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 
embedded in imported goods reached its peak in 2010 might mainly be related to the high volume of 
imported goods that flowed into the country immediately after the major earthquake. However, in the long 
run, humanitarian efforts without incorporating Haiti’s development agenda and the Haitian government’s 
active participation in decision-making, might erode the country of its self-reliance, from both political and 
economic perspectives. Amidst the inundating humanitarian efforts, what is underrepresented among the 
power dynamics of states and international actors is Haiti itself. After the earthquake in 2010, of the $2.29 
billion of humanitarian aid from donors, 1% was distributed to the Haitian government (Quigley, 2012). For 
example, most of the humanitarian aids from the United States went out to international nongovernmental 
organizations such as the American Red Cross or private contractors outside of Haiti. Foreign firms use the 
funds they are originally budgeted for Haitian employment for material resources and hire less than one-
fourth of the estimated Haitian workers. Contrary to the benevolence and altruism traditionally associated 
with humanitarian aids, the decision-making and management reflect the interests of international donors, 
service deliverers and certain Haitian local elites with political power, rather than the affected population of 
Haiti (Centre for Economic and Policy Research, 2011). The underrepresentation of Haiti’s true interests 
within the political dynamics, minimal accountability and transparency, and little coordination between 
donors and implementing partners, all contribute to the fact that despite the overwhelming pledged 
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amounts, humanitarian audits still indicate a lack of development and recovery in Haiti (Cunningham, 2012). 
Such failure not only has direct impacts on the satisfaction of social outcomes but also, more importantly, 
deprives Haiti of confidence, both internally and externally, to further invest in a more sustainable 
development route.  
 
Country Summary: 
As the poorest country in the west hemisphere, Haiti exceeds the planetary boundary of CO₂ emission and 
functions just marginally within the boundary for eHANPP. It fails to satisfy any of the social outcomes and 
the percentages of population that have access to electricity and improved sanitation are extraordinarily 
below the threshold values, despite decades of international aiding efforts. The fact that it does not exceed 
more planetary boundaries has much more to do with the lack of social progress than efficiency or green 
orientation embedded into its development process. The weakened institutional capacity, as part of its 
colonial legacy, intensified by both its fragility when exposed to natural disasters and the humanitarian 
efforts with no consideration of Haiti’s development agenda, has led to the weakened rule of law and further 
worsened social environment for investment. The disillusion due to lack of true progress after decades of 
aiding efforts further deprives the country of confidence in investment and human capitals required by its 
sustainable development. Haiti has a long way to go for its transition to a more sustainable development 
mode and what is essential is a strong government that can ensure Haiti’s true interests to be incorporated in 
any international collaborations in which Haiti is involved.  
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5.5 Cuba 
Cuba stands out among these five Caribbean small island states in its political isolation that protects it from 
the subsidized cheap import goods, which is common in the rest of the Caribbean region. Such isolation 
results in its economic hardship but facilitates its small-scaled urban eco-agricultural initiatives and green 
tourism. Although the central control under one party considerably restrains people’s accountability, its 
strong state power ensures its relatively consistent adherence to the national policy of environment 
protection. Its current biodiversity preservation amid the fast growth of the tourism sector reveals the 
relative success of its environmental protection efforts. Its 2008 CO₂ emissions and material footprint values 
both exceeded the boundary values, however, are 25% lower compared with the 1995 values. When 
interpreted in association with the fact that its GDP per capita increased by 79% from 1995 to 2008 (World 
Bank, 2018), the trend of change of its CO₂ emissions and material footprint reveals a relatively more 
sustainable development mode, compared with other nations covered by this research. 
 
From the perspectives of social progress, Cuba presents a mystifying picture. It provides free universal 
education and health care, and the resulted high quality human capital contributes to the development of 
advanced medical services, organic agriculture, and biotechnologies (Stiftung, 2018; Sweig, & Bustamante, 
2013). Despite both the political and economic hardships following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
COMECON states during the U.S. embargo, Cuba achieved 100% access to electricity in 2011, the daily calorie 
intake exceeded the threshold value by 24% in 2012, and the employment rate was 97.4% in 2017. However, 
on the flip side, it is still a nation with an average monthly salary of $32 (World Bank, 2017) and rations are 
applied for daily food supply. Underneath the apparent contrasts between different social aspects is the 
social inequality that is masked by the socialist efforts to provide equal welfare to the whole population. The 
lack of equality tends to deteriorate with its recent economic reform initiatives and has permeated into 
different aspect of its socioeconomic structure. The fact that it is not a topic for open discussion in Cuba 
makes it hard to tackle. Cuba’s equality is estimated as 0.6, the highest among the selected five nations, but 
still only 86% of the threshold value. Racial inequality, as its colonial legacy, plays a major role in its overall 
social inequality structure. In addition, the one-party dominance tends to further intensify the social 
inequality because of the unbalanced power relationship between different social groups. 
 
Racial inequality in Cuba can be traced back to the Spanish conquering and the subsequent arrivals of 
Africans as slaves in sugar plantations in the 19th century. After the slavery abolition, race continues to have 
impacts on people’s legal and social rights, which has major impacts on people’s economic status (de la 
Fuente, 1995; Helg 1995; Fernández-Robaina, 1990). Although private property is eliminated after the 
revolution, the deeply ingrained culture of racism has found its fertile breeding ground where race can 
continue to influence social relations. The capitalist-style initiatives to drive economic growth, such as 
opening the country up to foreign investment and mass tourism, and legitimating private enterprises and 
remittance, all tend to revive the racial inequality embedded within its social system and restrain the 
prejudiced group’s opportunity for economic mobility (Hansing, 2017). It is much easier for white Cubans, as 
the descendants of Spanish colonists, to emigrate to the U.S. or European Countries and therefore most 
families that have remittance as supplementary income are white (Hansing, 2017). Due to Cuba’s current 
imperfect credit system, remittance is nearly the only source of initial capital required by the private 
businesses. Consequently, remittance is not only directly related to the disparity of Cuban’s consumption by 
providing access to expensive consumer goods but also creates the disparity in economic mobility. 
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Hansing (2017) states that the role played by Cuba’s dual currency system in deepening its income disparity 
also has its racial ramification. Only certain sectors, such as tourism, private businesses, foreign joint 
ventures, and family remittances provide legal access to the hard currency, i.e., the Cuban Convertible Peso 
(CUC), about 24 times the value of the traditional Cuban Peso in which normal Cuban salaries are paid. White 
Cubans are not only the major group that have access to remittance but also dominate the tourism and 
foreign joint venture sectors where CUC is paid. By intensifying the colonial heritage of its racial prejudice, 
Cuba’s duel currency system has further deteriorated its social inequality. Hansing (2017) believes that most 
of private businesses are located at private homes, which makes the location of the real estate critically 
important. Most successful private businesses are located at central and well-maintained neighborhood, 
where the owners are dominantly white. In Cuba health care and education have been free, universal rights 
since 1959 (Hansing, 2017). However, the income disparity with its racial implication also has negative 
impacts on this egalitarian aspect of its social system. Families with higher income can afford after-school 
private tutors for their children and the increased quality of education will in turn provide the children with 
more opportunities for economic or political mobility. As for health care, since physicians and doctors in Cuba 
are paid low state salaries in local peso, “little gifts” from the patients’ families will have considerable 
impacts on the quality of treatment provided. Since only wealthy families, which are dominantly white, can 
afford the “little gifts”, income disparity is transformed into disparity in health service, the originally free and 
equal service to all population.  
 
Accompanying its economic initiatives, the political system of one-party dominance also has its impacts on 
Cuba’s social inequality. The World Bank Corruption score for Cuba is between 0.3 and 0.4 during the period 
of 1996 – 2011. It drops to 0.2 in 2012 and remains at 0.1 until 2016. The deteriorating of its corruption 
situation since 2011 can also be related to the development of private businesses in which connection with 
the party leads to business opportunities and personal gains. There have been studies on the correlation 
between the one-party dominance and perceived corruption (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Nurtegin & Czap, 
2012). Although the relationship between corruption and party competition might be complex, there have 
been empirical evidences that in countries with limited political competition, significant corruption is likely, 
despite the fairness of elections. With no presence of election in Cuba, the absolute lack of political 
competition can lead to relatively high level of corruption, despite the party’s original determination to be 
fair and transparent. This new type of inequality driven by the economic reform initiatives is something 
Cubans are not used to (Nolen, 2016). Despite its free education and medical service, the Life Satisfaction for 
Cuban is only 5.4, 17% lower than the threshold value of 6.5. With lack of historical data relevant to Cuban’s 
Life satisfaction, it is not feasible to test whether people are more satisfied with life before the economic 
initiatives. However, it is a hypothesis that deserves research efforts whether it is the economic inequality, 
rather than the low income, that makes Cubans less satisfied with their lives.  
 
Cuba’s political system of socialism under one party’s leadership and the resulted free education and health 
service provides it with a unique social profile in the Caribbean region. Firstly, its democratic quality differs 
from that of any other nations covered by this thesis possibly because of its central political control under 
one party. Cuba’s score for Political Stability and Absence of Violence approaches the threshold of 0.819, 
ranging between 0.5 and 0.6 during the period of 2014 – 2016. However, its score for Voice and 
                                                             
19 The threshold value for Democratic Quality is 0.8 in the Good Life for All within the Planetary Boundaries. It is the unweighted average of both 
Political Stability & Absence of Violence and Voice and Accountability.  
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Accountability is between -1.9 and -1.6 during the 10-year period between 2006 and 2016. In comparison, in 
Trinidad & Tobago, Dominican Republic and Jamaica, due to weaker state power, people enjoy relatively 
more freedom and accountability with lower level of political and social stability. The strong central control 
might, at least in a short term, strengthens the effectiveness of policy and legislation, however, as discussed 
previously, the lack of competition can be also directly related to corruption, which might constrain 
opportunities for a more dynamic and fair development in the long run. The second unique social aspect of 
Cuba is its relatively low fertility rate of the average 1.8 children per woman, the lowest among the five 
nations covered by this thesis. Both being low income developing states, the sheer difference between Cuba 
and Haiti’s fertility rate indicates contextualized non-linear relationship between socioeconomic factors. 
Cuban’s fertility rate has experienced an accelerated historic decline since the 1990s, which leads to the 
annual reproductive rate level falling below replacement within less than half a century (Albizu-Campos, 
2014). The usual theoretical framework supports the inverse relationship between fertility rate and economic 
growth, i.e., the more economically developed a society is, the lower might be its fertility rate. However, 
Albizu-Campos (2014) relates the low fertility rate of Cuba to the decrease in living standard, assessed by the 
monthly real wage. Usually the high fertility rate of the economically less developed society is related to the 
relatively high infant mortality rate, which is not the case in Cuba because of its free health service. In Cuba, 
despite the economic hardship and low income level, women have access to free medical service and 
education, which enables Cuban women to postpone or terminate pregnancy of their own accords. Lower 
fertility rate contributes to lower level of stress on the ecosystem, however, the lack of replacement can put 
stress on the current labor force and slow down the pace of the economic development.  
 
From the environmental perspective, Cuba also presents a unique profile among the five nations in its 
inverse relationship between achievement of social outcomes and stress on the ecosystem. Based on 
available data, Cuba exceeds 5 out of 7 planetary boundaries and satisfies only 6 out of 11 social outcomes, 
which does not suggest an ideal position between the environmental ceiling and social foundation. However, 
its environmental performances should not be interpreted in isolation without considering impacts from its 
colonial legacy and experiences of being one of Soviet Union’s closest allies, and more importantly its recent 
efforts to boost economy on a more sustainable basis. As part of its colonial legacy, Cuban agriculture has 
been characterized by sugar monoculture since the Spanish occupation. Its dependency on the sugar 
industry and the resulted reliance on imported goods for its food supply are intensified by its partnership 
with the Soviet Union (Gonzalez, 2003). The Soviet style of high degree of mechanization, with no 
accompanying efficiency, leads to the large-scaled stated-owned sugar plantations, characterized of being 
capital-intensive, export-oriented and heavily fertilizer-dependent. The lack of product diversification of the 
sugar sector has deprived Cuba of its strategic edge when faced with competition from Brazil. Though 
declining, its sugar industry still plays a major role in its overall economy and continues to consume 
tremendous resources as Cuba’s primary export. The lack of efficiency in the production process and the 
heavy fertilizer-dependency can be linked to Cuba’s relatively high CO₂ emission, biochemical flow and 
eHANPP. It also deteriorates Cuba’s food security since Cuba still imports 60% - 80% of its food and most of 
its population still rely on food ration for their nutritional needs (Salazar-Carrillo, 2013).  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union deprives Cuba of its overseas market for raw sugar and the supply of cheap 
machinery, oil and fertilizers, which forces the government to transform the inefficient state-owned farms 
into smaller agricultural cooperatives and distribute land to private producers and promote the low-input, 
ecologically sustainable agricultural practices. The subsequent U. S. embargo, though further deteriorates its 
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economic situation by excluding Cuba from access to international financial aids and market, however, such 
economic and political isolation has also protected Cuban agriculture from the tough competition of highly 
subsidized agricultural producers in the U.S. and EU. Instead of following the neoliberal agricultural model 
that prevails in the rest of the Caribbean region, Cuba has achieved an unprecedented degree of agricultural 
diversifications and improved environmental stewardship by its eco-agricultural initiatives, though it takes 
time for such initiatives to develop and substantiate.  
 
As part of its economic reform initiatives, Cuba government has been promoting mass tourism to increase its 
foreign exchange. In 2016, the total contribution of tourism to Cuba GDP is 9.6%(WTTC,2017). Consequently, 
the construction of hotels and provision of other tourism-related facilities have revived the production and 
consumption of cement, with its high contribution to CO₂ emission, and material consumption. Experts also 
worry the fast growth of Cuba’s tourism might jeopardize its natural heritage, such as its current well-
preserved coral reef and mangrove forests and cause severe environmental degradation. What is reassuring 
is, in Cuba, sustainable development and environmental protection have achieved constitutional status and 
its environmental record has been relatively promising. The rigidity associated to a strictly centralized state 
ensures, to some degree, tourism delivers benefits without fundamentally harming its environment 
(Velázquez, 2002; Wilkinson, 2008). This might explain why, by WWF criteria, Cuba is the only country that 
achieves both a HDI of 0.8 whilst functioning at the per capita ecological footprint of 1.8 gha per year20.  
 
Country Summary: 
Cuba serves as an exceptional case in that its current economic status contradicts with some of its social 
outcomes. When assessing Cuba’s development process from the perspective of interactions between 
biophysical and human processes, it is essential to compare the pace of social progress with the level of 
associated stress on the ecosystem. Despite the fast growth in its tourism sector, Cuba has maintained its 
biological diversity, especially its coral reef and mangrove forests. Though exceeding the planetary boundary 
values, the CO₂ emission and material footprint values are both 25% lower compared with the values of 
1995. In her paper, Borowy (2011) analyzes the “Cuba-styled” degrowth, which is originally imposed by the 
economic crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S. embargo. The declining production 
and consumption rates, as the result of Cuba’s adaptation to shrinking resources during the so-called Special 
Period, together with the protection offered by its economic and political isolation, forces it to abandon the 
traditional labor-intensive production models and facilitates the transition to a more environmental-friendly 
small-scaled eco-agriculture and ecotourism. Different from Trinidad & Tobago, Dominican Republic and 
Jamaica where the overdependence on one sector leads to lack of investment in social infrastructure and 
services, Cuba’s political structure ensures benefits from its tourism sector can be distributed to support the 
construction of its overall social foundations. Cuba’s development trend provides insights into a model of 
degrowth (Borowy, 2011) in which a satisfying but not excessive life can be satisfied at a proportionally 
decreasing rate of emission flow and resource consumption. However, it takes time for Cuba’s eco-
agricultural initiatives and green tourism practices to substantiate. Cuba is currently still a country that is 
desperately in need of foreign exchange and, due to lack of productivity and finance, has not been well-
positioned to diversify its exports. With the declining of its traditional sugar exports, the real challenge is 
associated with its increasing dependence on its tourism sector. With the normalization of the relationship 
                                                             
20 In this thesis, Cuba’s latest Ecological Footprint in 2014 is per capita 1.91 gha, which is higher than 1.8 gha but still lower than that of countries with 
similar HDI.  
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between Cuba and the U.S, it remains a question whether Cuba can adhere to its principle of ecological 
preservation when faced with the possible capital from the international market and the associated pressure.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 Regional Profile 
The United Nation’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to improve the lives of people and 
increase prosperity within the earth’s sustaining capacity. Given the large number of goals that cover both 
social and environmental performances, synergies and trade-offs between social and environmental goals 
are inevitable. In recent research, Scherer et al. (2018) suggest in general social goals are generally 
associated with higher environmental impacts. However, they also point it out that the nature of 
interactions differs greatly among countries and depend on specific goals. In line of this, no social or 
environmental factors function in isolation, instead, they interconnect with aggregated multi-metric 
implications within individual country’s specific development context. For a country’s transition to 
sustainability, it is essential to assess the achievement of social outcomes and the associated stress on the 
ecosystem within a place-based analytical framework. Only after identifying the vulnerable aspects of a 
nation’s development process, from both environmental and social perspectives can effective strategies be 
made to mitigate the vulnerability for the expected transition to sustainability. 
 
Because of their commonly acknowledged structural limitations and fragility when exposed to climate 
change-related natural disasters, small island states have become the focus of sustainable development since 
the term of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is initiated in 1992. Vulnerability assessment of small island 
states has been conducted by academic institutes, international organizations and government agencies to 
precondition sustainable development study. However, analysis of individual country’s systematic 
vulnerabilities by assessing the interconnections between a nation’s social and environmental performances 
has been rare. This thesis has been one of the first efforts to interpret the vulnerability of five individual 
small island states in the Caribbean region by analyzing their social and environmental performances within 
the Safe and Just Space Framework. The research finding can contribute to sustainable development strategy 
on both national and regional levels by revealing the vulnerable parts of these countries’ development 
processes, which tend to hinder these countries’ transition to a more sustainable development mode.  
 
In contrast to its commonly recognized vulnerable status, the Caribbean region, as represented by these five 
nations, presents a slightly more optimistic profile when compared with the global average. For 7 out of 11 
social outcome indicators, the average of the 5 Caribbean states covered by this research is higher than the 
global average. For 5 out of 7 planetary boundary values, the average of the 5 Caribbean states is lower than 
that of the global average. However, based on their social and environmental performances, currently none 
of these five states are ideally positioned within the safe and just space between the environmental ceiling 
and social foundation. Except Haiti, all other nations exceed at least 4 out of 7 planetary boundaries but none 
of them satisfy more than half of the 11 social outcomes. Haiti, as the poorest country in the west 
hemisphere, exceeds one planetary boundary but fails to achieve any social outcomes. Assessed within the 
Safe and Just Space framework, these nations are all vulnerable but with different vulnerability profiles 
associated with their individual development contexts. None of the five nations reach the threshold values 
for life satisfaction and equality. All of them suffer from marginalization of traditional agriculture and depend 
on strategic imports for food provision. Urbanization in most of these five nations is not driven by production 
but by the urban-rural disparity and is unsupported by social infrastructure, which tends to worsen the 
overall social condition and environmental degradation. All five nations perform badly for democratic quality 
but with different profiles. Trinidad & Tobago, Dominican Republic and Jamaica perform relatively well for 
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Voice and Accountability but unsatisfactorily for Political Stability and Absence of Violence. Cuba performs 
reasonably well for Political Stability and Absence of Violence but achieves a negative value, on a scale 
between -2.5 and 2.5, for Voice and Accountability. Haiti’s values for two indicators are both negative. From 
the perspective of the achievement of social outcomes and associated stress on the ecosystem, Cuba is the 
most promising one for the transition to a more sustainable mode. However, it is a tough challenge for a 
country that is desperate for foreign exchange to maintain its development mode between 1995 and 2008 
when faced with its capitalization initiatives and pressure accompanying the normalization of its relationship 
with countries represented by the U.S.  
 
Instead of being linear, the relationship between these Caribbean states’ biosphere and human factors is 
multi-metric and hard to confirm because of the contextualized interactions. It is not feasible to accurately 
quantify individual country’s vulnerability for comparison since vulnerability tends to evolve in association 
with other socioeconomic and environmental factors. However, despite the multi-metric interconnections, a 
few patterns and correlation between environment and social indicators can be observed on regional level. In 
general, the achievement of most social outcomes such as access to electricity, sanitation, income, nutrition, 
employment, education, social support and life satisfaction are positively related to emission or material 
consumption, such as CO₂ emission, especially from emission from fossil fuels, phosphorous flow, eHANPP, 
ecological footprint and material footprint. Based on performances of these five nations, the achievement of 
social outcomes is not closely related to blue water as one of the environmental performance indicator. 
There does not exist clear positive relationship between environmental indicators and social indicators such 
as healthy life expectancy, equality and democratic quality. 
 
6.2 Small Island States’ Vulnerability 
Within the last three decades of the 20th century, there are three historical shifts related to how small island 
states are conceptualized. In the 1970s, the focus of the literature related is small island states’ economic 
vulnerabilities. During the 1980s, there is a tangible shift from the structuralist critiques towards a neo-liberal 
ideology with its focus on small island states’ export-oriented production. Since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro, prompted by the global preoccupation of green agenda and the increasing attention to climate 
change, the focus of research on small island states shifts to both economic and environmental 
vulnerabilities (Campling & Rosalie, 2006). The tendency of associating small island states’ vulnerability with 
their smallness, remoteness and the resulted lack of scale of economy and limited absorbing capacity fails to 
recognize the intrinsic coping capabilities and resilience embedded in their traditional disaster reduction 
practices that have been eroded by colonialism, neo-liberal development and globalization (Campbell, 2009). 
Small island states’ capabilities to respond positively, collectively and responsibly to challenges that are 
embedded in their traditional beliefs, institutions and communities, together with their confidence in 
autonomy, are undermined and eroded since their initial contact with the European colonists (Baldacchino, 
2005; Connell, 2007). The resulted lack of confidence and self-respect is revealed by the fact that, despite 
economic status and nature of political system, none of the five nations covered by this research meets the 
threshold value for life satisfaction.  
 
The Caribbean region has been depicted as the crossroad of colonialism and its colonization can be traced to 
their first contact with the Europeans in 1492. Sugar cane plantation makes the Caribbean islands the most 
lucrative colonies of the European powers (Wong, 2017). As analyzed earlier, such colonial legacy can still be 
traced in Caribbean states’ soil degradation, biomass change and the biochemical flow into the aquatic 
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system. Bertram (2004) and McElroy (2006) correlate the economic development of small island states with 
their colonial ties, concluding that in comparison with sovereign states that fare poorly in the development 
stakes, island states, through continuing colonial-era ties to metropolitan countries, benefit from such 
economic and political relationships. However, such an analysis neglects the possibility that metropolitan 
powers might have chosen to retain the economically strong territories and give up those weak ones. Haiti’s 
unsatisfactory social and environmental performances and Cuba’s relatively high values of biomass change, 
CO₂ emission, biochemical flow and material footprints, despite its recent more sustainable efforts, can all be 
attributed to their colonial legacy and subordination to stronger powers. Small island states are not born with 
intrinsic vulnerability, rather, their inherent characteristics are transformed into vulnerability in their 
interaction with the rest of the world within the current unbalanced power system. The discourse of 
suggesting that smallness is synonymous with being vulnerable presents small island states as requiring help 
and advice from outside organizations and institutions, which all have their own political, environmental and 
economic agendas (Baldacchino, 2000; Scheyvens & Momsen, 2008). As discussed earlier in this thesis, 
external pressures from the unbalanced global power structure, such as the structural reform imposed on 
Jamaica by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, tend to disrupt small island states’ 
development process with long-term social implications and escalate their vulnerability. The creation of 
protected areas in small island states might undermine local well-being and impoverish population who lose 
entitlements to natural resources essential for their livelihoods (Stonich, 2003). As demonstrated by Cuba 
and Haiti’s different development models, within the unbalanced global power structure, it is not the 
“isolation”, but the interference without respect for small island states’ true interests and autonomy that has 
transformed the small island states’ structural limitations into vulnerabilities. It is then essential to dispense 
with the approach of regarding small island states as victims of their inherent characteristics and focus on the 
root causes for these countries diminishing “buoyance” (Connell, 2007) when faced with external challenges. 
Only after the root cause has been identified and actions taken can small island states be able to truly benefit 
from the international partnership and pursue self-determined sustainability. 
 
6.3 Transition to Sustainability  
Within the analytical framework of the Safe and Just Space, vulnerability reduction can be interpreted as 
providing a good life for everyone whilst keeping the ecosystem within biophysical limits. In a recently 
published paper, Fannings and O’Neil (2018) investigate the relationships between carbon-intensive 
consumption and two dimensions of human wellbeing, physical health and happiness for 120 countries 
between 2005 and 2015. They conclude that there has been no identified relationship between 
consumption, measured in either Gross Domestic Product or carbon footprint, and physical health. However, 
the research indicates countries with declining per capita consumption have significant reductions in average 
happiness. In contrast countries with growing per capita consumption have no significant change in 
happiness. In comparison, happiness is more sensitive to change to GDP than to carbon footprint. To ensure 
happiness within the environmental ceiling, one approach is to “decouple” carbon emission from economic 
growth or more importantly happiness levels must be made less sensitive to declining consumption. Such a 
change might require fundamental cultural shift supported by policies or initiatives to help people reevaluate 
quality of life. Raworth (2012) also analyzes the possibility of meeting basic human needs within the 
environmental ceiling within the Safe and Just Space Framework. She concludes that, in theory, it is possible 
to provide everyone with a satisfactory but not excessive life without pushing the ecosystem further out of 
the biophysical boundaries. She quantitatively demonstrates that, rather than exerting additional stress to 
the ecosystem, the achievement of social foundations is more related to resource redistribution and 
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efficiency. Raworth (2012) estimates that 57% of the global income are in the hands of 10% of the population 
and it requires only 0.2% of global income to end income poverty for the 21% of the global population who 
live on less than $1.25 a day. Reducing global resource consumption and achieving global equality are key to 
the transition into the safe and just space. In the case of five Caribbean nations, their General National 
Income (GNI) is approximately $ 189 billion annually (World Bank, 2013) and the maximum amount needed 
to ensure 100% of its population living on more than $ 1.25 a day is around $ 6.2 billion21, about 3% of their 
annual GNI. The percentage of 3% is higher than 0.2% but Raworth’s (2012) estimation is on global scale and 
this thesis covers only 5 Caribbean small island states that include Haiti and Cuba, two nations with the 
lowest per capita GNI in the Caribbean region.  
 
Raworth (2012) believes the key challenges to moving the population within the environmentally safe and 
socially just space remain such as how this framework could be extended to explore the fair shares of effort 
needed, between and within countries, to bring humanity into the safe and just space. She insists one key 
element to such a transition is a strong government to guide economic growth and achieve general social 
progress within the planetary boundaries through wealth and resource redistribution (2012 & 2014). 
Briguglio (2018), in his study that is focused on small island states, emphasizes the importance of 
institutional governance in achieving economic resilience by using Luxemburg, Estonia, Iceland, Mauritius 
and Malta’ successes as examples. Briguglio (2018) defines economic resilience as an essential part of 
sustainable development, which is the policy-induced ability of a country to withstand or reduce the harm 
associated with external shocks. The lack of sufficient institutional capacity of the Caribbean region, as part 
of its colonial legacy, has been intensified by the discourse of regarding being small as being vulnerable and 
powerless and therefore requiring external assistance and pivots the interactions between its environmental 
and social performances. On country level, farmers in Jamaica cannot take advantage of the fast growth of 
tourism because there lacks the formal marketing system with sufficient governance and technical and 
financial support, which prevents Jamaican farmers from supplying high-quality, competitive priced products 
to hotels on a consistent basis (Rhinoy, 2011). As a region, the evolution of the Caribbean’s agriculture, with 
long-term socioeconomic and environmental implications, reveals the region’s lack of capacity to effectively 
guide economic growth for social progress. Despite their current diversified economic models and social 
structures, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Cuba, all undergo the retreat of agriculture and transition into a 
service economy dominated by tourism. Trinidad & Tobago also abandons its traditional agriculture and 
depends solely on the energy sector. The increasingly declining role played by the agricultural sector as the 
primary domestic food provider can be traced back to the colonial period in which these island states are 
forced into a dual agricultural economy, comprising one or two export crops from large-scaled plantations 
and domestic food production sector dominated by small-scaled farmers (Barker, 1993). Such a development 
model not only leads to soil degradation, excessive biochemical flow into aquatic systems and biomass loss 
associated with large-scaled plantations but also results in desperate need for foreign exchange because of 
the heavy dependence on imported food. After gaining sovereignty, nations such as Dominican Republic and 
Jamaica are inundated with cheap imported food supply, which severely restricts small-scaled farmers’ entry 
into the domestic food market. In Cuba, farmers are faced with the lack of fertilizer and energy required by 
its large-scaled sugar plantations, following the collapse of Soviet Union and the U.S. embargo. The 
government encourages small-scaled urban organic farming, which has great potential for sustainability but 
takes time to substantiate. Its current desperate need for foreign exchange forces the country to continue its 
                                                             
21 Refer to Appendix G for detailed information. 
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dependence on its traditional sugar export, though declining when faced with international competition, 
with relatively high rate of emission and material consumption. In the case of these five Caribbean nations, 
profits from the fast growth of either tourism or energy sector are used to meet the imminent need for food 
provision, with no potential to redistribute profits to construct social infrastructure and encourage economic 
diversification. The lack of economic diversification in turn deteriorates rural poverty because agriculture is 
still the main livelihood in rural Caribbean, despite its declining contribution to GDP. Intensified rural poverty 
and the resulted urban-rural disparity, accelerate unplanned and unsupported urbanization, inequality and 
social instability with both environmental and social implications. Unplanned urbanization intensifies 
environmental pollution because of social infrastructure’ limited aborting capacity and increased 
consumption. From social perspective, the rural-urban disparity and inequality attracts low-cost rural labor to 
relatively higher wage in the tourism sector. However, lack of education constrains rural labor to lower part 
of the tourism service chain and some of rural laborers get engaged situationally or regularly in sexual 
exchanges with tourists for the possibility of higher profits (McElory & de Albuquerque,1990). The high 
HIV/AIDS of the Caribbean region can be closely related to its fast growth of tourism sector and the lack of 
social infrastructure to support a higher-end labor force. Urban-rural disparity also leads to social inequality 
and ultimately, social instability. Lack of effective government control causes the escalation of social 
instability into high crime rate and the presence of violence, which inevitably will erode confidence in 
investment and further impede economic diversification and mobility. The widened social and economic gap 
drives the society into a context of excessive material consumption in which the public try to fill in the wealth 
gap whilst the privileged groups determine to maintain their superiority. As revealed by these five nations’ 
development processes, no socioeconomic or environmental factors work in isolation. Instead, they are all 
pivoted around their lack of sufficient institutional capacity with multi-dimensional implications.  
 
A strong government with sufficient institutional capacity can not only come up with sound policies to guide 
growth and achieve economic resilience and social progress but also revive the social cohesion that is 
embedded in small island states’ community wisdom, practices and value system. Such social capital, which 
enables small island states to respect the force of nature but stay buoyant when faced with challenges, has 
been eroded in their encounters with the rest of the world. The revival of such social cohesion will unite the 
small island states’ people together and help the small island states resume their self-respect and confidence 
in their autonomy. The self-confidence is essential to help the small island states respond quickly and flexibly 
to exogenous changes by learning from their traditional wisdom and customs.  
 
Within the current international power structure and trend of globalization, it is not realistic to expect the 
small island states in the Caribbean region to build up its institutional capacity without interaction with the 
rest of the world. The 17th Sustainable Development Goal includes revitalizing the partnership for sustainable 
development. The overarching theme of the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing 
States held in 2014 is the sustainable development through genuine and durable partnership. Despite the 
high expectation for partnership in small island states’ sustainable development, the current insufficient 
institutional capacity constrains the nations in the Caribbean region to the passive role of recipient in 
international collaborations. The lack of true progress in Haiti after years’ aiding efforts and the worsening 
socioeconomic and environmental performances of Jamaica as a result of the structural reform imposed by 
the World Bank and IMF, as well as Cuba’s high emission level as the legacy of its traditional Soviet-style sugar 
plantations, all indicate partnership with no small island states’ true interests incorporated into the agenda 
not only fails to bring any long-term benefits for these states but erodes their autonomy and potential for the 
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necessary transition. Among the five selected Caribbean nations, Cuba is the most promising one from the 
perspective of the social progress and associated stress on the ecosystem. In a sense Cuba’s Its “degrowth” 
model of reduced production and consumption (Borowy, 2011) benefits from its isolation as a result of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union collapse and the U.S. embargo. However, the role of partnership in achieving 
sustainable development cannot be neglected in small island states’ development process because of the 
urgency for the transition and the interconnectedness between countries on the global level. Based on the 
analysis of these five Caribbean nations’ development process, we can conclude the strengthening of 
partnership goes beyond establishing more partnerships and requires the recognition of small island states’ 
interests and concerns. The building-up of their institutional capacity is contingent to the international 
society stepping out of the mindset of regarding small island states as being inherently vulnerable and 
powerless, respecting their social capital embedded in traditional cultural and practices and acknowledging 
their interests in decision-making on global level.  
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Figure 15: Stress on the Ecosystem and Achievement of Social Outcomes, Regional Caribbean and Global  
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6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
The limitation associated to this study relates mostly to data constraints in terms of data availability and 
accuracy. To maintain consistency and comparability, this thesis uses data from the same sources as those 
applied in O’Neill et al.’s research (2018). However, specific data related to some of these five Caribbean 
small island states’ social and environmental performances are not available for the period covered by this 
thesis. For example, income data are not available for Trinidad & Tobago, Cuba and Haiti for any year 
between 1995 and 2015 at the World Bank Open database. There are no data on General Enrollment Ratio in 
Secondary Schools for Trinidad & Tobago and Haiti at the World Bank Database for any year between 1995 
and 201522. Other databases, research papers and government reports are referred to, and estimations are 
made by following the same rationale as adopted in O’Neill’s research (2018). As for environmental 
performances, the eHANPP data are updated to 2007, provided by Dr. Kastner. Domestic contribution to CO₂ 
emission and material footprints are updated to 2008 at Eora MRIO. At Water Footprint Network, the most 
recent data related to consumption-based blue water use is that of 2005, an average value for the 10-year 
period between 1996 and 2005. The 2011 consumption-based blue water value is estimated based on the 
2005 value by using a factor calculated by comparing the total use of blue water in 2011 (Steffen et al. 2015) 
with the usage amount in 2005 (WFN, 2018). At Eora MRIO, data related to domestic contribution to 
Biochemical Flow is available for only 2000. Adjusting O’Neill et al.’s approach (2018), domestic contributions 
for each individual year between 1995 and 2015 are estimated by using a factor calculated by comparing the 
total use of phosphate and nitrogen fertilizers and the total amount of farm animal manure of individual year 
with the relevant amounts in 2000. Inaccuracy must have occurred in the process of proxy data source 
identification and data estimation. However, the objective of this research is not to accurately quantify 
individual country’s vulnerability, rather, it is to analyze the relationship between an individual country’s 
environmental and social performances over the past decade and identify the key element that might have 
caused its unsatisfactory position within the safe and just space. For future research, more recent data, 
especially consumption-based emission values, can be incorporated into the analysis to identify the 
interactions between these small island states’ more up-to-date environmental and social performances. The 
result can be compared with the results covered in this research to test whether the five small island states 
have made measurable progress in their transition to sustainable development.  
 
  
                                                             
22 For Trinidad & Tobago, data related to General Enrollment Ration in Secondary Schools is available for the year 2004 during the period between 
1995 and 2015.  
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Appendices 
 
A Correlation: Biophysical and Social Performances  
(O’Neill, et al. 2018) 
 
Supplementary Fig. 1. Average values of (a) life satisfaction, and (b) healthy life expectancy, for 
countries based on the number of needs-related social thresholds achieved. Error bars give the 
standard error of the mean. The countries included are the same as in Fig. 2 of the main text (N = 
109). 
 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. 2. Average values of (a) life satisfaction, and (b) healthy life expectancy, for 
countries based on the number of biophysical thresholds transgressed. Error bars give the 
standard error of the mean. The countries included are the same as in Fig. 2 of the main text (N = 
109). 
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Supplementary Fig. 3. The relationship between CO2 emissions (scaled to the per capita biophysical 
boundary) and each of the social indicators. The best-fit curve (as determined by AIC), and the comparable 
R2 value, are shown on each plot. Blue indicates a saturation curve, magenta indicates a linear–log curve, 
and cyan indicates a linear relationship. If no curve is shown, the relationship is not statistically significant. 
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B. Trend of Change: Environmental and Social Performances of the Five Selected Caribbean Nations 
 
Trinidad & Tobago, Environmental Performances, Trend of Change 
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Trinidad & Tobago, Social Performances, Trend of Change 
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Dominican Republic, Environmental Performances, Trend of Change 
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Dominican Republic, Social Performances, Trend of Change 
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Jamaica, Environmental Performances, Trend of Change 
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Jamaica, Social Performances, Trend of Change 
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Haiti, Environmental Performances, Trend of Change 
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Haiti, Social Performances, Trend of Change 
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Cuba, Environmental Performances, Trend of Change  
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Cuba, Social Performances, Trend of Change 
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C. Environmental Performances, National, Regional and Global Comparison 
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D. Social Performances, National, Regional (Caribbean) and Global Comparison 
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E. Data, Environmental Performances 
Trinidad & Tobago 
 
 
Year
CO₂ Emission
 (t/capita/year)
CO₂b Emission 
(t/capita/year)
Total CO² 
Emission
(t/capita/year)
Phosphorous 
(run-off,fertilizer)
(kg/capita/year) 
Phosphorous 
(run-off from manure)
(kg/capita/year)
Phosphorous
(run-off, manure & 
fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year
Nitrogen 
(run-off, fertilizer)
(kg/capita/year) 
Nitrogen 
(run-off, manure, 
kg/capita/year)
Nitrogen
(run-off, manure & 
fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Blue Water 
(m³/capita/year) eHANPP
Ecological Footprint 
(gha/capita /year)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(non-biomass)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(Biomass)
EORA MRIO
Consumption
(non-biomass 
& Biomass) Eora MRIO Eora MIRO Eora MIRO Eora MRIO Eora MRIO WFP Kastner et al GFN
1995 21.31 1.11 22.42 0.76 0.92 1.68 3.21 5.04 8.25 2.67 3.55
1996 22.67 1.08 23.75 0.79 0.96 1.75 3.34 5.25 8.59 2.59 3.56
1997 21.53 1.22 22.75 0.86 1.07 1.93 3.69 5.81 9.50 2.80 3.34
1998 22.69 1.05 23.74 0.73 0.94 1.67 3.14 5.13 8.28 2.79 3.59
1999 25.57 1.04 26.61 0.68 0.89 1.57 2.94 4.85 7.79 3.00 3.59
2000 26.43 0.98 27.41 0.75 0.95 1.70 3.24 5.18 8.41 2.91 3.64
2001 28.60 0.99 29.59 0.74 0.97 1.71 3.22 5.27 8.48 2.65 4.45
2002 30.44 0.98 31.42 0.73 0.98 1.71 3.17 5.31 8.48 2.57 5.59
2003 31.23 1.03 32.26 0.75 0.99 1.74 3.23 5.40 8.63 2.83 6.42
2004 34.70 0.95 35.65 0.79 1.04 1.83 3.47 5.62 9.08 2.94 5.95
2005 38.47 1.05 39.52 0.85 1.09 1.94 3.65 5.92 9.58 110 2.78 7.04
2006 42.39 1.11 43.50 0.84 1.06 1.89 3.60 5.74 9.33 2.50 7.85
2007 44.00 1.57 45.57 0.93 1.13 2.06 3.97 6.16 10.13 2.84 8.78
2008 50.97 1.27 52.24 1.08 1.10 2.18 4.60 5.99 10.59 9.70
2009 52.74 1.14 1.01 1.01 2.02 4.26 5.53 9.78 10.55
2010 54.57 1.05 0.87 0.88 1.75 3.69 4.79 8.48 9.58
2011 56.46 1.10 0.94 0.98 1.92 4.05 5.31 9.36 282 8.25
2012 58.42 1.15 1.00 1.03 2.03 4.28 5.62 9.90 7.99
2013 60.45 1.19 1.00 1.04 2.04 4.32 5.67 9.98 7.64
2014 62.55 1.19 1.02 1.05 2.07 4.37 5.73 10.10 6.69
2015 64.72 1.13 1.04 1.05 2.09 4.42 5.75 10.17
Boundary 1.61 0.89 8.90 574 2.62 1.72
2007/Boundary 1.08
2008/Boundary 31.66 0.70 32.45
2011/Boundary 1.06 1.18 2.15 0.45 0.65 1.05 0.49 4.80
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Dominican Republic 
 
 
 
 
Year
CO₂ Emission
 (t/capita/year)
CO₂b Emission 
(t/capita/year)
Total CO² 
Emission
(t/capita/year)
Phosphorous 
(run-off,fertilizer)
(kg/capita) 
Phosphorous 
(run-off, manure)
(kg/capita)
Phosphorous
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year
Nitrogen 
(run-off, fertilizer)
(kg/capita) 
Nitrogen 
(run-off, manure)
(kg/capita)
Nitrogen
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Blue Water 
(m³/person/year) eHANPP
Ecological Footprint 
(gha/capita /year)
Material Footprint 
(t/year)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(non-biomass)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(Biomass) Eora MRIO Eora MRIO Eora MIRO EORA MRIO Eora MRIO Eora MRIO EORA MRIO WFP Kastner et al GFN Eora MRIO 
1995 2.22 1.82 4.04 0.47 0.79 1.25 1.81 4.72 6.53 2.79 1.32 10.48
1996 2.30 1.89 4.19 0.46 0.82 1.28 1.77 4.91 6.68 2.72 1.40 11.31
1997 2.30 1.85 4.15 0.49 0.81 1.30 1.88 4.88 6.76 2.77 1.50 11.57
1998 2.35 1.67 4.02 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.56 4.78 6.34 2.84 1.61 11.15
1999 2.50 1.67 4.17 0.40 0.69 1.09 1.56 4.15 5.71 2.70 1.67 12.64
2000 2.61 1.61 4.22 0.37 0.66 1.04 1.47 3.98 5.45 2.77 1.69 11.67
2001 2.61 1.72 4.33 0.44 0.68 1.12 1.70 4.07 5.76 2.79 1.72 11.61
2002 2.65 1.69 4.34 0.38 0.83 1.21 1.46 4.98 6.44 2.82 1.72 17.15
2003 2.77 1.62 4.39 0.28 0.79 1.08 1.00 4.76 5.76 2.38 1.48 16.39
2004 2.57 1.63 4.20 0.29 0.87 1.16 1.01 5.22 6.23 2.34 1.39 13.71
2005 2.46 1.72 4.18 0.26 0.87 1.14 1.06 5.25 6.31 130.5 2.42 1.50 13.05
2006 2.61 1.84 4.46 0.35 0.90 1.25 1.38 5.39 6.77 2.60 1.65 11.62
2007 2.71 1.85 4.55 0.34 0.97 1.31 1.35 5.81 7.17 2.78 1.63 13.39
2008 2.91 1.82 4.73 0.37 0.94 1.31 1.46 5.64 7.11 1.59 12.68
2009 2.94 1.82 0.40 0.95 1.35 1.58 5.68 7.25 1.47 13.15
2010 3.07 1.82 0.48 0.98 1.46 1.88 5.73 7.61 1.69 13.90
2011 3.30 1.86 0.51 1.07 1.58 2.07 6.20 8.27 334.08 1.71 15.48
2012 3.32 1.86 0.43 1.05 1.48 1.78 6.11 7.88 1.57 15.63
2013 3.29 1.85 0.43 1.02 1.44 1.75 5.93 7.68 1.62 15.38
2014 3.31 1.84 0.47 1.01 1.49 1.92 5.90 7.82 1.59 15.55
2015 3.32 1.83 0.51 1.00 1.51 2.03 5.83 7.86 15.41
Boundary 1.61 0.89 8.90 574 2.62 1.72 7.20
2007/Boundary  1.06
2008/Boundary 1.81 1.14 2.94 1.76
2011/Boundary 0.58 1.12 1.77 0.23 0.66 0.93 0.58 0.99
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Jamaica 
 
 
 
 
Year
CO₂ Emission
 (t/capita/year)
CO₂b Emission 
(t/capita/year)
Total CO² 
Emission
(t/capita/year)
Phosphorous 
(run-off,fertilizer) 
Phosphorous 
(run-off, manure)
Phosphorous
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Nitrogen 
(run-off, fertilizer) 
Nitrogen 
(run-off, manure)
Nitrogen
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Blue Water 
(m³/person/year) eHANPP
Ecological Footprint 
(gha/capita /year)
Material Footprint 
(t/year)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(non-biomass)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(Biomass) EORA MRIO Eora MRIO Eora MRIO EORA MRIO Eora MRIO Eora MRIO EORA MRIO WFP Kastner et al GFN Eora MRIO 
1995 5.29 1.49 6.78 0.77 0.79 1.55 3.12 4.36 7.48 2.84 1.67 20.08
1996 5.43 1.51 6.94 0.74 0.77 1.52 2.86 4.29 7.15 2.48 1.65 20.79
1997 5.46 1.50 6.96 0.69 0.74 1.43 2.84 4.09 6.93 2.69 1.67 20.60
1998 5.34 1.45 6.79 0.55 0.62 1.18 2.29 3.44 5.74 2.66 1.68 20.05
1999 5.39 1.40 6.79 0.56 0.63 1.19 2.32 3.48 5.80 2.68 1.90 18.82
2000 5.45 1.36 6.81 0.52 0.60 1.12 2.17 3.30 5.47 2.74 1.65 18.86
2001 5.44 1.19 6.63 0.54 0.61 1.15 2.22 3.39 5.60 2.66 1.77 20.26
2002 5.36 1.12 6.48 0.54 0.62 1.17 2.24 3.45 5.69 3.06 1.67 20.59
2003 5.45 1.10 6.55 0.52 0.60 1.12 2.14 3.30 5.44 2.68 1.78 20.99
2004 5.58 1.17 6.75 0.50 0.56 1.06 2.07 3.11 5.19 3.12 1.60 21.60
2005 5.44 1.14 6.58 0.55 0.62 1.17 2.25 3.42 5.67 90 2.98 1.70 21.91
2006 6.22 1.20 7.42 0.57 0.64 1.20 2.33 3.51 5.84 2.80 1.64 24.13
2007 6.70 1.34 8.04 0.60 0.65 1.25 2.45 3.60 6.04 2.56 2.12 20.38
2008 6.35 1.26 7.61 0.70 0.64 1.34 2.86 3.54 6.40 1.40 21.90
2009 6.09 1.17 0.62 0.56 1.18 2.52 3.12 5.64 1.52 22.03
2010 6.08 1.15 0.57 0.52 1.10 2.34 2.90 5.24 1.84 22.16
2011 6.18 1.16 0.63 0.58 1.21 2.58 3.24 5.83 230.40 2.07 22.29
2012 6.28 1.14 0.62 0.58 2.57 3.23 1.77 22.42
2013 6.26 1.12 0.60 0.56 2.47 3.11 1.89 22.55
2014 6.32 1.10 0.61 0.57 2.53 3.18 1.77 22.69
2015 6.36 1.07 0.62 0.57 2.55 3.19 22.82
Boundary 1.61 0.89 8.90 574.00 2.62 1.72 7.20
2007/Boundary 0.98
2008/Boundary 3.94 0.67 3.04
2011/Boundary 0.70 0.64 0.29 0.36 0.40 1.20
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Haiti 
 
 
Year 
CO₂ Emission
 (t/capita/year)
CO₂b Emission 
(t/capita/year)
Total CO² 
Emission
(t/capita/year)
Phosphorous 
(run-off,fertilizer) 
Phosphorous 
(run-off, manure)
Phosphorous
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Nitrogen 
(run-off, fertilizer) 
Nitrogen 
(run-off, manure)
Nitrogen
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Blue Water 
(m³/person/year) eHANPP
Ecological Footprint 
(gha/capita /year)
Material Footprint 
(t/year)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(non-biomass)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(Biomass) EORA MRIO EORA MRIO EORA MRIO EORA MRIO EORA MRIO EORA MRIO EORA MRIO WFP Kastner et al GFN Eora MRIO 
1995 0.22 1.40 1.62 0.06 0.75 0.81 0.85 3.12 3.97 2.32 0.60 2.26
1996 0.23 1.58 1.81 0.06 0.74 0.80 0.76 3.16 3.92 2.35 0.60 2.25
1997 0.25 1.54 1.78 0.09 0.72 0.81 1.27 3.28 4.56 2.46 0.62 2.20
1998 0.23 1.53 1.76 0.07 0.71 0.78 0.99 3.42 4.40 2.44 0.61 2.16
1999 0.24 1.44 1.68 0.05 0.70 0.75 0.75 3.36 4.11 2.52 0.62 2.20
2000 0.23 1.32 1.55 0.09 0.69 0.78 1.25 3.67 4.92 2.68 0.59 2.18
2001 0.26 1.34 1.60 0.07 0.67 0.74 1.07 3.63 4.70 2.53 0.56 2.64
2002 0.27 1.45 1.72 0.07 0.66 0.73 1.04 3.58 4.62 2.47 0.58 2.69
2003 0.26 1.38 1.64 0.07 0.65 0.72 1.03 3.54 4.57 2.39 0.57 2.66
2004 0.28 1.35 1.63 0.07 0.64 0.71 1.01 3.45 4.47 2.34 0.59 2.80
2005 0.29 1.51 1.80 0.07 0.63 0.70 1.00 3.42 4.41 76.3 2.27 0.58 2.82
2006 0.30 1.61 1.91 0.07 0.62 0.69 0.98 3.35 4.33 2.19 0.60 2.75
2007 0.32 1.71 2.04 0.07 0.61 0.68 0.97 3.30 4.27 2.16 0.62 2.89
2008 0.34 1.79 2.13 0.07 0.60 0.67 0.98 3.26 4.23 0.61 2.77
2009 0.35 1.79 0.08 0.60 0.68 0.98 3.21 4.19 0.64 2.81
2010 0.38 1.80 0.08 0.59 0.67 1.00 3.16 4.17 0.68 2.95
2011 0.38 1.81 0.08 0.58 0.66 0.99 3.13 4.12 195.33 0.65 2.90
2012 0.39 1.82 0.08 0.57 0.97 3.11 0.62 2.94
2013 0.39 1.83 0.08 0.56 0.96 3.07 0.68 2.97
2014 0.40 1.83 0.08 0.55 0.96 3.03 0.67 3.02
2015 0.41 1.84 0.08 0.55 0.95 3.01 3.06
Boundary 1.61 0.89 8.90 574 2.62 1.72 7.20
2007/Boundary 0.82
2008/Boundary 0.21 1.14 0.38
2011/Boundary 0.09 0.62 0.11 0.34 0.34 0.38
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Cuba 
 
 
 
Year
CO₂ Emission
 (t/capita/year)
CO₂b Emission 
(t/capita/year)
Total CO² 
Emission
(t/capita/year)
Phosphorous 
(run-off,fertilizer, 
kg/capita) 
Phosphorous 
(run-off, manure
kg/capita) 
Phosphorous
(run-off, manure & 
fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Nitrogen 
(run-off,  fertilizer 
kg/capita）
Nitrogen 
(run-off manure
kg/capita) 
Nitrogen
(run-off, manure 
& fertilizer, 
(kg/capita/year)
Blue Water 
(m³/person/year) eHANPP
Ecological Footprint 
(gha/capita /year)
Material Footprint 
(t/year)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(non-biomass)
EORA MRIO 
Consumption 
(Biomass) EORA MRIO Eora MRIO Eora MRIO EORA MRIO EORA MRIO Eora MRIO EORA MRIO WFP Kastner et al GFN Eora MRIO 
1995 3.95 3.71 7.65 0.36 1.17 1.53 2.28 6.24 8.52 3.68 1.70 16.31
1996 3.93 4.38 8.31 0.33 1.14 1.46 2.07 6.09 8.16 4.07 1.77 18.88
1997 3.81 3.77 7.58 0.41 1.11 1.52 2.71 5.93 8.65 4.18 1.82 18.73
1998 3.71 3.17 6.88 0.34 1.12 1.46 2.19 6.00 8.19 3.43 1.77 17.01
1999 3.77 3.63 7.40 0.24 1.12 1.36 1.48 5.99 7.47 3.39 1.71 15.98
2000 3.84 3.75 7.59 0.25 1.10 1.35 1.57 5.89 7.46 3.61 1.81 17.22
2001 3.74 3.28 7.02 0.26 1.10 1.36 1.63 5.89 7.52 3.73 1.83 14.91
2002 3.81 3.79 7.60 0.23 1.07 1.30 1.39 5.75 7.14  3.80 1.75 15.53
2003 3.80 2.35 6.15 0.12 1.09 1.21 0.56 5.85 6.41 3.59 1.82 12.37
2004 3.71 2.96 6.66 0.16 1.07 1.22 0.86 5.72 6.58 3.76 1.88 12.78
2005 3.68 1.76 5.44 0.13 1.02 1.16 0.65 5.48 6.13 105.7 4.55 1.92 9.79
2006 3.80 1.31 5.11 0.19 1.07 1.26 1.03 5.73 6.76 3.27 1.91 10.51
2007 3.82 1.30 5.12 0.21 1.08 1.29 1.16 5.78 6.95 4.52 1.96 12.84
2008 4.35 1.41 5.76 0.25 1.09 1.34 1.40 5.85 7.25 1.95 13.79
2009 4.21 1.36 0.16 1.10 1.26 0.79 5.90 6.69 1.98 13.00
2010 4.21 1.31 0.19 1.09 1.29 1.03 5.86 6.89 2.09 12.26
2011 4.22 1.26 0.27 1.12 1.39 1.58 5.99 7.57 270.59 2.04 12.04
2012 4.20 1.21 0.25 1.08 1.46 5.78 2.01 11.75
2013 4.21 1.16 0.29 1.09 1.71 5.82 1.96 11.57
2014 4.19 1.12 0.34 1.11 2.12 5.93 1.91 11.29
2015 4.15 1.08 0.31 1.10 1.86 5.91 10.91
Boundary 1.61 0.89 8.90 574 2.62 1.72 7.20
2007/Boundary 1.73
2008/Boundary 2.70 0.67 1.92
2011/Boundary 0.30 1.24 0.18 0.66 0.47 1.19
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F Data, Social Performances 
 Trinidad & Tobago 
 
 
Year
Life Satisfaction
Response Cantril life ladder
(0–10 scale).
Healthy Life Expectancy
No. of years in good health
Nutrition
calorific intake 
(kcal/capita/day) 
Sanitation
Percentage improved 
sanitation
Income
Percentage > $1.90/day
Access to Energy
Percentage access 
to electricity
Education
Gross Enrollmentn ratio, 
Secondary School
Social Support
90% with friends/family 
to depend on
Democratic Quality
Average of
voice and accountability &
 political stability
Equalty
(1-Gini coefficient of household 
disposable income) * 100
Employment
Percentage of employed
labor force
 
Gullup World
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report FAOSTAT  World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank 
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Standardized World 
Income Inequality Databas World Bank
1995 2596 90.3% 87.26% 58.52 82.78%
1996 2640 90.4% 88.15% 58.52 83.75%
1997 2616 90.5% 89.02% 58.54 84.99%
1998 2664 90.5% 89.87% 58.50 85.79%
1999 2674 90.6% 91% 58.49 86.88%
2000 2777 90.7% 91.29% 58.51 87.9%
2001 2832 90.8% 92% 58.51 89.12%
2002 2790 90.8% 93.08% 58.52 89.61%
2003 2749 90.9% 93.85% 58.51 89.5%
2004 2776 91.0% 94.62% 85.51% 58.48 91.7%
2005 2756 91.1% 95.40% 58.46 92%
2006 5.832 60.222 2801 91.1% 96.19% 88.68% 0.185 93.7%
2007 2845 91.2% 97% 94.5%
2008 6.696 60.498 2828 91.3% 97.83% 85.83% 0.209 95.4%
2009 2841 91.4% 99% 94.7%
2010 2841 91.4% 99.30% 96.2%
2011 6.519 60.980 2906 91.5% 99.74% 86.28% 0.331 96.8%
2012 2989 91.5% 99.94% 97%
2013 6.168 61.274 3052 91.5% 99.99% 88.32% 0.288 97.5%
2014 91.5% 100% 97.8%
2015 91.5% 100% 97.8%
2016 100% 97.0%
2017 6.192 61.738 91.60% 95.2%
Boundary 6.5 65 2700 95% 95% 95% 95% 90% 0.80 70 94%
2011/Boundary 1.003 0.938 1.076 0.963 1.053 1.050 0.9 0.959 0.414 0.835 1.029
2013/Boundary 0.949 0.943 1.130 0.963 1.053 0.981 0.360 1.038
2014/Boundary 0.963 1.053 1.040
2015/Boundary 0.963 1.053 1.040
2016/Boundary 1.053 1.032
2017/Boundary 0.953 0.950 1.018 1.013
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Dominican Republic 
 
 
 
 
Year
Life Satisfaction
Response Cantril life ladder
(0–10 scale).
Healthy Life Expectancy
No. of years in good health
Nutrition
calorific intake 
(kcal/capita/day) 
Sanitation
Percentage improved 
sanitation
Income
Percentage > $1.90/day
Access to Energy
Percentage access 
to electricity
Education
Gross Enrollmentn ratio, 
Secondary School
Social Support
90% with friends/family 
to depend on
Democratic Quality
Average of
voice and accountability &
 political stability
Equalty
(1-Gini coefficient of 
household 
disposable income) * 100
Employment
Percentage of employed
labor force
 
Gullup World
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report FAOSTAT  World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank 
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Standardized World 
Income Inequality Databas World Bank
1995 2256 75.2% 84.14% 44% 52.43 84.97%
1996 2175 75.6% 95.1% 85.03% 52.51 83.31%
1997 2153 76.1% 94.8% 85.9% 52.21 84.04%
1998 2141 76.6% 86.75% 54.17% 51.82 85.60%
1999 2149 77% 91% 55.79% 51.45 86.18%
2000 2224 77.5% 94.5% 88.77% 59.04% 51.06 86.29%
2001 2258 77.9% 95.8% 89.79% 51.04 84.48%
2002 2285 78.4% 94.2% 89.75% 67.2% 51.02 84.05%
2003 2143 78.9% 93.2% 89.17% 50.73 83.44%
2004 2216 79.4% 91.4% 90.32% 68.2% 50.72 81.93%
2005 2328 79.9% 94.2% 90.14% 69.75% 50.95 93.52%
2006 5.088 61.642 2367 80.4% 95.5% 90.12% 91.89% 0.049 51.07 94.44%
2007 5.081 61.825 2403 80.8% 95.7% 96.88% 78.08% 84.75% 0.06 51.59 94.93%
2008 4.842 62.004 2352 81.3% 96.2% 97.76% 76.75% 85.01% 0.064 52.29 95.33%
2009 5.431 62.181 2392 81.7% 96.7% 97.86% 78.58% 87.82% 0.044 52.82 94.66%
2010 4.735 62.353 2532 82.1% 97.4% 98.15% 76.02% 86.00% 0.014 53.49 94.98%
2011 5.397 62.521 2562 82.5% 97.1% 97.9% 75.63% 87.21% 0.045 54.01 94.03%
2012 4.753 62.687 2573 82.9% 97.4% 97.87% 76.39% 87.92% 0.188 54.58 93.48%
2013 5.016 62.852 2614 83.3% 97.7% 98.39% 77.60% 87.84% 0.161 54.86 92.93%
2014 5.387 63.014 83.6% 97.9% 98.47% 78.36% 89.06% 0.167 55.30 93.60%
2015 5.062 63.175 84% 98.1% 98.56% 77.82% 89.32% 0.195 55.41 94.08%
2016 5.239 63.335  100% 77.17% 89.48% 0.239 94.22%
2017 5.605 63.496 89.44%
Boundary 6.5 65 2700 95% 95% 95% 95% 90% 0.80 70 94%
2011/Boundary 0.830 0.962 0.949 0.868 1.022 1.031 0.796 0.969 0.056 0.772 1.000
2013/Boundary 0.772 0.967 0.968 0.877 1.028 1.036 0.817 0.976 0.201 0.784 0.989
2014/Boundary 0.829 0.969 0.880 1.031 1.037 0.825 0.990 0.209 0.790 0.996
2015/Boundary 0.779 0.972 0.884 1.033 1.037 0.819 0.992 0.244 0.792 1.001
2016/Boundary 0.806 0.974 1.053 0.812 0.994 0.299 1.002
2017/Boundary 0.862 0.977 0.994
 
 
156 
 
Jamaica 
 
 
Year
Life Satisfaction
Response Cantril life ladder
(0–10 scale).
Healthy Life Expectancy
No. of years in good health
Nutrition
calorific intake 
(kcal/capita/day) 
Sanitation
Percentage improved 
sanitation
Income
Percentage > $1.90/day
Access to Energy
Percentage access 
to electricity
Education
Gross Enrollmentn ratio, 
Secondary School
Social Support
90% with friends/family 
to depend on
Democratic Quality
Average of
voice and accountability &
 political stability
Equalty
(1-Gini coefficient of household 
disposable income) * 100
Employment
Percentage of employed
labor force
 
Gullup World
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report FAOSTAT  World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank 
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Standardized World 
Income Inequality Databas World Bank
1995 2684 80.3% 80.26%
1996 2717 80.3% 96.6% 85.71% 42.81
1997 2697 80.4% 82.04% 43.16
1998 2710 80.5% 82.91% 43.49 84.5%
1999 2725 80.6% 97.4% 84.55% 86.43% 43.82
2000 2729 80.7% 84.57% 85.29% 43.58 84.5%
2001 2798 80.8% 87.71% 84.53% 43.35
2002 2795 80.9% 97.3% 86.68% 84.59% 43.12 85.8%
2003 2810 81.0% 86.94% 84.68% 42.94 88.3%
2004 2792 81.0% 98.3% 87.73% 89.93% 42.79 88.6%
2005 2795 81.1% 88.51% 89.65% 88.7%
2006 6.208 63.745 2792 81.2% 89.31% 90.91% 0.151 89.7%
2007 2791 81.3% 90.13% 92.31% 90.3%
2008 2747 81.4% 92.00% 93.56% 89.7%
2009 2749 81.5% 91.84% 94.53% 88.6%
2010 2762 81.6% 92.72% 91.78% 87.6%
2011 5.374 64.939 2768 81.6% 91.10% 91.62% 85.46% 0.208 87.3%
2012 2754 81.7% 93.10% 86.1%
2013 5.709 65.289 2746 81.8% 95.43% 82.08% 86.49% 0.363 84.7%
2014 5.311 65.434 81.8% 96.35% 81.67% 87.42% 0.294 86.3%
2015 81.8% 97.28% 80.60% 86.5%
2016 98.20% 86.8%
2017 5.890 65.819 91.30% 88.3%
Boundary 6.5 65 2700 95% 95% 95% 95% 90% 0.80 70 94%
2011/Boundary 0.827 0.999 1.025 0.859 1.035 0.959 0.964 0.950 0.260 0.611 0.929
2013/Boundary 0.878 1.004 1.017 0.861 1.005 0.864 0.961 0.454 0.901
2014/Boundary 0.817 1.007 0.861 1.014 0.860 0.971 0.368 0.918
2015/Boundary 0.861 1.024 0.848 0.920
2016/Boundary 1.034 0.923
2017/Boundary 0.906 1.013 1.014 0.939
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Haiti 
 
 
 
Year 
Life Satisfaction
Response Cantril life ladder
(0–10 scale).
Healthy Life Expectancy
No. of years in good health
Nutrition
calorific intake 
(kcal/capita/day) 
Sanitation
Percentage improved 
sanitation
Income
Percentage > $1.90/day
Access to Energy
Percentage access 
to electricity
Education
Gross Enrollmentn ratio, 
Secondary School
Social Support
90% with friends/family 
to depend on
Democratic Quality
Average of
voice and accountability &
 political stability
Equalty
(1-Gini coefficient of 
household 
disposable income) * 100
Employment
Percentage of employed
labor force
 
Gullup World
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report FAOSTAT  World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank 
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Standardized World 
Income Inequality Databas World Bank
1995 1761 19.2% 31.3%
1996 1809 19.6% 30.77%
1997 1839 20% 31.2%
1998 1920 20.3% 31.61%
1999 1956 20.7% 31.99%
2000 1958 21% 33.7%
2001 1897 21.6% 31.54% 45.8
2002 1902 22.1% 33.04% 45.6
2003 1872 22.6% 31.6% 45.4 74.59%
2004 1889 23.2% 33.69% 45.3
2005 1884 23.7% 34.02%  45.1
2006 3.754 49.962 1942 24.2% 33.9% 42.2% 69.3% -1.053 44.9
2007 1970 24.6% 34.73% 44.7 83.2%
2008 3.846 50.664 2014 25.1% 35.11% 67.9% -0.986 44.6
2009 2060 25.5% 35.52% 44.4
2010 3.766 51.374 2169 25.9% 35.94% 55.4% -0.826 44.2
2011 4.845 51.711 2097 26.3% 36.38% 56.7% -0.870 44.0
2012 4.413 52.029 2084 26.7% 46.1% 37.9% 74.9% -0.775 43.8 85.9%
2013 4.622 52.325 2091 27.1% 37.29% 64.8% -0.690
2014 3.889 52.598 27.4% 37.75% 55.4% -0.717
2015 3.570 52.848 27.6% 38.22% 56.4% -0.735
2016 3.352 53.097 38.69% 58.4%  
2017 3.824 53.347 64.7%
Boundary 6.5 65 2700 95% 95% 95% 95% 90% 0.80 70 94%
2011/Boundary 0.745 0.796 0.777 0.277 0.485 0.383 0.444 0.630 0 0.629 0.914
2013/Boundary 0.711 0.805 0.774 0.285 0.392 0.720 0
2014/Boundary 0.598 0.809 0.288 0.397 0.616 0
2015/Boundary 0.549 0.813 0.291 0.402 0.627 0
2016/Boundary 0.516 0.817 0.407 0.649
2017/Boundary 0.588 0.821 0.719
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Cuba 
 
 
Year
Life Satisfaction
Response Cantril life ladder
(0–10 scale).
Healthy Life Expectancy
No. of years in good health
Nutrition
calorific intake 
(kcal/capita/day) 
Sanitation
Percentage improved 
sanitation
Income
Percentage > $1.90/day
Access to Energy
Percentage access 
to electricity
Education
Gross Enrollmentn ratio, 
Secondary School
Social Support
90% with friends/family to 
depend on
Democratic Quality
Average of
voice and accountability &
 political stability
Equalty
(1-Gini coefficient of household 
disposable income) * 100
Employment
Percentage of employed
labor force
 
Gullup World
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report FAOSTAT  World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank 
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Gullup World 
Happiness Report
Standardized World 
Income Inequality Databas World Bank
1995 2325 84.1% 94.88% 76.13% 91.73%
1996 2447 84.6% 95.33% 80.55% 92.39%
1997 2563 85.2% 95.76% 80.73% 92.90%
1998 2651 85.7% 96.17% 93.77%
1999 2898 86.2% 96.56% 80.27% 93.74%
2000 3031 86.7% 97.00% 83.13% 62 94.55%
2001 3076 87.2% 97.28% 85.04% 95.92%
2002 3154 87.7% 97.62% 88.80% 96.69%
2003 3246 88.3% 97.95% 91.68% 97.67%
2004 3346 88.7% 98.29% 90.86%
2005 3254 89.2% 98.63% 92.30% 98.05%
2006 5.418 66.327 3260 89.7% 98.98% 93.66% 96.96% -0.706
2007 3251 90.2% 99.33% 93.38%
2008 3120 90.7% 99.64% 92.72%
2009 3233 91.2% 99.86% 90.94% 98.33%
2010 3160 91.7% 99.96% 91.13% 97.50%
2011 3285 92.2% 100% 91.47% 96.82%
2012 3346 92.7% 100% 90.83% 96.50%
2013 3409 93.1% 100% 92.29% 96.54%
2014 93.2% 30% 100% 98.99% 96.71%
2015 93.2% 100% 100% 97.30%
2016 100% 97.40%
2017
Boundary 6.5 65 2700 95% 95% 95% 95% 90% 0.80 70 94%
2011/Boundary 0.834 1.020 1.217 0.971 0.316 1.053 0.963 1.077 0.000 0.886 1.030
2013/Boundary 1.263 0.980 1.053 0.971 1.027
2014/Boundary 0.981 1.053 1.042 1.029
2015/Boundary 1.053 1.053 1.035
2016/Boundary 1.053 1.036
2017/Boundary
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G: 100% of the Five Countries’ Population Living on more than $ 1.90 a day 
 
 Trinidad & Tobago Dominican Republic Jamaica Haiti Cuba 
Population 1,369,130 10,528,394 2,728,777 10,145,054 11,475,982 
Percentage of living on 
less than $ 1.25 a day 
0 1.9% 1.7% 53.9% 70% 
Amount needed to fill in 
the gap23 
0 $250,049/day $57,986/day $6,835,230 $10,041,484 
Total $17,184,749/day 
Annual Amount: $17,184,749* 365= 6.2 billion  
 
                                                             
23 There is no information related to the exact amount of daily expenditure of those who are reported to live on less than $ 1.25a day. The assumption is they do not have any income at all.  
